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ART. I. — *The Works of the* RIGHT REV. JOHN ENGLAND, *First Bishop of Charleston, collected and arranged under the immediate Advice and Direction of his immediate Successor, the* RIGHT REV. IGNATIUS ALOYSIUS REYNOLDS. Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1849. 5 vols. Large 8vo. Double columns.

THE wide-spread fame of Dr. England as an orator, a divine, a patriot, and a scholar, will doubtless be greatly enhanced by the publication of his works. Some acquire a high reputation for oratory in the pulpit or at the bar, whose discourses, when published, leave us astonished at the weakness of their reasoning, and the flimsiness of those ornaments of speech which fascinated multitudes. Not so with those of the illustrious Bishop of Charleston. His arguments are such as bear the severest scrutiny; his discourses are the compositions of a skilful artist, who combines each part with the other in close union and harmony; his images are natural and striking. It may, indeed, be a matter of surprise to those who peruse the solid and persuasive sermon which he delivered in the hall of Congress in 1826, and which we take to be a fair specimen of his doctrinal discourses, that he could succeed in arresting the attention of popular assemblies on matters better suited to a highly intellectual audience, such as that which he then addressed; but the fact is widely known, that the unlearned, as well as the philosophical inquirer, hung with delight for hours on his lips, whilst he descanted on the evidences of Christianity, and that children fancied they understood what he propounded. This

is accounted for by the plain and clear language which he employed, by his illustrations, which brought sublime truths down to the level of the humblest intellects, and by the life and spirit which breathed throughout, since he acted, but without affectation, all that he spoke. The maxim of Demosthenes, that delivery is the chief qualification of an orator, was illustrated in him, since his long and profound discourses, without this charm, would necessarily have fatigued the attention of his hearers. His gesticulations were almost too animated for the pulpit; but they were perfectly in character, and they gave charm and effect to his appeals. As he stood, with folded arms, pausing at the close of some luminous argument, and surveying his audience, to discover whether they felt and acknowledged its force, all remained entranced. The effect of the oratorical pause was never seen to more advantage. The mind, surveying the chain of reasoning which, link by link, had been formed, admired its beauty, and felt happy in being encircled by its magic power, and made captive to truth. Interrogatories, with the responses, opportunely intermingled, relieved the seriousness of logical exercise, and fixed the attention of all on the point under consideration. We recollect to have heard him in the first Council of Baltimore, above twenty years ago, when he presented the claims of the Church to be our guide in the things of salvation, with a combination of argument and authority not easy to be resisted. At the close, he asked himself in the name of some votary of liberty, — "Do you mean, then, to establish the despotism of authority? Will you have us to renounce reason, and follow blindly the dictates of erring fellow-mortals? Will you deprive us of the liberty of thought?" To each of these questions he emphatically answered, "No." "What then?" said he. "I will only," he replied, "that man be subject to God."

His descriptions were picturesque and animated, bringing, as it were, under the eyes of his audience the scenes which he represented. In treating of the evidence of miracles, he observed that the reality of death can be ascertained beyond all doubt, and, as if a corpse lay before the audience, he pointed to each symptom, — the stiffened limbs, the glazed eyes, the absence of all pulsation, the commencement of decomposition; and, as he proceeded in his scrutiny, he demanded with earnestness, "Is he dead?" The oratorical pause which ensued, and which was wonderfully expressive, left the audience in deep reflection; but on one occasion it was wellnigh being disturbed by almost ir-

repressible laughter, produced by a somewhat ludicrous reminiscence. There sat in front of the pulpit the revered *proto-sacerdos* of the United States, who had been an actor in a scene not dissimilar. In the earlier part of his ministry in Kentucky, he had attended many times a chronic patient, whose sufferings made such an impression on his imagination, that his sleep was disturbed with the painful idea that the afflicted man was buried alive. The man died at length, during the absence of the missionary, who, however, returned in time to assist at the burial. Just before the coffin was deposited, its lid was raised to give the friends for the last time the opportunity of looking on the face of the departed. The priest demanded with earnestness, "Is he dead?" All stood silent and motionless, astonished at the unusual interrogatory, and unaware of the dream that disturbed the imagination of the good father; but, on the repetition of the question, one of the by-standers, who was deemed half-witted, and whose pronunciation was nasal, replied, "I reckon he is; he don't speak." This curious occurrence had long passed away from the remembrance of the aged father; but it was brought fresh to the mind of the younger priest, who sat at his side, and who in his boyhood had assisted at the interment. The vivid description of the Bishop would have infallibly convulsed him in any other place, but a sense of the sacredness of the temple and the solemnity of the occasion enabled him to preserve his gravity, and leave the audience under the influence of the powerful eloquence of the orator.

The outline of his general reasoning on this subject is found in the admirable discourse delivered in the hall of Congress, to which we have already referred. His arguments on the authority of the Church are dispersed throughout the collection of his works. "An Essay and Letters on Infallibility" are, with great propriety, placed at the commencement of the first volume, which will be found to exhibit that accuracy of statement and strength of reasoning which so eminently characterized him. We should be pleased to see it published apart, in pamphlet form, for general distribution, as one of the clearest and strongest essays adapted for general use. The letters to the Rev. Hugh Smith, a Protestant Episcopal minister in Georgia, "On the Judicial Office of the Catholic Church," treat of the same subject under a different point of view, with such happy variety of method, that the reader is not wearied by repetition, but finds delight, as well as an increase of information, in the new phases of the discussion. The same observation ap-

plies to the many essays contained in these volumes, in which the subject recurs. The author seems always to have had present to his mind all he had written, and when he found himself obliged to repeat the substance of former statements, he varied his expressions, or chose a new mode of argument directed to the same end. In his reasoning he appears like a builder engaged in the erection of a colossal monument; he piles argument on argument till the logical structure rises in fair proportions to a height that surprises and overawes the beholder. We know of no work in which the authority of the Church, as a tribunal of doctrine, is treated with greater clearness of diction and power of reasoning, as well as variety of method.

We must, however, take leave to express our regret, that, whilst scrupulously tenacious of the defined doctrines, the illustrious prelate, in the early part of his career, was tinged with those theological opinions which pass under the name of Gallican. Our readers are aware that, ever since the Declaration of the French Assembly in 1682, as to the limits of Papal authority, these opinions have been generally ascribed to the clergy of France, although we believe the majority of that illustrious body never cordially accepted them. In their mildest form they are characterized by a narrow spirit of nationality, which claims for the French Church certain privileges, as immemorially enjoyed, and not to be interfered with or set aside by the Sovereign Pontiff. The most effectual refutation of these pretensions to restrict the exercise of the supreme authority was given by Divine Providence, which so disposed the course of events, that it became necessary, in order to preserve the Church of France from extinction, that Pius VII. should remove her ancient landmarks, and displace the occupants of her sees, to create a new hierarchy, and give her a new organization. This unprecedented act of sovereign ecclesiastical power was performed with the applause of the Catholic world, and with the acquiescence of most of the French prelates, who acknowledged its wisdom and necessity. In ordinary circumstances none are more willing than the pontiffs to respect the ancient usages of local churches. St. Gregory the Great, writing to Dominic, Bishop of Carthage, declared, that, as "he defended his own prerogatives, so he maintained inviolate the rights of the respective provinces."

The relations of the Church to the civil power were, in truth, the great point at stake at the time of the Assembly of 1682. Louis XIV., in the pride of absolute sovereignty, had

encroached on the rights of several bishops, who invoked pontifical interference to prevent the extension of the royal prerogative, styled *regalia*, to matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Innocent XI. acted on their solicitation; but in the strife which ensued, the bishops, overawed by the sovereign, weakly undertook to circumscribe the Papal power. No attempt had been made by the Pontiff to revive the claims of some of his predecessors to a paramount authority over princes, nor was there any likelihood of their revival; but Louis, feeling that it would annoy Innocent to have them formally denied, urged the prelates to declare against them. This declaration was offensive, as well as unnecessary; it was an implied censure on the holy pontiffs, who, in the Middle Ages, had struggled against tyranny by wielding a power which, from whatsoever source it was derived, they actually possessed, and it was calculated to render the civil authority absolute and despotic, by removing moral restraint. Those who deny that the Pope had any divine right over civil governments, cannot on this account close their eyes to the evidence of history, that he was for ages appealed to by princes and their subjects, and that his judgment was sought as to the moral obligations by which they were mutually bound. It was scarcely fair, in these circumstances, to emit a declaration, which, even if true to the letter, was injurious to the memory of illustrious pontiffs, and prejudicial to royalty itself, by the irresponsible character which it ascribed to it. For our own part, we believe that the sanguinary scenes of the French Revolution may be traced to the absoluteness of the monarchy as it existed in the Great Louis, whose maxim was, "L'état c'est moi." The penalty paid by his unfortunate descendant is an atonement for the pride which spurned any superior but God in matters of temporal administration. Monarchs, as well as their subjects, are bound by the moral law, and the abuse of power, if not remedied by the legal deposition of the sovereign, according to the jurisprudence of the Middle Ages, provokes rebellion and bloodshed.

The learned prelate willingly acknowledged that the dispensing power, as it was called, was no usurpation, whilst he denied that it was held by divine right, and traced it to the concession and the institution of the princes and the people of Christendom.* We think it has a higher source. It may not be easy to prove the alleged acts of concession, much less the formal

* Vol. I. p. 168. Vol. II. p. 405.

institution of this power by all the Christian princes and nations. The simplest and justest mode of accounting for its origin is in the nature of the moral ties which bound rulers and their subjects. Allegiance was due to those in power, and it was sanctioned by an oath. Protection and good government were promised by the rulers under the same solemn sanction. There were necessarily limits to the duty of obedience, as it was pledged on conditions which might be violated. When the nations generally professed the Catholic faith, they instinctively were led to appeal to the judgment of their common father to determine whether they were released from the duty, and from the oath by which it had been confirmed. The Pope, whose judgment and interposition were implored, did not, necessarily, exercise any divine right over the temporal powers; he acted only as the authoritative expounder of moral obligation; he was the proper judge of its extent and its limits, and, as interpreter of the moral law, he released subjects from the oath of allegiance, so that his decree was declaratory of an exemption to which the facts of the case entitled them. His absolution from the oath would have been of no account whatever, had not the enormous abuse of power already destroyed the intrinsic force of the obligation, and warranted the sentence. His act was not an exercise of temporal power, direct or indirect, but of spiritual authority, regarding a moral point, on which he was called to pronounce by both, or either, of the parties. Ordinarily the popes and bishops confine the exercise of their authority to the exposition of general principles, which they apply to individual cases only when these are submitted to them by those concerned, or by others having a right, or interest, in their decision. The popes did not act merely in the capacity of spiritual advisers, but as filling the highest judicial station in the Church, and they approached the delicate investigation with all the caution which its importance demanded, and pronounced sentence with that assurance which the facts seemed to warrant, and that tone of authority which their office gave to their judgment.

The integrity of Bishop England's faith on the Primacy, and his devoted attachment to the Holy See, are evident from his erudite essay on "St. Peter's Roman Episcopate," which is found in the second volume, and from other portions of his works; but it was his lot to have pursued his ecclesiastical studies under circumstances not favorable to a just estimate of the pontifical prerogatives. In the struggles of the Catholics of

Ireland, in the early part of this century, for the attainment of their civil rights, the strongest ground of opposition to their claims was the alleged incompatibility of allegiance to the crown with the acknowledgment of the Papal supremacy. The advocates of emancipation, laboring to remove every pretext for this calumny, undertook to circumscribe the pontifical authority within the narrowest limits which the defined dogma would permit. The acts of various popes being objected to them, they were not content with observing, that these were not accompanied with a declaration of the right, or that the declaration was not of that solemn character which constitutes a doctrinal definition. They chose the bolder position of denying the infallibility of the Pontiff. This, if understood of his personal opinions, might be denied without suspicion or censure; but when embracing his most solemn decrees addressed to the whole Church on doctrine, under penalty of excommunication, it clashes with the very general opinion of divines, and the settled convictions of the great body of the hierarchy, founded, as we believe, on Scripture and tradition. We are free to confess, with the eminent author, that it is not an article of Catholic faith, because it has not been formally proposed by the competent authority; and as long as the Church does not attach to its denial the forfeiture of her communion, we dare not cast censure on those who question its correctness: but we deprecate all attempts to forestall her judgment, and embarrass its exercise by unnecessary statements, which may hereafter be alleged as tokens of an adverse tradition. When the civil government, through weak jealousy, demands such a declaration, it may be admissible, since it is a mere statement of fact, which cannot be withheld without serious loss or suffering; but to embody it formally into the constitution of the churches intrusted to his charge was, we think, improper. But for this blemish, these documents, which display much legal as well as ecclesiastical knowledge and great ability, might have received that attentive consideration at Rome to which their intrinsic merit entitled them, and that approbation which the distinguished prelate never could succeed in obtaining, notwithstanding the high personal regard which was cherished for him by the Pontiff.

The official infallibility of the Pope in his doctrinal decisions is necessarily to be presumed, even on Gallican principles. The French clergy, in their famous Declaration, admitted that he was entitled to take a leading part in defining the revealed

doctrines, whilst they denied that his judgment was incapable of being amended, as long as the consent of the Church at large had not ratified it. As the question regards only decrees of faith addressed to the Church generally, it is clear that the consent is to be presumed, unless opposition be speedily and formally manifested. This presumption is especially necessary on the part of the faithful, whom it would ill become to question the judgment of the chief bishop, intrusted by Christ with the feeding of his lambs and sheep, and the confirmation of his brethren in faith. In every government official infallibility is necessarily supposed in the supreme tribunal, from which no appeal lies, since otherwise litigation would be endless. In the Church, whatever questions may be raised as to the relations of the Pope to general councils, the Holy See is the only permanent tribunal, which, if it be not endowed with the prerogative of infallibility in judgment, becomes nugatory for the decision of controversies, since it cannot command the assent of the mind. Yet in all ages it has been deemed competent to decide such questions; recourse has been had, from all quarters of the Church, to its judgment; the decrees of local or national councils have been sent to it for examination; and when a solemn confirmation issued, the prelates of the Church, everywhere, were ready to exclaim, in the words of Augustine, — "The cause is now finally decided."

Thirty years before the holding of the French Assembly, Innocent X., at the solicitation of the bishops of France, had condemned the five propositions which formed the basis of the book of Jansenius. No sooner had the condemnation issued, than eighty-six of their number addressed the Pontiff, declaring that his dogmatical decrees "rest on a divine and supreme authority throughout the whole Church, to which all Christians are in duty bound to give even the homage of the mind." The artifices of the Jansenists, whereby they strove to elude the force of the condemnation, derived coloring from the subsequent declaration of the Assembly, that the judgment of the Pope admitted of amendment, until it had received the assent of the body of bishops; for it was by no means easy to establish the fact of the express and deliberate adhesion of the bishops generally; and the tacit consent was not satisfactory. We may, perhaps, appear superstitious, or enthusiastic, in our frequent remarks on providential interference; but we appeal to the calm judgment of the reader. Does it not look like a special Providence, that, at the very time when lines were drawn

to circumscribe the pontifical authority, its intervention was found necessary and effectual for the extirpation of a most subtle heresy, in the very country wherein the rash attempt was made? The Apostolic See has the glory of crushing Jansenism, as well as the opposite extreme of Semipelagianism, without the aid of a general council, a fact which far outweighs the Declaration of the Assembly.

In the expression of our sentiments on this subject, we feel that we owe no apology to the admirers of the French clergy, or of Bishop England, since we leave to others the liberty which we claim for ourselves, to speak freely where the definite judgment of the Church has not imposed silence. We do not complain because the learned prelate stated, what we ourselves avow, that the official infallibility of the Pontiff is not an article of faith; but we regret the statement in a document like that of the constitution of the diocese of Charleston, and we rejoice that it has been modified and corrected by a note bearing the initials of the present distinguished incumbent of that see: — "The infallibility of the Pope is not of *faith*, i. e. has not been defined and declared an article of faith; but it is generally taught by theologians, and believed by the secular and regular clergy, and by the Christian people, that the *successor* of him for the preservation of whose faith Christ prayed never errs when he speaks *ex cathedra* in declaring the Christian doctrines, or the principles of Christian morality. — I. A. R."

Without wishing to renew the contest on doctrinal developments which some time since was carried on in this periodical with a friend of Mr. Newman, we take leave to express our conviction that this prerogative may hereafter be formally defined. We do not regard it as a mere inference logically drawn from a revealed premise, or as an idea suggested by the Holy Spirit to the mind of the Church in her meditation on the divine truths. The prayer of Christ for Peter especially, that his faith may not fail, strikes us as a revelation of his inerrancy in the office of confirming his brethren. It is manifest that the Holy See has always been acknowledged by the whole Church as a doctrinal tribunal, at which controversies about faith were decided, and the decision was proposed to all the faithful under the highest penalty that the Church can inflict, — separation from her communion. The confidence with which the Jeromes, the Ambroses, the Augustines, and the Peters of Ravenna had recourse to this oracle of Christian truth, shows the deep conviction of its unfailing orthodoxy. It may be

wondered that God permitted any doubt to be entertained of that authority, which he decreed should serve as a pillar of light to guide wanderers in their pilgrimage; but it is still more wonderful, that, amidst the storms of human passion, which beat around the Holy See, its right to judge of doctrine was always admitted, and its decisions were always received by the great body of bishops, so that the harmony of his brethren proved to all that the successor of Peter had faithfully delivered the tradition preserved in his see from the days of the great Apostle. Bishop England himself defied its adversaries to show a single instance of error in a doctrinal decision.

The fact, that no false doctrine has ever been solemnly promulgated by any of the two hundred and fifty or sixty individuals who have occupied St. Peter's chair, is itself a presumptive proof of the strongest character that the Holy Ghost specially assists the actual incumbent, that Peter may always speak by his mouth, and that he lives and teaches in each one of them. A tribunal, which has been in the constant exercise of its judicial powers in matters of faith during eighteen centuries, and is acknowledged, even by many who are unwilling to recognize its prerogatives to their full extent, never to have pronounced an erroneous judgment, is fairly presumed incapable of error. On no human principle can this invariable correctness be explained. Neither the learning nor the piety of the Pontiffs can account for their felicity in judgment: and when we reflect that some few were deficient in personal qualifications, we are forced to admit the superintendence of a special Providence, which has always maintained the doctrine of truth in the chair of unity.

The language used in some places by the illustrious prelate, in regard to the power of the Pope and his relations to general councils, would, no doubt, have been corrected by himself, had he lived to prepare a complete edition of his works. He denies that the Pope has greater power in the Church than the President of the United States exercises in the Union, or than Governor Troup, whose extravagances drew his special attention, claimed in Georgia. He compared the relations of President Monroe to Congress with those of the Pope to a general council. All must admit the inaccuracy of these comparisons and statements. It did not please the Divine Founder of the Church to give her a written constitution, by which the powers of her rulers should be defined. He chose one among his apostles to be his

special representative and vicegerent, to whom he gave a plenitude of authority in the most express terms, and under symbols the most significant. No limits to its exercise are assigned; but those which arise from right, justice, and the general good are essentially implied. We do not find any record of the institution of a paramount authority to check the abuse or control the exercise of the sovereignty thus delegated to Peter; confessedly no permanent tribunal of this character exists in the Church, and it would be an anomaly in government, that the supreme executive should be subject to the control of an assembly for whose convocation no provision was made, or the right of convoking which was vested in the sovereign. We venerate the doctrinal definitions of general councils as we venerate the Gospels of Christ, for the same divine truth is manifested in both, although the words in which it is declared by councils are not inspired; but we cannot discover the character of general councils in any assemblies of bishops, where Peter is not present, in the person of his successor, or by his legates, for, as St. Ambrose remarks, "where Peter is, there is the Church." With great respect, then, for the memory of Bishop England, we take leave to dissent from the positions which, in his earlier writings, he has laid down on the subject. The Pontiff, according to the definition made in the Council of Florence, has full power of governing the Universal Church; which plenitude of power cannot be ascribed to the President in reference to the Union, or to the governor of a State.

At a time when Gallicanism, as it has been styled, is repudiated by the body of the French clergy, who with all their heart cling to the See of Peter, it were to be lamented if it should be revived among us, where no narrow jealousy on the part of civil power exists to foster it. Since the Constitution leaves religious sentiment free, and interferes in no way with the exercise of Church authority, we need not labor to circumscribe it, in order to satisfy the prejudices of individuals. Limit it as we may, it will always appear odious to those who conceive that opinion should be unrestrained; whilst, to those who prize unity, no power will seem excessive which is directed to the maintenance of truth and the building up of the body of Christ. We, indeed, have no fears of the spread of these views, which Divine Providence effectually checked in France by successive revolutions, loosening the ties which bound the Church to the state in servile dependence, and put-

ting the clergy in the happy necessity of looking up to the Father of the faithful with filial confidence and attachment, for guidance, support, and consolation. The Councils of Paris and of Soissons, which have been recently held, furnish unquestionable evidence of devotedness on the part of the French hierarchy to the See of Peter, since they have loudly proclaimed her unfailing faith, and have adopted measures to establish the most perfect harmony, even in ritual details, with the Roman Church, mother and mistress of all churches.

It is a remarkable fact, that a layman shares the honor of exposing the fallacy of that system which received support from an assembly of clergy, with the illustrious Bossuet in their midst. Count de Maistre in his immortal works, *Eglise Gallicane*, and *Du Pape*, has triumphantly vindicated the pontifical prerogative, placed in clear light those facts of history which had perplexed inquirers, and demonstrated that the vaunted liberties of the Gallican Church were but a flattering name for the subjection of its priesthood and prelacy to parliaments and princes. The happy sallies of his wit, the deep cuts of his satire and irony, combined with his luminous reasoning, entertained and enlightened many, who would not have yielded to the profound arguments of Orsi or Gerdil, or to the stringent logic of Capellari. The action of Divine Providence concurred to dissipate prejudices, which more than once threatened schism, — the solemn assemblies of the French clergy, which for a time vied with Rome in pronouncing judgment on erroneous propositions, could no longer be held, — the Sorbonne became a nullity, — the very existence of the French hierarchy and Church was endangered, — and all became conscious that there must be an authority to guide, to govern, to teach, equal to all emergencies, and which, when councils were impossible, could assuredly declare the truth as it is in Christ, and summarily provide for the Church's necessities.

The disputes which have been raised on this point may be accounted for, in part, by the necessary distinction to be made between the personal opinions of the Pope and his solemn definitions of faith. As many Papal acts are not marked by those characters which, by the confession of all divines, are necessary to give them the highest degree of authority, it is not strange that questions should arise as to the circumstances in which a decision should be regarded as final. The concordant acceptance of the decree by the body of bishops, is evidence that it has all the necessary characteristics ; and the unity and

strength of Catholic faith are manifested in the harmony of the episcopal college with their head, so that the decision is thereby invested with an extrinsic and adventitious authority ; but its value in the mind of the believer is derived from the guidance of the Holy Spirit, by which the chief bishop is directed in the discharge of the important duty of feeding the lambs and sheep of Christ. Prophets and apostles were individually inspired, and their declarations were entitled to belief on the authority of God, in whose name they spoke. The Pope lays no claim to inspiration ; but the Holy Ghost, who guides the pastors of the Church into all truth, enlightens him in his solemn judgment, that he may discriminate the ancient faith from human innovation, and maintain it, pure and entire, against every form of error.

The vindication of the moral character of the popes, which is furnished towards the end of the second volume of the works of our author, is a most valuable essay, although, in some few instances, it might be more positive and triumphant. Various other pieces, replete with information and most logical in their texture, will be perused with profit and delight, not only by the ecclesiastical student, but by the general reader. The inquirer after religious truth, whose mind is still clouded with the prejudices of education, or who has drunk from polluted streams of history, can find the solution of every difficulty in the elaborate letters on Blanco White, or in some other of the controversial writings which are contained in these volumes. The local usages of Spain in regard to dispensations and pecuniary contributions are admirably explained in the letters on the Bull of the Crusade. The amount of information, historical as well as theological, contained in the letters on Transubstantiation, addressed to Dr. Bachman, is extraordinary. Our theological students, by an attentive perusal of the works of Dr. England, will be furnished on all points with weapons to resist the adversaries of the faith, and will be prepared for rightly handling the word of truth. Nothing trivial is found in his discourses or writings ; but facts and arguments are spread before the reader in clear language, occasionally adorned with imagery, and rising to the highest order of eloquence. To preach with dignity and effect, it is not sufficient to be master of dogmatic and moral theology, and to have fluency of expression : a knowledge of the history of the Church and of the sects, of the laws and usages of the country, of the modes of thought and of the feelings of those whom we address, is highly important. Bishop England had made a profound study of the prin-

ciples of law, having been originally destined for the bar; he was thoroughly acquainted with the constitutions of the United States and of the various States; he was familiar with our laws and institutions in great detail; he had early observed and justly appreciated the peculiarities of the American character; and his varied acquirements qualified him for addressing the most enlightened classes of the community, as well as the most unlettered, with ease and effect. He was heard with profit and delight by professional men, politicians, and statesmen. The humblest slave was instructed by his teaching, and consoled by his exhortations; whilst senators stood astounded at the depth of his researches, and the commanding character of his oratory. He treated of controversy without bitterness; he confounded his adversary without mortifying him; and when he had brought him to the ground, the benignant smile which lighted up his countenance almost persuaded the fallen foe that it was rather a playful exercise than a feat of chivalry. The last adversary with whom he was engaged was Mr. Fuller, of Beaufort, a Baptist preacher, formerly a lawyer, a man of considerable information and ability. The subject under discussion was the Roman Chancery, against which this gentleman had made a most outrageous charge of pandering to crime. Notwithstanding the exciting nature of the topic, the Bishop conducted the investigation with the most delicate courtesy, as well as with immense Bibliographical erudition; and such was the impression made on the mind and heart of his adversary, that, on reaching Charleston, just after the demise of the learned prelate, he shed tears on receiving the melancholy intelligence. But few controversial writers win the affections of those whom they confute.

Although the Bishop treated with respect the prejudices of the public, he by no means flattered them. He was the fearless advocate of truth, ready to brave all opposition and encounter every danger in its maintenance. He had

> "A heart where dread was never so impress'd
> To hide the thought that might the truth advance,
> In neither fortune loft, nor yet repress'd
> To swell in wealth, or yeeld unto mischaunce."

He felt it, indeed, to be his duty to meet the popular prejudice against the Church, by showing the democratic features of her institutions, in which respect he may have been occasionally betrayed by his zeal into some exaggeration. In a discourse delivered at Boston, on May 14th, 1841, a day of general fast

throughout the United States, he thus refuted the charge of their inconsistency with republicanism: — "The principle of republicanism is the equality of men. We teach that all Christians have a common Parent; that all are equally redeemed by the blood of the Saviour; that all must appear before a common God, who knows no distinction of persons; where, then, is the inconsistency? Look through the records of the world, and see where the principles of true republicanism are first to be found. They had their origin in Christianity, and their earliest instance is in the Church of which we are members. Her institutions are eminently republican. Her rulers are chosen by the common consent; her officers are obliged to account strictly to those over whom they preside; her guide is a written constitution of higher force than the will of any individual. What call you this? Aristocracy? Monarchy? It is republicanism." Here we must acknowledge an oratorical flourish; for in sober truth we cannot affirm that the institutions of the Church are purely republican. The illustrious prelate, on other occasions, distinctly stated that they combine the advantages of each form of government, without the usual evils attendant on them. The Church, we have heard him say in a discourse before the provincial council, has the energy of monarchy, without its absolute character; the wisdom of enlightened aristocracy, without the incubus of hereditary nobility; the equality of a republic, without the fluctuation of popular caprice. Monarchy is represented in her supreme executive; an aristocracy, not of birth nor of wealth, but of merit, encircles the throne; and the democratic element pervades her whole system, because the general good is the object of her government, and all her children are equally eligible to her highest offices. He particularly dwelt on the manifestation of this principle in various religious orders, in which the noble and the peasant stand on the same level; are chosen to offices of trust by the free votes of their fellows, and hold them for a limited period, lest the perpetuity of the charge might generate abuses, and render their remedy impossible. In various parts of his works, the development of these views may be found, which will lead the reader to acknowledge their correctness, and acquit the prelate of any sacrifice of principle to public prejudice, or of any wilful misstatement of facts, to gain for himself an evanescent popularity, or for the Church adherents under the influence of narrow views of her affinity with any particular form of government. He quoted with approba-

tion the words of Hussey, the eloquent Bishop of Waterford : — "As the Catholic faith is a religion preached to all nations, and to all people, so it is suitable to all climes and to all forms of government, monarchies or republics, aristocracies or democracies." *

The letters on Domestic Slavery, which Bishop England addressed to Mr. Forsyth, then Secretary of State of the United States, may create an impression on the minds of European readers, that he yielded to the difficulties of his position by advocating the slave system. We wish he had been spared to continue these learned essays, as he intended, by pointing out to masters the duties which they owe to their slaves, and placing in bold relief the many ecclesiastical enactments made to mitigate the evils of the system. His object was, not to flatter Southern prejudices or to rivet more strongly the chains of the slave, but to relieve the Pontiff and the Church from the odium of disturbing existing relations, with danger of involving society in a servile war. The bull of the late venerable Pontiff against the African slave-trade was represented by the Abolitionists of the North as a condemnation of domestic slavery ; which impression was likely to retard the progress of the Catholic religion in the Slave States, perhaps even to expose the churches and clergy to popular violence, from which they had narrowly escaped a few years before in Charleston. Under these circumstances the zealous prelate undertook to point out the precise object of the Papal document, and the wise economy which the Church had observed in ancient times, on which point he displays vast stores of erudition ; but, at the same time, he fearlessly declared that he was not friendly to the continuance of slavery. We applaud his zeal, admit the correctness of his statements, and unhesitatingly acquit him of all subserviency to local prejudices or interests ; although we should have admired him still more as the advocate of the slave, pleading his cause in the name of humanity and religion. We are not of those who would claim the praise of philanthropy at the expense of social order, and with danger of insurrection and bloodshed ; we know the difficulties by which slaveholders are beset, but we regret their extreme sensitiveness on this point, and the readiness of some to visit with vengeance the mildest expression of sentiment. Their best safeguard is the influence of religion, which would reconcile the slave to the order of Providence,

* Vol. II. p. 419.

secure for him his spiritual privileges and natural rights, and, by ameliorating his condition and mitigating the severity of his lot, prepare him gradually for the enjoyment of liberty. Whatever extenuation of the system may be found in the circumstances in which it originated, or the manner of its exercise, or the dangers attendant on its abolition, the contrast which it presents to liberty — our country's boast — is such as to give us in foreign nations a character of inconsistency, not easily explained away. The principles which form the basis of the Declaration of Independence seem to be forgotten or ignored in regard to our slave population. All friends of the honor and prosperity of the Southern States must desire them to be relieved from the odium of a system which is not in harmony with the general feelings of our age, and which notably retards their advancement. Had Ohio been embarrassed by it, she could never, in so short a period of time, have outstripped her sister States, and attained to the third rank in the Union. The moral considerations, which are of a still graver kind, are easily understood by those who have passed some years in the South.

Bishop England was uniformly kind in his treatment of slaves, and evinced the greatest solicitude for their religious instruction. For this purpose he opened a school at Charleston, under the care of the Sisters of Mercy, whom he had established there; which, however, he was forced to close at a period of unusual excitement. His acceptance of the mission from the Holy See to the republic of Hayti gave such offence to many, that he received an intimation from some leading men, that, if he continued his relations to the colored population of that island, the churches and religious institutions of his own diocese would be endangered. His true Christian philanthropy and independence of character appeared in his pursuing the good work intrusted to him, until the Pope thought proper to release him from a charge highly troublesome, and rendered fruitless by the wily policy of the government of that country. The frankness of his character and the ardor of his temperament ill prepared him for the cold and unprincipled chicanery of mongrel statesmen, who trifled with his generous confidence; as they afterwards sported with the good faith of his successor in the negotiation, — the late Bishop of St. Louis. It was highly honorable to Bishop England to have been chosen by the Holy See for this arduous mission, and invested with legatine powers, and to have received warm commendations from the Pontiff for the zeal and ability which he had dis-

played in the discharge of his high functions. Nowhere is character so justly appreciated as in the court of Rome. National and individual peculiarities are regarded with kind indulgence, — theological opinions which do not harmonize with the teaching of Roman divines are treated respectfully, — and, where faith is entire, morals unblemished, zeal pure, learning and talents eminent, the individual is honored and cherished. In the course of a few years the Bishop of Charleston crossed and recrossed the Atlantic several times, on business of his diocese or in his legatine capacity, and visited the See of Peter, where his talents and virtues, with his admirable candor and affection, won him the esteem and love of the highest dignitaries. The prejudices of his education and political associations in regard to the pontifical prerogatives gave way to the mild influence of learned divines, and to the inspirations which are imperceptibly imbibed at the tombs of the Apostles. His first sermon on his return from Rome, preached in St. Peter's, New York, was on the power given by Christ to Peter.

It is known that Dr. England was the intimate friend of the illustrious O'Connell, with whom he took a conspicuous part in Irish politics. Many persons may imagine that the reverence due to the priesthood is easily forfeited in the struggle for civil rights, and that the voice which proclaims the Divine law should never resound in political assemblies ; yet the circumstances of the Irish people and clergy should be thoroughly understood, before judgment be passed on them for the share they have taken in peaceful agitation. They felt that their influence would animate the laity to hope for their just rights, and to seek them in a legal and constitutional way, whilst it would restrain them from acts of violence and bloodshed. When a child, John England had been conducted by his grandfather to the dungeon in which the aged man had been immured under the operation of the penal laws to prevent the growth of Popery, and, as the youth advanced in years, his spirit burned with an indignant sense of the wrongs of his ancestors and country. With his ardor of temperament and brilliancy of genius, it was impossible to feel no sympathy for his fellow-sufferers, or to restrain its expression. Religion achieved a triumph of which his country might be jealous, when she led to the altar the youth who might have espoused the cause of liberty on the battle-field; but, although a bondman of Christ, the floods of his eloquence beat against the pedestal of the column which was the memorial of the subjugation of Ireland by the Saxon. In

the vigor of life he came to this country, deeply imbued with those political principles which had guided him in his opposition to English misrule. His sympathies with the Democratic party were soon manifested. He exercised his privilege of voting, and otherwise showed the interest which he felt in the cause of his adopted country ; but he did not become an active politician, or forget for a moment the high duties of his ministry. At the crisis which threatened the integrity of the Union, he avowed his opposition to the doctrines of nullification, regardless of the popularity which he might have acquired by flattering the pretensions of the State in which he lived. His letter to the Roman Catholic citizens of Charleston, which is found in the fourth volume of his works, is a model of prudence and impartiality, and well calculated to guard the Catholics against the abuse of the privileges of freemen. He wished them to vote freely and conscientiously, without bias or influence of any kind, according to their best judgment, for the interests of their country. Those who would impose on clergymen entire silence in regard to politics, virtually proscribe them, denying them the rights of the most humble citizen. It is seldom, indeed, that it is advisable for a clergyman to identify himself with a political party, as it is wholly unsuitable for him to become an active partisan, — still less a tool ; but he has rights in common with other citizens, of which, if he exercise them calmly and inoffensively, with a view to the public good, no one should censure or envy his enjoyment. It is his duty to teach his people the moral obligation of using their rights conscientiously, without suffering themselves to be tampered with or deceived by interested and unprincipled politicians, and to caution them against strife, violence, and outrage, that they may act as freemen, and not as making liberty a cloak for malice. We know of no better moral lecture on the eve of an election than the letter just referred to, or the discourse pronounced by him at Boston.

The organization of the diocese of Charleston, which was effected by the late lamented prelate, is developed in the constitutions of the local churches of the various States which composed it, in the addresses of the Bishop to the conventions assembled from year to year, and in the proceedings of those bodies, as reported in the fifth volume. The praise of much legal knowledge, and great skill in adapting the ecclesiastical system to local institutions and usages, must be awarded to the learned author of the constitutions. The candor of his statements, the

force of his appeals, the beauty of his descriptions, the thrilling power of his eloquence, will be acknowledged by all who read his addresses. The proceedings themselves bear a formal and solemn character, which, in some circumstances, would have been highly impressive. The assembling of the lay delegates in one house, and of the clergy in another; the declarations of adhering to the constitution, formally made by the officers in the hands of the Bishop, who presided with princely bearing; the conferences and reports of the two houses; and the confirmation of their acts by the prelate; — all these forms and acts would have been of the most imposing character, had the Catholic population been great, the resources of the diocese considerable, the representatives numerous and influential, and the building in which they assembled suited to the grand occasion. But where the Catholics were few, and scattered over a vast territory, with limited means, the system could not be tested to advantage, and a feeling of disappointment necessarily arises on finding that scarcely any thing was accomplished by the committees charged to raise funds for general purposes. One great benefit, however, resulted from these annual assemblies. The trustee system, which had inflicted such dire evils on the diocese of Charleston, as well as on several other dioceses of the Union, was curbed and broken; the unlimited control of laymen over church property and funds was subjected to the provisions of a constitution which regulated their rights and privileges; and the representative system was adopted in a way to satisfy the cravings of a few for distinction, and yet to make them weary of the trouble and formality. In the mind of the illustrious prelate the constitution was the sovereign remedy for the pretensions of laymen who encroached on sacred ground; and such, in fact, it proved to be, when managed by one who possessed so much energy of character and such personal influence. But we hold it to be a dangerous experiment to ingraft popular institutions on those of the Church, and place the laity in a relation to the clergy, which, if it give them no real power, must prove dissatisfactory. The calamities which at that time afflicted the church of Philadelphia, and that of Charleston, led him to devise this plan, which he no doubt would have submitted to the judgment of his colleagues, had it been then customary for them to assemble in council for the common interests of the ecclesiastical province; but his importunate solicitations for this purpose failed of success until after the constitution had gone into full operation, when the

rights legally regulated could no longer be disturbed. The laity, by the law of Christ, are dependent on the clergy in all that regards the revealed doctrine and the administration of the sacraments ; and under no circumstances can they claim rights over the temporalities of the Church in such a way as to check and control the clergy in the exercise of their spiritual privileges. The simplest way of preventing such interference seems to us to be by general disciplinary enactments, to be made by provincial or national councils, and applied to each diocese by synodical statutes. These could assume a form which even the public tribunals would respect, should unfortunately the necessity exist of seeking the protection of the law against the usurpations of ignorant or bold men who overstep the limits of their office, and seek to lord it over those whom Christ appointed to be their fathers and guides.

The interposition of Dr. England, to remedy the disorders occasioned by the unfortunate Hogan and his partisans in Philadelphia, is an evidence of his zeal and kind intentions, as well as of his unsuspecting charity and confiding honesty ; although, as his letters themselves show, by the contrivance of unprincipled men, it aggravated the evils which then afflicted the congregation of St. Mary's. It is not necessary for us to dwell on so painful a topic, which many will regret to see presented again to the public consideration, so long after that schism has been extinguished ; but history, which is no respecter of persons, does not cast the mantle of oblivion over past disorders. Her lessons are derived from the scandals of former days, as well as from examples of heroic virtue, and she summons from the dead the actors in every variety of scenes, to teach us, by the different results of their conduct, what we should shun, as well as what we should imitate.

> "Là, rétraçant leurs foiblesses passées,
> Leurs actions, leurs discours, leurs pensées,
> A chaque état ils reviennent dicter
> Ce qu'il faut fuir, ce qu'il faut imiter."

The Church in this country owes to Bishop England the celebration of provincial councils, which have given form and consistency to her hierarchy, and order to her internal economy. The venerated Carrol, the first Bishop of Baltimore, when this see was raised to the metropolitical dignity, held a meeting of his colleagues, then newly created, and adopted some few arrangements for their harmonious action. Nearly nineteen years passed without any other episcopal assembly. The distance of

several of the suffragan prelates from the chief see, their poverty, the need of their presence in their vast dioceses, ill provided with missionaries, were serious hindrances to their coming together in council; but it cannot be dissembled, that the weightiest impediment arose from the fear which some excellent men entertained, that such an assembly would occasion agitation among the clergy and people, and lead to rash innovations. The ardent character of the Bishop of Charleston was not calculated to diminish this apprehension. The ceaseless activity of his mind, his peculiar views on certain points of discipline, and his power in debate, were subjects of misgiving, so that little regard was paid to his suggestions, until Archbishop Whitfield was raised to the see. In the first council which he summoned, in 1829, Bishop England used with great moderation the success which crowned his efforts. The ease, the dignity, the power, the beauty of his language, in the unstudied effusions of the council-chamber, or in the conferences with the theologians, were more admirable than the flashes and thunders of his eloquence which amazed the crowded audiences in the public sessions. His moderation of sentiment and courtesy of manner surprised such of his colleagues as had known him only by his reputation as a bold, uncompromising patriot and prelate. Notwithstanding the caution with which his suggestions were received, he succeeded in inducing the adoption of many measures originating with himself, and he readily modified his own views to harmonize with those of his brethren in the episcopate. At his instance, it was resolved to hold the next council after the lapse of the canonical period of three years; but when the appointed time was approaching, the worthy metropolitan shrunk from the responsibility of a second experiment, and it was not until the Sovereign Pontiff intimated his express will, that his repugnance was overcome. We state these facts in no offensive spirit; we respect the motives of the prelate and his advisers; but it is right that the praise of originating and promoting these most important assemblies should be given to the eminent Bishop of Charleston. "Honor to whom honor is due."

We could have wished that the admirable letter to the clergy, and another of great beauty and force to the laity, which were published in the name of the first council, as also the letters of the second and third councils, which are known to be all from the pen of Dr. England, had found a place in the collection of his works. Besides their intrinsic value, they possess an adventitious authority as the expressions of sentiment of these venera-

ble assemblies through their eloquent organ. Should the sale of the works call for a second edition, as we fervently hope, this deficiency may be supplied. It may be right, however, to correct a mistake into which his biographer has fallen, in ascribing to him the Latin letters to the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen, which beautiful productions, worthy of a Cyprian or a Bernard, are from the pen of the lamented Rosati, the late pious Bishop of St. Louis. Dr. England, although an excellent scholar, did not possess that command of the Latin language which would enable him to write it with ease and dignity. His power lay in the use of the English, which he effectually employed in the defence of truth and of his father-land, as well as of the institutions of his adopted country.

Art. II. — *The Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. Morell, A. M. New York: Appleton & Co. 1849. 16mo. pp. 359.

Mr. Morell is, we believe, a Scotchman, and a minister of the Scottish kirk. He first made himself known to our community by a *History of Modern Philosophy*, written from the eclectic point of view, and which we have heard spoken of as a very clever performance. Some views advanced in that work touching the mutual relations of religion and philosophy were supposed to favor modern Rationalism, and the volume before us has been written to develop them, and to show that they are defensible on psychological principles. The volume has attracted no little attention among British and American Protestants, and though it contains nothing new or striking to one familiar with the later developments of Protestantism on the Continent of Europe, or even in our own country, and though it is written in a dry, hard style, without much regard to idiomatic grace or propriety, we have read it with a good deal of interest, and, considering the source whence it emanates, we cannot help regarding it as a remarkable production.

Mr. Morell belongs to the progressive party among Protestants, the party that labors to continue the work of the Reformers of the sixteenth century, and carry it on to its legitimate termination. He retains, indeed, many traces of his Presbyterian and Evangelical breeding, but he departs widely from the formal teach-

ings of his sect, and appears to be fully aware that the formal or scholastic theology of the elder Protestant teachers is without vitality, is, indeed, an anomaly in Protestantism, and at best superfluous in the Protestant economy of life. He seems, also, to be convinced that religion itself cannot be maintained on the ground ordinarily assumed by Protestant theologians, and that, if they continue to retain the rule of private judgment, they must either reject all religion, or else exclude from religion, as unessential, whatever transcends private reason. Determined, or apparently determined, to retain that rule at all hazards, he adopts the latter alternative, and labors with all his learning, energy, and power of analysis, to prove that religion originates in and is determined by an element of our nature; that, in all that is essential to it, it comes within the scope of individual reason, and that it is as philosophically explicable and verifiable as any other psychological fact that passes under our observation. In this he is, unquestionably, faithful to the Protestant spirit, and deserves great credit for his courage and consistency. But although he in this strikes a mortal blow at all dogmatic Protestantism, and, in reality, resolves modern Evangelicalism into mere sentimentalism, which is all very well, he goes, perhaps, farther than he intends, and certainly farther than we can go with him. We cannot bring all religion within the scope of private reason, without excluding as unessential all that is supernatural, and therefore not without excluding all that is peculiarly and distinctively Christian. Mr. Morell, then, whatever his intentions, really rejects the Christian religion itself, and is even a more dangerous enemy to it than he would be if he confessedly arranged himself on the side of its open and avowed enemies. However conclusive his work may be against his own sect, we cannot, therefore, commend it, for even Presbyterianism is better than total apostasy, — than absolute incredulity.

The very title Mr. Morell gives his work, *The Philosophy of Religion*, proves that he is either consciously hostile to religion, or totally ignorant of its real nature. There is and can be no philosophy of religion. Religion must be regarded either as natural religion or as revealed religion. As natural, since philosophy is simply natural theology, it and philosophy are identically one and the same thing, and it is as absurd to talk of the philosophy of religion as of the philosophy of philosophy. As revealed, religion is above philosophy, not accountable to it, nor explicable on its principles. A philoso-

phy of religion is conceivable only on the supposition that religion is below philosophy; a special discipline, like physics or æsthetics, under philosophy, deriving its principles from it, and bound to apply them according to its commands. The author sees this, and therefore attempts to relegate religion to a single department of human nature, and to confine it to a single class of human emotions. But this is manifestly false and absurd; for religion, if any thing at all, is no special discipline, but the queen of all disciplines, giving the law to all special disciplines, and receiving it from none.

The author does not lack ability and industry, and we cheerfully concede him considerable philosophical aptitude; but, with all his pretensions, he is no real philosopher. He is misled by the psychological method of modern philosophy, and mistakes philosophy no less than Christianity. He is a mere psychologist, or rather psychologue, and gives us as the result of his painful philosophizing only miserable psychologism, which, we need not tell our readers, is as far removed from philosophy as any thing well can be. Taking the human soul, or, in modern language, the facts of consciousness, for its point of departure, and the Cartesian doubt for its method, psychologism necessarily, as we have heretofore shown, results on the one hand in sensism;* and on the other in pantheism, both of which, in their turn, necessarily result in Pyrrhonism and nullism or nihilism. That Mr. Morell is a mere psychologue, even in religion as well as in philosophy, is evident enough from the very design of his book, and is proved by the following extract from his opening chapter.

"Whatever may be the religion proper to man, its real nature, and its possible intensity, must depend upon the constitution of the human mind. If the human faculties were of a lower order than they really are, it is obvious that our religious consciousness could never reach the standard to which it now rightly aspires. The reason of this becomes manifest, when we consider, that under such circumstances the real objects of religious worship could not be in the same sense accessible to us; and that, as a natural consequence of this, the emotions arising from their contemplation must be proportionably modified and diminished. If, on the other hand, we

* We venture to introduce *sensism* from the scholastic Latin *sensismus*, or the Italian *il sensismo*, as more appropriate than the Fench *sensualisme*, which, though the more ordinary term, has, in English, a practical rather than a speculative sense *Psychologism* and *psychologue* we use in a bad, and *psychology* and *psychologist* in a good sense, agreeably to the practice of some recent writers in our language.

possessed a combination of faculties of an order superior to those which the human mind now enjoys, then our enlarged powers of thought and feeling, and the widened range of our actual experience, would naturally elevate our whole religious being, when once awakened, to a proportionally higher degree of development. Accordingly, since the whole aspect of our religious experiences must depend upon the natural capacities with which we have been endowed, our first object in discussing the *philosophy of religion* must be to make some inquiry into the powers and faculties of the human mind. . . . . .

"By this process of analysis we find at length that the central point of our consciousness — that which makes each man what he is in distinction from every other man, — that which expresses the real concrete essence of the mind, apart from its regulative laws and formal processes — is *the will*. Will expresses power, spontaneity, the capacity of acting independently, and for ourselves. If this spontaneity be withdrawn, our life sinks down at once into a mere link in that mighty chain of cause and effect by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time. Without will man would flow back from the elevation he now assumes, to the level of impersonal nature, — in a word, we should then be *things*, and not *men* at all. Spontaneity, personality, will, self, — these, then, and all similar words, express as nearly as possible the *essential nature or principle* of the human mind. We do not say, indeed, that we can comprehend the very essence of the soul itself, *apart* from all its determinations; but that, by deep reflection upon our inmost consciousness, we can comprehend the essence of the soul in connection with its operations; that we can trace it through all its changes as a *power* or pure activity; and that in this spontaneous activity alone our real personality consists. If, therefore, in our subsequent classification of the faculties of the mind, little appears to be said about the will, it must be remembered that we assume the activity it denotes as the essential basis of our whole mental being, and suppose it consequently to *underlie* all our mental operations. . . . . .

"Between the intellectual and the emotional activity, however, there always subsists a direct correspondency. Just on the same principle as we saw that a higher development of our whole intellectual capacity would imply a possibly higher development of the religious nature; so also in every succeeding stage to which the consciousness, intellectually speaking, attains, there is always associated with such an advancement a proportionally higher order of emotion. Our intellectual and our emotional life, in fact, run parallel with one another, and develop themselves correlatively; so that we may draw out a table of the successive stages of human consciousness in the following manner: —

MIND
commencing in
MERE FEELING (undeveloped unity)
evinces a
TWOFOLD ACTIVITY.

	I. *Intellectual.*		II. *Emotional.*
1st Stage.	The Sensational consciousness	(to which correspond)	The Instincts.
2d Stage.	The Perceptive consciousness	"	Animal Passions.
3d Stage.	The Logical consciousness	"	Relational Emotions.
4th Stage.	The Intuitional consciousness	"	Æsthetic, moral, and religious Emotions.

meeting in

FAITH — (highest or developed unity)."

— pp. 35 – 38.

This extract, to the intelligent reader, proves not only the psychological character of the work, but that its psychology, even as psychology, is defective and false. That such would be its character was to be expected from the author's method. M. Cousin holds that it is possible to rise by psychological analysis to ontology, or the science of being, but this the author, in what he says of the "intuitional consciousness," very properly rejects; yet he does not seem aware that psychology no more than ontology can be psychologically constructed. To be of the least value, our psychology, as well as our ontology, must be ontologically derived; for, as we shall have occasion before we close to repeat, it is the object that determines the subject, never the subject that determines the object. All evidence is objective, must be in the object instead of the subject, or knowledge is impossible, and all real certainty out of the question. To suppose, as Mr. Morell does, that the subject determines the object, and that the object must vary as varies the subject, or as varies the intellect that apprehends it, is to deny all objective certainty, to make the object the creature of the subject, and to reduce all existence for us to the soul and its subjective affections; which is to deny the soul itself, for none of its faculties actually exist without their appropriate objects. If man could exist and operate, save in relation with his appropriate object independent of himself, or if he were his own adequate object, that is, adequate to a single act, he would be pure act, and therefore not man, but God, who is termed pure act, because he is in himself his own adequate ob-

ject. But as man is not pure act, is not God, he can actually exist only in relation with his object, and then not at all if that object is removed, or does not itself exist.

It is the folly of modern philosophers to suppose that we are capable of independent action, and can know dependent beings without knowing that on which they depend, or the creative being from whom they derive their being. Only that which *is* can be an object of knowledge, and what *is* only from and by another, since it is not in and of itself, cannot in and of itself be intelligible. Hence that which is only from, by, and in another, is intelligible only mediately through the intelligibility of that from, by, and in which it is, or has its being. As the human soul is only by virtue of the Divine creative act, and as that act is only from God as real being, and therefore cognizable only in the cognition of God, it follows that the human soul itself is cognizable only in the cognition of God, from whom, by whom, and in whom it is, or has its being, and therefore its intelligibility. Psychology, which is the science of the soul, is then possible only in ontology, which is the science of being, that is, the science of God. The science of God, or ontology, is learned from the Catechism, and whoever disdains to study that will never be able to attain to either an ontology or a psychology deserving the least reliance. He who does study it, and constructs his psychology in the light of the ontology it teaches, will fall into no gross psychological errors. Indeed, as a matter of fact, nearly all the errors which vitiate modern psychology originate in doubt of the ontology of the Catechism, and in the effort of philosophers to defend or justify that doubt; that is, philosophical errors are in general the result of a departure, and of the insane attempt to justify departure, from the faith. Philosophy, whenever regarded as an independent discipline, distinct from theology, and as capable of being constructed without revealed theology, or as any thing more than a collection of rules for the right use of reason in the service of theology, indicates a heterodox tendency, if not absolute incredulity.

But be this as it may; a single glance at Mr. Morell's psychological table is sufficient to show, that, whether psychology is or is not attainable psychologically, his psychology is not worthy of our acceptance. He mutilates human nature, and misrepresents the faculties which he recognizes. The will he resolves into the general activity of the soul, and makes it equally underlie all our mental operations. He acknowledges only two faculties, the intellectual and the emotional; and thus

necessarily reduces all our mental operations to cognitions and emotions. Man is, then, simply a being that knows and feels, and therefore differs only in degree from any of the animal tribes; for they all know and feel to some extent at least. But by what authority does the author exclude volitions? When one wills to do or not to do a thing, to resist or to follow inclination, to obey or to disobey God, is the mental fact simply an emotion or a cognition? A child knows better. The difference between cognition and emotion is not greater or more evident than the difference between either of them and volition, and the fact of volition is as certain as that we know or feel.

The author, doubtless, fancies that he recognizes volitions, because he professes to recognize the will; but he does not recognize the will as a distinct faculty, or as the principle of a distinct class of mental facts. He resolves it, as we have seen, into the general activity of the soul, and gives it only the intellectual and the emotional modes of action. He must, then, either deny all voluntary activity, or else assert that all activity is voluntary. We have just shown that he cannot do the former; is he prepared to assert the latter, — that all our sensations, perceptions, intuitions, instincts, and animal passions are volitions, and therefore acts for which we are morally responsible, even though we have not deliberately excited or assented to them? This were, indeed, to go the full length of Calvinism. Calvinism, we are aware, confounds will with the simple power to act, and freedom with liberty *a coactione*. Hence it declares the simple motions of concupiscence to be sins, not only the effects of original sin, and inclining to sin, but sins themselves, for which we may be brought into judgment, even when actually resisted. It makes all instinctive and indeliberate actions, not proceeding from grace, mortal sins, and allows no distinction between what we do deliberately, and what we do indeliberately and unintentionally. This is the real doctrine of Jonathan Edwards's famous *Treatise on the Affections*, and it makes sanctity consist in having no internal struggles, and diminishes our merit just in proportion to the internal obstacles we have to overcome, or spiritual conflicts to maintain. But this is manifestly false as well as horrible. We are responsible only for what we do voluntarily; and only that act is voluntary which it depends on the will to do or not to do. Nothing is more absurd than to term an act which we cannot but do a voluntary act; and nothing is more certain than that our cognitions and emotions do not always depend on our will, —

are not always subject to our control. They not unfrequently come and go unbidden, in spite of our most strenuous efforts to the contrary. How often do we grieve at the intrusion of unwelcome thoughts, and at emotions which we would, but cannot, suppress? Who that knows any thing of the spiritual life, who that has attempted to live in thought, word, and deed a pure and holy life, needs to be told that not a few of his thoughts and emotions are indeliberate and involuntary, and occur in spite of his firmest resolutions, and most unremitting vigilance in guarding the avenues of his mind and heart? Who needs to be told that the Christian's life is an unceasing warfare?

But our objections to Mr. Morell's psychology do not end here. Leaving by the way, for the moment, what he says of the emotional side of his table, we assure him that we cannot accept the intellectual side without important modifications. The mind, according to the author, begins in mere feeling, and passes successively through four degrees or stages of development; namely, the sensational, the perceptional, the logical, and the intuitional. In sensation, the sensitive subject and sensible object are confounded; the soul seizes, indeed, the sensible object, but does not distinguish itself from the object, or external cause of its sensitive affection. In perception, the soul apprehends the sensible object, and apprehends it as external and distinct from both the apprehension and the subject apprehending. In logic, or reflection, the soul generalizes, or applies its own abstract forms to the objects which it has perceived. That is, by perception we learn sensible objects, and by logic apply to them the abstract forms, or, as Kant would say, the *categories*, of the understanding. But our knowledge is not limited to our sensible intuitions and the subjective forms of the logical understanding. Above the logical understanding, which adds nothing to the matter or "content" of knowledge, is the intuitional consciousness, in which the soul apprehends another and a higher order of truth, — supersensible, necessary, and absolute truth, — pure Being, or God himself. This the author explains in the following passage.

"The mathematical sciences, for example, have as their essential foundation the pure conceptions of space and number; or, if they be of the mechanical order, the conceptions of power and motion. Moral science, again, is based upon the fundamental notions of good and evil; æsthetical science upon that of beauty; theological science upon the conception of the absolute, — of God. Now, these primary elements of all the sciences can never be communi-

cated and never *learned* exegetically. Unless we have a direct consciousness of them, they must ever remain a deep mystery to us, — just as no description could ever give to a blind man the notion of color, or to a man who has no organ of taste the idea of bitter or salt. We do not deny but that means may be employed to *awaken* the consciousness to these ideas, but still they can never be known by definition, — never communicated by words to any man who has not already felt them in his own inward experience. Here, then, we have the actual material of all scientific truth, and that material, it is evident, must be *presentative*, coming to us by the immediate operation of our intuitional consciousness." — pp. 69, 70.

There is little here, in the sense of the author, to which we do not object; but we restrict our comments to his doctrine of intuition. By the "intuitional consciousness" it is clear that he means the *reason* of Jacobi, Coleridge, and Gioberti, who very unreasonably distinguish reason as a faculty from understanding. It is the *Vernunft* distinguished from the *Verstand* and *Empfindungs-vermögen* of the Germans, and is held to be a power or faculty of the soul to apprehend immediately supersensible truth, — in our terminology, the intelligible as distinguished from the sensible, the Idea, in the language of Plato, which, as we showed in our last Review,* is identically God as *Ens reale et necessarium*. But to this we object, — 1. That it supposes the order of truth intuitively revealed comes to the mind only in the fourth stage of its development, instead of the first; and 2. That it makes intuition a faculty of the soul, and asserts for man the natural subjective power to see God.

1. The solidity of the first objection we established in our Review for last January, in the article just referred to, by showing that the order of knowledge must follow the order of being, since what is not can be no object of knowledge, and where there is no object there can be no fact of knowledge. That is to say, we cannot know without knowing somewhat, and cannot know somewhat unless somewhat is, — no very startling proposition, we should suppose, and very much like a truism. The intuition of God, then, if the order of knowledge follows the order of being, must precede all knowledge of existences, because existences are from God, and subsequent to him, and because without him our existence is not, is nothing, and one term of a relation always connotes the other. To affirm ourselves as simple being, as *ens reale*, is to affirm a falsehood, for *ens reale* is God, and we are not God. To af-

* *Quarterly Review*, January, 1850, Art. I., pp. 24–26.

firm ourselves as existence, taking the word, as we must if we distinguish it from real being, in its strict etymological sense, (from *exstare*,) is to affirm that we are from God, and are only as we are in him, by virtue of his creative act, and therefore is to distinguish ourselves from him, and to assert our dependence on him and relation to him as his creatures; which is impossible, unless we know that he is, and has created us. Perception, in Mr. Morell's sense, cannot precede intuition of the intelligible, for it is only by virtue of intuition of the intelligible, that the sensible is perceptible, or any thing to us but a mere sensitive affection or mode of the soul itself. Nor can the logical operation described, but, by the way, inaccurately described, precede intuition; for logic cannot operate without *data*, and without the intuition of the intelligible it can have no *data*, that is, can have no principles, no premises; for no man a little versed in philosophy can seriously maintain that the categories are mere subjective forms of the understanding. The error of the author grows out of his confounding the order of intuition with the order of reflection. Intuition follows the order of being, and presents us the ontological order as it really is, independent of us, as it is revealed by God himself, and taught us in the Catechism, and therefore presents being before existence, the Creator before creatures, because such is the real order. Reflection, which is rethinking, reverses this order, begins where intuition leaves off, and leaves off where intuition begins. It takes the creature from intuition, and by analysis rises to the reflex cognition of God. It is the neglect to distinguish between these two orders of knowledge, and fixing attention mainly on the fact of reflection, undistinguished from intuition, that so wofully misleads our modern philosophers, and renders obscure and doubtful what in itself is clear and certain.

2. We ourselves, indeed, hold that God reveals himself intuitively to us, but we do not admit that intuition is a faculty, nor that we have the natural, inherent power to see God. The distinction between reason and understanding, contended for by Kant, Jacobi, Coleridge, Gioberti, and others, is imaginary; for to know is always one and the same fact, and demands, on the side of the subject, only one and the same faculty. To suppose that we must have one power by which to know sensible objects, and another by which to know God, is as superfluous as to suppose that we need one voice with which to sing the praises of our Redeemer, and another with which to sing

the praises of a conquering hero. All the facts of knowledge have not, indeed, the same conditions, nor the same objects, but, as facts of knowledge, they all depend, by the very force of the word, on the same cognitive principle. Can there be a cognition which is not cognition, which is more or less than cognition? — or knowledge that is intellectual, but not rational, — rational, but not intellectual? Can there be a man that understands but does not know, or knows but does not understand? There is, and can be, only one cognitive faculty. Intuition is simply a mental fact, not a mental faculty, or power of the soul.

But we do not admit that we have the inherent power to behold God intuitively. In the first place, what is intuitively revealed to us of God is not his *quidditas*, is not *what* God is, but simply that he is; that is, he is made known to us simply as QUI EST, He who is, and who creates existences. In the second place, this cognition of God, although intuitive, is not by virtue of our own inherent intellectual force or created light; for till God is present to the mind as its intelligible object, it has no intellectual activity. Prior to the intuition of God, the intellect is not constituted, is not actual intellect, is at best only *intellectus in potentia*. It is only the moment when God presents himself as the *creative* intelligible object, that the intellect is objectively formed, — is *intellectus in actu*. The power or activity that reveals and affirms God is his, not ours, and the revelation or affirmation of himself as intelligible object is only the completion of that creative act, which, from nothing, creates us, not only existences, but *intellectual* existences. As it is only by virtue of the intimate presence and immanence of God as *ens reale*, *mediante* his creative act, that we are existences, or continue to exist, so it is only by the intimate presence and immanence of God as the intelligible, *mediante* the same act, that we are and continue to be *intellectual* existences; for it is only in him that we live, move, and are, or are able to perform any function whatever. It is not, then, we who by our power behold God, but he who, by his own agency, makes himself known to us; and our intuitive apprehension of the fact that he is, is by virtue of an act as truly an act of divine revelation as is the revelation of the Christian mysteries themselves, differing from that only in the respect that it reveals what, when revealed, is evident *per se*, whereas that reveals what, when revealed, is evident only *per alia*. This distinction between the two revelations, we remark by the

way, is important; for if we neglect it, we shall attempt, either, with De la Mennais, to base science on faith, or, with the Rationalists, to reduce faith to science.

Intuition, we have said, is a fact, not a faculty, and we use it simply in contradistinction to discursion or ratiocination. First principles are never discursively obtained, for the mind must have them before it can operate discursively. They must be known, or else discursion is valueless; for conclusions drawn from unknown premises are as conclusions drawn from no premises at all. *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.* They must, then, be given intuitively. Now God is the first principle of all science as of all existence, and therefore must be known as the indispensable condition of all science, and therefore intuitively known. This is all we mean by saying that our knowledge that God is, and is the creator of existences, is intuitive. But we do not suppose him the *passive* object of our intuition; we are ourselves rather the passive recipients of his own revelation and affirmation of himself. We are the spectators, and he is the actor. We assert that he must be known in this way, because, unless he is, the fact of knowledge in any order is, not merely inexplicable, but absolutely inconceivable.

Now Mr. Morell's doctrine of intuition of God is widely different from this. He supposes that prior to the intuition the intellectual faculty is formed and already in active operation, and therefore that there may be knowledge, science, without recognition of God. He supposes, also, that we have a *vis intuitiva* adequate to the immediate apprehension of God, without his active revelation of himself. He makes no account of the very important fact, that in actual cognition the object must concur actively no less than the subject. He places the intelligibility, not in the object, but in the intellect itself, which is the radical principle of all skepticism. If the intelligibility is in the intellect, in the subject, nothing is intelligible *per se*; then nothing is evident *per se*, and then all evidence is purely subjective. Then we can have only subjective certainty, which is sufficient neither for science nor faith. Here is the fatal error of Cartesianism, which has plunged the whole modern philosophical world into real, if not formal, skepticism. Descartes placed the evidence in the subject, that is, in our own conceptions, and consequently denied to himself all possible means of objective verification; for he retained only his conceptions with which to verify his conceptions, and concep-

tion can never be more evident than conception. If his conceptions were called in question, he had no remedy; for the conceptions he might be disposed to allege in support of the conceptions questioned, could themselves be questioned in turn, and thus on *ad infinitum*.

It is this grave error of placing the evidence in the subject, the intelligibility in the intellect, instead of the object, that has embarrassed all modern philosophers, and led to those interminable and fruitless discussions as to the objective validity of our conceptions, whether there be or be not an external reality corresponding to the internal conception, or *idea*. It is also this that creates the grand difficulty we have in proving to liberal Protestants that they ought to assent to the Divinely instituted authority of the Church. "Private judgment has, no doubt," say they, "its inconveniences, and is, unquestionably, no adequate rule of faith. It gives rise to as many different doctrines as there are doctors, and leaves all things floating and uncertain. But what is the remedy? You propose authority. Very good. But what is the authority for your authority? That must be taken either on the authority of private judgment or on none. The real sense, too, of its teachings and definitions, inasmuch as they are addressed to the individual, can be determined for the individual only by his private judgment, and will be in his mind only what he judges it to be. Words themselves mean to the mind only what it interprets them to mean. So, after all, if you by authority diminish in some degree the external manifestation of the evils of private judgment, you do not in the least remove them. At bottom, under authority, there is all the diversity that there is elsewhere." No scientific reply to this is possible, if you place the evidence in the conception, the intelligibility in the subject, instead of the object. The real answer is in showing that this reasoning proceeds on a false assumption, because the object concurs as actively as the subject in the production of a fact of knowledge, and the intellect never does and never can act, save in concurrence with an object intelligible and evident *per se*, and therefore never does and never can know any thing which is not immediately or mediately objectively intelligible. The object is not intelligible because we know it, but we know it because it is intelligible.

According to Mr. Morell's doctrine, as we understand it, man has the inherent power to see God, and in the fact of intuition God is intelligible to us, not by his own act, not by virtue of his own intelligibility, but by virtue of our created light.

It is, then, we who, by our intellect, make him intelligible to us, not he who makes himself intelligible to our intellect by his own intelligibility. What we assert is, that God by his own creative act places the intellectual power with which he endows us in relation with his own being as its intelligible object, as the object intelligible *per se*, and as the light by and in which our intellect sees and knows all that it does see and know. According to this view, man can no more be intellectual without the intimate presence and immanence of God as intelligible object, than he can simply exist without the intimate presence and immanence of God as creator. Mr. Morell overlooks this important fact. He supposes that, in the natural order at least, our intellect is complete in itself, and sufficient for itself. In other words, that God has created us, given us certain powers, and constituted us capable of acting, within a given sphere, independently. He does not seem to be aware that in this he virtually adopts the old Epicurean philosophy, which supposes that, God having made us, we can now, as the excellent Dr. Evariste de Gypendole would say, "go ahead on our own hook." If this were so, we might sing, —

> "Let the gods go to sleep up above us, —
> We know there is no god for this earth, boys."

But we cannot so far separate man, either in his existence or his intellect, from his Maker; we cannot conceive him in any respect capable of performing a single independent action. It is by the immanent presence of God that he denies God, and by the immanent light of God that he blasphemes God. In him we live, and move, and are, and in the natural order, no more than in the supernatural, are we any thing, or can we do or know any thing, without him. Our intellect is not the intellect of pure Being, but the intellect of a dependent being, of a created existence, which is nothing save by virtue of the immanence of the creative act, any more than my volition is something independent of my willing. Suppose my intellect capable of an independent act, of one fact of knowledge, the sole product of its own inherent power, and you suppose it the intellect, not of man, but of God. The human intellect as the intellect of a creature can, in the very nature of the case, know only what is made intelligible to it by a light not its own; that is to say, a created intellect is simply the faculty to be taught, or to receive, actively, what the Creator chooses, immediately or mediately, to communicate to it, and the primal sin of man

is in aspiring to know independently, to know as God knows, in and of himself, without a teacher.

We have dwelt thus long on this point, because we have wished to distinguish the ontological intuition, which we hold in common with the Fathers and great Doctors of the Church, from the psychological and transcendental doctrine sometimes confounded with it, that the intelligibility of the object is in the intellect, and that our intellectual power is adequate to the intuition or direct and immediate vision of God, which implies that man may, if he chooses, enjoy the beatific vision even in this life. In the beatific vision the blessed see God as he is in himself, but in this life we cannot so see him. Here we see him, as to what he is in himself, only through a glass darkly, as in an enigma. All we can see here is that he is, and is creative. This is all that is evident to us *per se*, and this we see only because he so far reveals and affirms himself to us. All beyond, not logically deducible from this, that we believe of him, we know only by his supernatural revelation, coeval and parallel with the intuitive. The one revelation is, in reality, as old as the other, and, indeed, they are two revelations only in regard to us ; — in regard to God they are one and the same, and made by virtue of one and the same Divine act. In regard to us, they are distinguishable, and should always be distinguished, but never separated. The object of faith is God as superintelligible, — the object of philosophy is God as intelligible ; the matter of faith is what is contained in the supernatural revelation, — the matter of philosophy is what is contained in the intuitive revelation, or what is evident *per se ;* but the two form, in reality, only one whole, and neither is complete in fact without the other ; for the root of the intelligible is in the superintelligible, and the supernatural presupposes the natural.

The error of philosophers in all ages has been in not rightly understanding the fact we here state, and in attempting to separate philosophy, or natural theology, from supernatural theology, and to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline. In our times their effort is, not only to erect it into a distinct and independent discipline, but to make it the mistress and judge of faith, forgetting that the supernatural is above the natural, the superintelligible above the intelligible, and therefore that faith, not science, is sovereign. Philosophy is only the handmaid of faith, and has no right to aspire even to freedom, or to act save as bid. A right use of reason is essential, and the right use of reason in theological and religious matters is all

that the philosopher can aspire to. This he should aspire to; but even this he can attain to only under the infallible direction of the society to which God has committed his supernatural revelation. In other words, we need and can have no independent system of philosophy; and natural theology can escape error, and be worthy of our reliance, only as subjected to the supervision of supernatural or Catholic theology; for it is only by virtue of orthodoxy in faith that we can preserve orthodoxy in science, and it would not be difficult to prove that all modern scientific heterodoxy has grown out of the religious heterodoxy professed by the Reformers of the sixteenth century. Descartes only gave to Luther's heresy its philosophy, as Rousseau afterwards gave it its politics.

Thus much we have judged it proper to say of philosophy in general, and of Mr. Morell's philosophy, or rather psychologism, in particular. We proceed now to consider the author's application of philosophy to the explanation of religion, or rather, to the explanation of the facts of religious experience. We do Mr. Morell, in the outset, the justice to say, that he disclaims being a Rationalist. A Rationalist he defines to be one who places religion in the logical faculty as its subject. The logical faculty deals not with the matter but with the forms of knowledge, which are merely forms of the subjective understanding. These forms are abstract, without "content," and have no objective validity. To place religion in them is to make it a mere formal thing, a dry, dead abstraction, destitute of all objective truth. Such, according to him, is Rationalism, and, indeed, all scholastic theology, or logical statement of doctrine; in which he agrees precisely with our countryman, Dr. Bushnell. We of course do not accept this definition either of Rationalism or of the logical faculty. Logic deals, indeed, only with the forms of knowledge, but these forms are real, exist *in re*, not merely *in mente*. But let this pass. We agree that Mr. Morell is not a Rationalist, and must tell our Puseyite friends of *The Christian Remembrancer*, that they are wrong in maintaining that he is. But he is generically a Humanist, and specifically a Sentimentalist.

We have seen that Mr. Morell's psychological table has two sides, the intellectual and the emotional, which run parallel with each other in their respective stages of development. The intellectual side we have already considered. On the emotional side we find, placed in the order of their development, instinct, animal passion, relational emotion, and æsthetic, moral, and re-

ligious emotions. Now on this emotional side of human nature, that is, the inferior or sensitive soul, the author places religion as in its subject, which, after Jacobi and Schleiermacher, he defines to be "the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it." This is not Rationalism, but it is something far below it. Rationalism errs in denying all truth not intrinsically evident, or evident *per se*, that is, in rejecting the Christian mysteries outright, or attempting to explain away their supernatural sense by treating them as symbols of truths or facts of the natural order. This last we see in Pierre Leroux, really one of the profoundest thinkers, as well as the most perverse, that we are acquainted with among the enemies of our holy religion. He does not, like ordinary unbelievers, regard Christianity as a fiction and her mysteries as falsehoods. He maintains that Christianity is true, and that all her mysteries cover great ontological facts or truths, but facts or truths of the primitive creation, not of the new or supernatural creation. Here is his error, and a no vulgar error it is. But Mr. Morell falls far below him, degrades religion from the rational nature altogether, to grovel in concupiscence, or mere sensitive affection, differing only in degree from instinct and animal passion. We let him speak for himself.

"Inferring, then, from the foregoing considerations, that religion cannot be a form of pure intellection, we proceed to inquire next, *Whether it can consist essentially in action?* The superficial and degrading idea, that religion consists in the mere external performance of certain duties, can hardly merit the serious attention of any reflective mind. No outward actions can possibly answer to the most feeble notion we possess of real piety; for we invariably look beneath the outward phenomena to the spiritual life within, before we pronounce upon the religious attributes of any agent whatever. And if we take the term action in an inward and spiritual sense, yet it only presents to us the aspect of a blind and indeterminate *energy*, until it is regulated and directed by some specific purpose or feeling. Action, then, *as action*, cannot be religious; it only becomes so when we show that it springs from a *religious* impulse or emotion. The measure of our mere activity, whether external or internal, can never be the measure of our religious intensity; it is activity *in some particular form* which alone can determine it. The essence of religion, accordingly, cannot consist in the activity itself, for that is indifferent to the question; but in the peculiar element, whatever that may be, which influences our activity so as to direct it towards the Infinite and the Divine. Now it

is an almost universally acknowledged axiom in psychology, that the *principles of action* (those which give aim and direction to all our energies) are the feelings or emotions, which on that account have been frequently called the *active*, in opposition to the intellectual powers. We may conclude, therefore, even by the rules of the disjunctive syllogism, that the essence of religion belongs to that class of phenomena which we term *emotional*.

"This conclusion, we find upon due consideration, is borne out by the very same kind of reasoning by which the other cases we e rejected. Neither intelligence nor activity, viewed alone, can become the measure of our religion; but there are certain forms of emotion which can readily become so. If, for example, we could find some determined form of emotion, which causes all our thoughts, desires, actions, — in a word, our whole interior and exterior life,— to tend upwards towards God as their great centre and source, we should have little hesitation in saying that such an emotion would precisely measure the true religious intensity of our being, and little hesitation in fixing *there* the central point, the veritable essence, of religion itself.

"'The most able and earnest thinkers of modern times, who have attempted to solve the problem now before us, have in fact almost universally considered the essential element of religion to consist in some of the infinite developments of feeling. We shall adduce *two* of them as examples. Jacobi, who was one of the first to see the full worth and signification of *feeling* in the domain of philosophy, defines religion to be 'a faith, resting upon feeling, in the reality of the supersensual and ideal.' The other author to whom we refer is Schleiermacher, than whom no man has ever pursued with greater penetration of mind and earnestness of spirit the pathway of a Divine philosophy; and he places the essence of religion in *the absolute feeling of dependence*, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it. All our former considerations, accordingly, as well as the great weight of authority amongst the best analysts, lead us to place the primitive and essential element of religion in the region of human emotion." — pp. 88, 89.

"These considerations give us a safe clew to the solution of the problem we have now before us, — to determine, namely, the precise mode of feeling in which religion essentially consists. Let us recapitulate the steps and draw the conclusions. Every state of consciousness involves in it the opposition of subject and object: in the emotions, the predominance of the subject gives a sense of freedom, the predominance of the object a sense of dependence. On the side of freedom, our feelings cannot reach the infinite, for the subject, *self*, is always circumscribed. On the side of dependence, however, we *can* reach the sphere of infinity; for the moment our consciousness attains that elevation in which our finite self

becomes nothing in the presence of infinity, eternity, and omnipotence, the accompanying state of emotion is one which involves an absolute object; *and such an emotion must be equivalent to a sense of Deity.* Hence we infer that the essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence, — a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity; of our being *parts* of his great plan; of our being held up in his vast embrace; of our being formed for some specific destiny, which, even amidst the subordinate and finite pursuits of life, must ever be kept in view as the goal of our whole being.

"In describing this absolute sense of dependence, as containing the essential element of religion, we do not mean that this *alone*, without the coöperation of the other faculties, would give rise to the religious *life*. To do this there must be intelligence; there must be activity; there must be, in short, all the other elements of human nature. But what we mean is this, — that the sense of dependence *accompanying* all our mental operations gives them the peculiar hue of piety. Thinking alone cannot be religious; but thinking accompanied by a sense of dependence on the infinite reason is *religious thought*. Activity alone cannot be religious; but activity carried on under a sense of absolute dependence upon infinite *power* is religious action. In a word, it is this peculiar mode of feeling pervading all our powers, faculties, and inward phenomena, which gives them a religious character; so that we may correctly say, that the *essence* of religion lies exactly here."— pp. 93, 94.

These extracts show clearly enough that we do Mr. Morell no injustice in saying that he makes religion originate in the emotional side of our nature, and its essence consist in sentiment, or sensible emotion. The emotional element is distinguished clearly, as we learn from the author's psychological table, from the intellectual element, and the will, we have seen, is the soul itself, in its essence, the *vis agendi*, underlying alike intellect and emotion. So the particular emotion in question cannot be regarded as an affection of the will, in the sense of our theologians, therefore not as an affection of the rational soul at all; otherwise the author would be obliged to identify it with cognition, from which he expressly distinguishes it. Nothing, then, remains but sensible emotion, or affection of the inferior or sensitive soul. This is evident, again, from the fact, that the author makes the emotional element, which, according to him, is the seat of religion, the seat of instinct and of *animal* passion. This is what, when reviewing Mr. Parker, we showed is the fact with all Transcendentalists. This emotional nature is what is commonly called the inferior soul, sometimes

the sensitive soul, the animal soul, and is termed by St. Paul the *flesh*, in distinction from the *spirit*, — the *carnal mind*, not subject to the law of God, — concupiscence, which the Holy Council of Trent declares remains after baptism to be combated. Mr. Morell, perhaps, little thinks, that in making this the seat of religion, and the very essence of religion to consist in one of its affections, he virtually raises the flesh above the spirit, and sense above reason, — the very thing Satan is perpetually tempting us to do, and against which the Christian is obliged to struggle as long as he lives, and against which, without grace, he must struggle in vain. There can be no doubt that this nineteenth century is the age of progress, and has already advanced far enough to warrant us in applying to it the words of the holy prophet,—"Woe to you that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter. Woe to you that are wise in your own eyes, and prudent in your own conceits." — Isaiah v. 20, 21.

There is another doctrine in these extracts worth remarking, namely, that the character of an action is determined by the feeling or emotion with which, or from which, it is done; or, what is the same thing, that "the aim and direction of our energies" are given by our feelings and emotions, instead of being given by reason and free will, as we had supposed should be the case. This doctrine would have made some of our old moralists stare not a little. The character of an action is determined by its motive, or by the end for which it is performed, and we had supposed it a censure rather than a commendation to say that a man's activity receives its "aim and direction" from his feelings and emotions. These are blind, and activity, the author himself says, is blind, and therefore true wisdom consists in the blind leading the blind! Has the author forgotten that, "if the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch"? Does he not see that his whole doctrine puts reason and will to the service of the feelings and emotions, and makes their proper position that of mere instruments or slaves of the passions? Does he mean this? We know not; but if his words are a true index to his sense, he certainly does mean it, and intends to teach the doctrine of Charles Fourier, that the passions are the governing power, and that intellect and will are merely instrumental faculties, to be employed in the service of the passions, having no office but to do their bidding; that is, man is in his normal state only

when he is the slave of his passions; for passion is only feeling intensified, or emotion prolonged!

Mr. Morell's definition of religion, borrowed from Jacobi and Schleiermacher, is a real curiosity. "The essence of religion is the absolute feeling of dependence, and of a conscious relationship to God, originating immediately from it." Why does the author add the epithet *absolute* to feeling? Can feeling be more or less than feeling? Are there feelings which are feelings only *secundum quid*, feelings which are not absolutely feelings, but only relatively feelings? What is the meaning of "feeling of dependence"? Does dependence feel? The phrase must mean, either that dependence is the subject of the feeling, or that feeling is an obscure perception of dependence, and therefore of that on which we depend; for relation is unintelligible without intuition of the terms related, since without the terms it is nothing. The author cannot mean the former, and the latter contradicts his own doctrine; for feeling, as a perception, however obscure, is an intellectual operation, and the author would imply by it that the essence of religion is in cognition, in which he says it is not. But the essence of religion is not in the absolute feeling of dependence alone, but also in the absolute feeling "of a conscious relationship to God." What is the sense of absolute feeling of a conscious relationship? Feeling, distinguished from intellection, perception, or intuition, is purely subjective, and has and can have no object. It may have an external cause, but it is the intellectual, not the emotional element, that takes cognizance of it. *Feeling of relationship.* What is the difference between the feeling of *relationship* and the feeling of *dependence*? Is not dependence a relationship, and the dependence in question precisely our relationship to God? How can the two feelings then be two? Again, the absolute feeling of a conscious relationship to God is said to originate immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence. How can one absolute feeling originate from another, or how can a feeling be derived and yet be absolute? "The absolute feeling of a *conscious* relationship." Is the relationship conscious, or are we conscious of it? The latter we presume is meant. But *to be conscious* is to know, is an intellectual act, and a *conscious* relationship must mean a *known* relationship. What is the meaning of the absolute feeling of a *known* relationship, originating immediately from the absolute feeling of dependence? Or what is the meaning of *feeling of* consciousness? We may be conscious of a feeling, that is, know that we feel so and so, but *to feel* that we

know this or that is something we do not understand. We do not feel that we know; but if we know, we know we know. A feeling of conscious relationship can mean no more nor less than that we are conscious of it. The absolute feeling of dependence, the author elsewhere says, is equivalent to a sense of the Deity, that is, to an obscure perception of God, for *sense*, as here used, means obscure perception, and is an intellectual, not an emotional fact. The author says the essence of religion is not in the intellect; but his definition, if rendered intelligible, necessarily asserts that it is; for the only intelligible meaning of his definition is, The essence of religion is in the feeble or obscure perception of God, and of our absolute dependence on him. But this is, we take it, precisely what the author means to deny, in denying that religion is any form of knowing, and asserting that it is essentially emotion. Really, Mr. Morell, as well as Plato, becomes inconsistent and puerile the moment he breaks from the traditions of the Fathers.

Mr. Morell's real inquiry, as we understand it, is, What is the peculiar psychological principle of religion, regarded, not as doctrine, but as a virtue? He considers religion on its subjective side, as a simple fact or phenomenon of human experience, and wishes to determine, psychologically, what it is generically and differentially, what constitutes a fact or phenomenon of experience religious, and distinguishes it from every fact or phenomenon that is not religious. If he had not been misled by his psychologism, he would have known beforehand that this is not psychologically determinable, for, as we have already remarked, the faculties of the soul are not themselves psychologically determinable. They are all ontologically determined, that is, characterized by their respective objects. Religion, as a purely psychological fact, does not exist, is not conceivable, as the author himself, if he understands himself, implies in his very definition; for he includes in his definition cognition of the object, — "conscious relationship to God." The essential and distinctive character of religion is derived from its object, and its psychological principle is determinable only in the determination of its ontological principle; for, till it is known what it is that religion requires of us, we cannot know what special faculty of the soul must be exercised in order to fulfil its requisitions.

Here is the fact that our neologists, reared under Evangelical influences, overlook; and hence, in spite of their talents, learning, and industry, their failure to attain to any thing solid or val-

uable. Evangelicalism, a species of pretended illuminism, is itself nothing, at bottom, but mere psychologism, and proceeds always on the supposition, that the subject determines the object, — that the object, or objective truth, is to be concluded from the conception, the internal sentiment, or affection. We need not be surprised, then, that Jacobi, Fries, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Parker, Bushnell, Morell, and others, who have outgrown the earlier Protestant dogmatics, should follow the psychological method in religion, as well as in philosophy. These men have discovered, what all their brethren are beginning to discover, that the earlier Reformers, by asserting that man lost his spiritual faculties in the Fall, virtually denied grace, which they professed to extol, by leaving no subject of grace, and that, in order to be the subject of grace, man must retain his spiritual faculties ; they have also discovered that the sensist philosophy, so rife in the last century and the beginning of the present, really denied all knowledge by denying all cognitive subject, and that in order to be instructed, and instructed to some end, man must have the inherent power to receive and use instruction. Thus far they have done well. But they conclude, from the necessity of asserting the spiritual faculties in order to assert man as the subject of grace, that these faculties suffice without grace, and thus run into pure Pelagianism, the very error of denying grace they intended to escape. They conclude, also, that the power to receive and use instruction suffices without instruction, and that, to possess such power, man must have in himself the germs of all truth, needing only external influences for their development. They thus make all knowledge purely subjective, which is virtual skepticism, and reach, by another route, the very error of the sensists, which they proposed to avoid. They wished to get rid of the Protestant dogmas and the sensist philosophy, which made man nothing, and to substitute for them a doctrine which should make man count for something ; but, misled by their psychologism, they have seen no way to do it, but by making man count for every thing ; and in making him count for every thing, they make him, in their turn, count for nothing, and fall into pure nullism.

Unaware of the conclusions which an enlightened and vigorous logic must draw from their premises, and taking it for granted that all religion, faith, science, and truth are in the soul, needing only to be developed, brought out, they proceed by way of psychological analysis to detect and determine the pe-

culiarly religious phenomena, and from them to determine their peculiar psychological principle, or, in other words, to determine what must be religion by determining what is its psychological subject. Yet we should suppose that a moment's reflection would suffice to show them that nothing can be more unscientific than their method. How are you to know what are religious phenomena, if you know not their principle? and how are you to know their subjective, if you know not their objective principle? Suppose you find, by analysis, that we have cognitions, volitions, emotions, and various classes of emotions, how are you to decide in which of these is the subjective characteristic of religion? You may *say* it is in this or that, — is not in cognition, and is in emotion; but how do you know that what you say is true? Is religion something independent of man, or is it nothing? If nothing, what is the use of your inquiry? Man is man, and religion is the same, whatever the conclusions you may draw, or in whatever class of psychological facts you may place it or not place it. If something, how, unless you know what that something is, determine its psychological principle? If you know not what religion requires you to know, to do, or to feel, how are you to be sure that you do not mistake its psychological seat? Nothing, then, can be more evident, than that it is religion as object that must determine for us the psychological principle of religion; and if Mr. Morell and others prove to be right in the account they give, it can only be by a happy accident.

Religion as a virtue cannot differ essentially from virtue in general. Virtue is not a cognition, nor an emotion, but an act, and, as the word itself indicates, a human act, that is, an act performed by the human person. The human person is all in the rational nature, for person is, by its very definition, "an individual substance of a rational nature." Virtue is, then, a rational act, and therefore cannot have its seat in the emotional element, for that element is irrational, is the animal as distinguished from the rational nature, as Mr. Morell himself must concede, since he distinguishes it from the intellectual element, and makes it the seat of "animal passion." This is conclusive against the sentimentalists or emotionalists. The rational nature has two faculties or modes of activity, understanding and will, or free will. Rational nature must be intellective, and its characteristic as activity is to act *propter finem*, — not simply *ad finem*, which is common to all animal nature, but *propter finem*, that is, in view and for the sake of an end, — and therefore it must be free activity, or free will. As understanding, it presents the end and the motives for seeking it as free will; it

elects, wills the end, or rejects it. To virtue both faculties are necessary, the understanding to present the end and its motives, and the will to elect it; but as the act is specially in the act of election, the virtue is placed primarily in the will, and no act is virtuous except it is an act of free will. Hence, when we inquire whether a man is virtuous or vicious, we look always to his will, and seek not what he has done externally, but the will with which he has done it, and we pronounce him virtuous or vicious according as that proves to have been virtuous or vicious. The act, as the subject of the predicate virtue or vice, as praiseworthy or blameworthy, is purely an act of the will, and hence moral theologians throw out of the account all except the internal act. Thus they speak of acts of faith, of hope, of charity, of contrition, which are pure internal acts, and may be performed any time, and as often as one chooses. The virtue of religion partakes of this general character of virtue, and is always an act of free will, done in view and for sake of an end, as is and must be every act of free will.

But we have not yet the distinctive character of virtue, — have not yet found that which makes an act virtuous, and distinguishes it from all other acts. Virtue is an act of free will, a voluntary act for an end intellectually apprehended. But not all voluntary acts for an end, or acts of free will, are virtues; for every sin is an act of free will, a voluntary act, done for the sake of an end intellectually apprehended; and therefore, by psychological analysis, do our best, we can make no valid distinction between virtue and its opposite. Hence it is, that psychologism results usually, and, with not a few of its cultivators, avowedly, in the denial of all distinction between virtue and vice, as well as between truth and falsehood. To determine the distinctive mark of virtue, we must look beyond the subject to the object; for the character of the act is determined by the end for which it is done, and the end for which an act must be done in order to be virtue can be determined only as we are taught, mediately or immediately, by our Creator. According to Christianity, and even philosophy or reason itself, man can no more exist without a final than without a first cause, and nullity can no more be his end than his beginning. No created existence can be its own finality, or the final cause of any thing, and therefore the final cause of all existences is and must be God. God is the origin and end of creation. The irrational portion of creation tends to him by its intrinsic and necessary laws; the rational portion are required to seek him

voluntarily, as their freely chosen end. If they do, they gain the end for which they were made, and find their supreme good, the Supreme Good itself; if they do not voluntarily, if they voluntarily refuse to do it, their action bears them from God, that is, away from their supreme good, away from all good, into unmitigated darkness and evil, which is hell; for men create their own hell, and damn themselves. The end we are to seek is our final cause, and hence the end we must seek in order to be virtuous is God. A virtuous act is therefore an act of free will, done for the sake of God as its end; or, more simply, virtue is voluntary obedience to the will of God because it is his will, or the voluntary compliance with his commands because his commands.

The virtue of religion is distinguishable from other virtues only by the fact that God is the immediate object to which it is directed. All virtues are acts done for God as the end, or ultimate end; but some are directed to God immediately, and others immediately to ourselves, or to our neighbour. The immediate object of morality, as distinguished from religion, is the preservation of our own life and health, the proper care of our families, the assistance of the needy, the preservation of society, the promotion of social and political well-being, &c. But these acts, whatever they may be, and however conducive they may be to the welfare of ourselves or our neighbour, are virtuous only in so far as they are done for God's sake, with the intention, explicit or implicit, of fulfilling his commands, because his. If I preserve my life and my health only for my own sake, my act is selfish, not virtuous; if for the sake of being serviceable to my neighbour, or to my country, it is benevolent, or patriotic, but still not virtuous; and my act rises to virtue only when I do it because God commands me to do it. There must be always reference to God as the ultimate end of the act, — the intention of doing his will, because his will. This, too, must be the case in those acts which are specially religious, done immediately for the honor and glory of God. If I perform the external duties of worship, but not for the sake of God, my act wants the essential character of virtue; for God is always the ultimate end of all virtuous acting. This granted, whatever distinction we may for convenience' sake make between religion and the other virtues, or between religion and morality, no real distinction between them exists, and we should always bear in mind that the specific acts of religion, such as prayer, praise, thanksgiving, private or pub-

lic worship, assistance at the Holy Sacrifice, partaking of the Sacraments, are an integral part of morality, or general ethics, — as truly so as succouring the needy, practising temperance, fortitude, and prudence, and giving to our neighbour his dues. No man is moral except he fulfils the law of God, and to fulfil that law is to keep all its precepts, whether they are made known to us through natural reason, or by supernatural revelation. He who refuses to believe the mysteries which God has revealed, if we rightly consider the matter, is, to say the least, as immoral as he who picks his neighbour's pocket, or violates any of the precepts of justice. We insist on this, because there is in our days a tendency to institute a divorce between religion and morality, and it is important to show wherein the two are identical, rather than wherein they are distinct. No divorce between them is admissible or conceivable. An immoral religious man, or an irreligious moral man, is a contradiction in terms. Morality is nothing but the practical application of theology, or of religious dogmatical teaching. Religion, as doctrine, is the supreme law, and conformity to it in practice is morality, or religion as virtue. In practice all virtue is religious, and all religion is virtue, though no act is religious or virtuous, in the full Christian sense, unless done from divine grace, which elevates the actor above the natural order, and places him on the plane of a supernatural destiny.

We are saying nothing new; we are only repeating, in our own imperfect way, what all Christian moralists have uniformly taught from the beginning. But the view we present is precisely that which offends Mr. Morell and his fellow-neologists. It is precisely to get rid of the conclusion to which we come, that they psychologize, and seek a new definition of religion. They have been brought up in modern Evangelicalism, and find themselves unable or unwilling to believe the Evangelical theology, and they wish to be free to reject it without forfeiting their religious character. They confound the theology of their sect or sects with Christian theology, and therefore, for the same reason and on the same condition, wish to be free to reject all theology, or doctrines addressed to the understanding. Their real aim is to secure all the freedom of denial claimed by unbelievers, and at the same time not forfeit their Christian character in the estimation of their co-religionists, and perhaps in their own, for it is not improbable that they are as unwilling to think themselves unbelievers as they are to be thought so by others. They therefore, after the example of the early Prot-

estant Reformers, confound free will with liberty *a coactione*, define it as the general activity of the soul, or the soul itself, the *vis agendi*, and represent it as underlying all the mental operations. As nobody of any note thinks of making religion a mere cognition, or supposing that the mere hearers and not the doers of the law are religious, they place the essence of religion in emotion, feeling, or sentiment; for, after understanding and free will, there is no other psychological element in which they can place it. Placed in emotion, which is purely subjective, a mere sensitive affection, which demands no distinct cognition of the object, and no exercise of the understanding in regard to objective truth, they feel themselves able to assert that they have, providing they have the sentiment, all that is essentially and distinctively religious, whatever the intellectual doctrines they believe or disbelieve. Hence Schleiermacher, in his *Reden über die Religion*, resolves the Church into general society, and religious worship into the kind feelings and pleasant conversation of friends casually meeting of an evening at a neighbour's house; and maintains that belief in the personality of God and the personal immortality of the soul is by no means essential to true and acceptable religion. Dr. Bushnell, our own countryman, if he follows out the principles he adopts, must go as far. M. Cousin reproaches the pantheist Spinoza with being too devout, too much absorbed in the thought of God. We have heard some of our Protestant friends term the poet Shelley, who ostentatiously wrote Ἄθεος, Atheist, after his name, one of the most devout worshippers God ever had on earth. And we have known others go so far as to call the pagan Goethe a second Messiah, and to praise his lascivious *Wahlverwandtschaften* as eminently pious, and admirably adapted to spiritual edification. And, indeed, there is an unmistakable tendency among the most eminent of modern Protestant authors to rehabilitate all the ancient pagan superstitions, not excepting disgusting fetichism, and to place them, as religion, on a level with Christianity. Intellectually considered, these superstitions may have been very defective, and, no doubt, bear witness to a low state of culture, and the rudeness of the tribes or nations that professed them; but as religion, as evincing the activity of true and acceptable religious feeling, they were to their adherents all that Christianity is to us. The negro worshipping his Mumbo Jumbo is as truly worshipping God, as the Christian saint offering up the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, or prostrating himself in devout prayer before the altar of the Almighty. Not

only do our Protestant authors, philosophers in their own estimation, divorce religion from morality, but they also divorce it from knowledge, and suppose a man may be truly religious who is ignorant of every article in the Creed, and breaks every precept of the Decalogue, — making it necessary for us to defend against them, not only the orthodox faith, but even ordinary intelligence and morality, the very elements of civilization.

But, after all, these neologists do not quite succeed in their attempt. Mr. Morell, as much as he wars against intellect or understanding, — the logical understanding, as he calls it, — finds himself obliged, as the indispensable condition of religion, to assert intuition of God, as its object, and he can frame no definition of religion that excludes cognition. He cannot, for a moment, maintain his pretence, that the activity of the emotions is the will, for nothing is more certain than that emotions are neither voluntary nor rational, and that we are, morally or religiously speaking, no farther interested in them than we deliberately excite or assent to them. Man is not to be regarded as one simple nature, but, so to speak, as two natures united in one person, the rational and the animal. The rational acts *propter finem*, and therefore rationally from free will; the animal acts *ad finem*, according to its own intrinsic necessity, as does all animal nature. It is only on the supposition of these two natures in one person, that we can explain the fact of temptation, or that internal struggle between reason and passion, judgment and inclination, which, since the Fall, rends the bosom of every man. Not otherwise is the language of St. Paul, in the seventh chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, susceptible of an intelligible meaning, or is there sense in the often-quoted words of the heathen poet, —

> "Video meliora, proboque:
> Deteriora sequor."

To place religion in the animal nature, though our author does it virtually, is too gross a violation of common sense for any one with his eyes open. Then it must be placed in the rational nature. Then all religious action is for God as final cause, and then it is necessary to know God, as the end, and also the means of attaining unto him or gaining our end. To know our end we must know our origin, for our final cause is unintelligible without a knowledge of our first cause. Here is all theology, for theology is nothing else than the knowledge of our origin and end, and of the means of gaining our end. It is idle, then, for a man to fight against theology, or

to pretend that knowledge is not requisite to religion, — not only to its perfection, but even to its existence. It is a hard case that we, benighted Papists, who are accused of maintaining that ignorance is the mother of devotion, should have to defend the common cause of intelligence against the philosophers who claim to be the great lights of the age. Perhaps by light they mean darkness, and suppose that forgetting is acquiring knowledge.

The difficulty our Protestants feel arises, not from the necessity of theology, or doctrinal instruction, to the religious character, but from the false theology taught by their sects, and which they mistake for Christian theology. We are not surprised that Protestants rebel against Protestant instruction, or regard Protestant theology as a let and hindrance, at best as superfluous; for it really is an anomaly in Protestantism, and has no relation to the general economy of Protestant life. The Christian doctrines which Protestants profess to retain and incorporate into their theologies are really incredible and absurd when taken as Protestant doctrines, severed from the body of truth to which they belong, and on private judgment or private interpretation. This is a point of great importance, and one which cannot be too often insisted upon. We find Protestants professing certain doctrines which they have retained from us, and we are apt, at first sight, to suppose that these doctrines mean for them what they mean for us, and are as credible when they profess them as when we profess them; or, if we do not so suppose, Protestants themselves do, especially those Protestants who admit to themselves that they are unable to believe these doctrines. But the fact is, that the Christian mysteries professedly held by Protestants are not really the mysteries we believe; for they are taken as isolated doctrines, and differ as much from ours as a branch severed from the trunk, withered and dead, differs from a branch united to the trunk, living and bearing its fruit. On Protestant principles, they serve no purpose in the economy of religious life, they have no connection with Protestant notions of sanctity, are destitute of that beauty and grandeur which pertain to them when seen in their proper place as parts of an organic whole, which rests on a solid and adequate foundation. With us they receive a practical meaning by virtue of their relation to other truths which we hold, but which Protestants reject, and are credible because asserted on a sufficient authority. With Protestants no peculiarly Christian truth has any practical meaning, or is

supported by any authority sufficient for a revealed doctrine. Hence it is that in the bosom of every Protestant sect we see always a party protesting against the nominally Christian doctrines retained by the sect, as relics of Popery, denouncing them as anomalies, inconsistent with Protestantism, and calling upon the sect to clear them away. This is as it should be, and we see not how an intelligent Protestant, not wishing to profess to believe what he does not and cannot, as a Protestant, believe, can do otherwise. To be called upon to believe a mass of doctrines which have no practical connection with life, throw no light on our duties, and furnish no motives to their performance, is an affront to good sense; and we wonder not that so many are found to resist, and labor either to reject or to explain them away.

But, if these intelligent and consistent Protestants — consistent, we say, for they are consistent as Protestants — could be persuaded to look at the Christian doctrines in their unity and integrity, as an organic and living whole, as held by those who have been commissioned to keep and teach them, they would at once see that all their objections are misplaced and puerile. They would then see that he who wars against the understanding, or doctrines addressed to it, is too unreasonable to be called a madman. We grant the doctrines they reject are incredible as Protestant doctrines, but nothing is more credible as Catholic doctrines, because as Catholic doctrines they are in their place, and receive their true significance.

There is much more in Mr. Morell's book on which we might remark, especially his application of his philosophy to the explanation of inspiration and the Christian mysteries; but we have said enough to show that his doctrine is fundamentally false, and hostile to the very conception of religion, and it is not necessary to pursue and refute it in detail. The whole book affords us only a melancholy instance of the impotence of great abilities and respectable scholarship to construct, without the aid of that scientific and theological tradition which has come down to us from Adam, any thing deserving the name of a moral or a religious code. The greatest ability, the most creative genius, and the most varied and profound erudition, operating outside of the traditional wisdom of the race, can produce nothing that can abide for a moment the test of enlightened criticism. Man out of unity is weak and helpless, and can originate nothing but puerility and absurdity. The reason

of this is, that man has not the source of knowledge and wisdom in himself, and is nothing save as he is taught and educated by his Maker. Pride may revolt at this, and men, puffed up by a vain philosophy which only darkens the understanding and perverts the heart, may revolt and blaspheme, but the experience of six thousand years proves that it is true.

Our Maker has never deserted us, and has always been near us to instruct us, if we would but sit down at his feet and listen. Some he has always instructed, and always have those who chose to learn been brought to the knowledge of his will, and informed with his truth. The great body of true doctrine, revealed and natural, has been from the beginning within the reach of all men, is incorporated into the speech of all nations, and preserved in its unity, purity, and integrity in the infallible speech of the Church. There we may learn it, and if we learn it not there, we shall learn it nowhere, and be as heterodox in philosophy as in theology. We have neither to create nor to invent truth ; we have only to consent to be taught it. What fools we must be to refuse to learn ! What greater fools we must be to suppose that all who have preceded us have been fools, that science and wisdom were born only with us, and that our minds are the first on which truth has ever dawned ! There were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise men before Schleiermacher and Morell. The race has not lived six thousand years without a moral or religious code, or with one that now needs to be reversed. Let our philosophers reflect on this, and know that they can reverse the wisdom transmitted us only by putting evil for good, folly for wisdom, and darkness for light. It has been only to arrive at this moral, and to enforce it by a striking example, that we have introduced Mr. Morell's work, and called our readers to its false and immoral teachings and speculations. Such works are instructive, and teach us wisdom as the Spartans taught their sons temperance, by exhibiting the disgusting spectacle of the drunken Helots. From the folly and impiety of even the distinguished among Protestants, let us learn to love our Church still more, and still more humbly adore the grace that permits us to call ourselves *her* children.

ART. III. — *The Mercersburg Review: devoted to Theology, Literature, and Science.* Mercersburg, Pa. January, 1849–1850. Bi-monthly. 8vo.

THIS is a periodical recently established by "the Alumni of Marshall College," Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, as the organ of what is called "the Mercersburg system" of theology, and is conducted with spirit, learning, and ability. Its writers are strong men, apparently in earnest, and they present Protestantism in as plausible a form as it admits, and give it the most respectable vindication that it receives in our language. Whoever would see Protestantism in its least irreligious form, and learn the best that can be said in its favor, will do well to study the pages of this new review. Its modes of thought and expression are, perhaps, a little German, but its pages are rarely dull or uninstructive.

We call the attention of our readers more especially to the number for January last, which contains a long and elaborate article on ourselves, designed to set aside our arguments for the Church, and to vindicate Protestantism, as the writer understands it, from our attacks. The article is ably written, in a tone and manner as acceptable as rare in those who write against us or our Church. The writer is a Protestant, but no vulgar Protestant; he is a gentleman and a scholar, and makes as near an approach to being a Christian as is to be expected from one who opposes the Christian Church. He aims to be fair and candid, and has evidently done his best to state our arguments correctly, and to urge only grave and solid matter against them. It is refreshing to meet such an opponent, and we are sorry to add, that he is almost the only direct opponent we have ever had that we did not feel it a sort of degradation to meet. He is one we can respect, and whom we should dread to encounter, if we had no advantage in our cause to make amends for our own personal inferiority.

The Reviewer very frankly concedes, in the outset, that, as against popular Protestantism, taking private judgment, with or without the Bible, for its rule of faith, our arguments for the Church are conclusive, and that there is no answer to be given to them. He concedes, moreover, that the Protestantism which we have attacked, whether under the special form of High Church or Low Church, Presbyterianism or Methodism, and which has nothing to reply to us but cant and sophistry, is

and long has been the dominant form of Protestantism, and the only form that has been set forth prominently as the rival or the antagonist of Rome. We have, then, he must farther concede, the right to regard this in the judgment of Protestants themselves, as genuine Protestantism, and therefore as its more solid and defensible form. If, as he concedes, we have refuted this, we may conclude *a fortiori* against those minor and less solid forms, that have never been able to make themselves generally acknowledged by Protestants themselves. As the Reviewer contends that the Church is true against no religion, and all religions but the Protestant, he must concede, then, that we have, by his own concessions, the right to conclude its absolute truth.

But, without insisting on this, we remark that the Reviewer contends that there is a higher doctrine than either prevailing Protestantism or Catholicity, and against which our reasoning is not, in his judgment, conclusive. If we had known this doctrine, or been in a condition to appreciate it, we should not, he thinks, in rejecting Unitarianism, have swung to the opposite extreme of Romanism. We were right, he says, in renouncing Rationalism, but we have gone to as great an extreme, though a less dangerous one, in going to Rome. Our fault lies in abandoning private judgment for authority, instead of seeking and finding a doctrine which reconciles them, and preserves them both. But with all respect to our learned and philosophical critic, we were not, if we understand his doctrine, ignorant of it, but were detained by it a considerable time outside of the Church. It is in substance, though not in all its details, the doctrine we sketched in the last number of the *Boston Quarterly Review*, in refuting Mr. Parker's notion of the Church; which we developed at some length in *The Christian World*, during the winter of 1842–43; and which we established our present journal expressly to explain, propagate, and defend.

The attempt to reconcile private liberty and public authority did not escape us. This reconciliation in a supposed higher doctrine than either Catholicity or Protestantism was the precise problem with which we were engaged for the ten or twelve years next preceding our conversion. The attempt to get a satisfactory solution of this problem is the key to all our writings and sermonizing during that long period, and no greater mistake can be committed than to suppose, that, even when we were a Unitarian, we accepted in theory, however closely we may have followed it in practice, the Protestant rule of private

judgment. We never, after 1832, and before that we were too young to be of any account, adopted individualism, but uniformly opposed it, and contended, as our published writings bear witness, for a catholic authority both in church and state, although we erred grievously as to its seat and constitution. Indeed, if there is a single problem that we have studied with any degree of thoroughness, it is this very problem which our Mercersburg friend accuses us of having neglected, namely, the reconciliation of the so-called rights of the individual mind with legitimate public authority. At no period after we began to be known as a Unitarian were we any more prepared to give up authority than we were to give up liberty ; or when, if it should appear that we could not retain both, and that one or the other must be sacrificed, we would not have sacrificed liberty rather than authority. It shows no little want of acquaintance with our personal history, and a gross misapprehension of our published writings, to assert that we went in our conversion from extreme Rationalism to Catholicity, or from extreme individualism to authority. We went to the Church from a theory which was invented to retain them both, and to reconcile them systematically and really one with the other.

We may not have exhausted all possible theories for the reconciliation of liberty and authority, — in the Reviewer's language, "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object," — but we were not ignorant of "the new religious principle and theory" which he proposes, and which he says "the case demanded for its solution." If we understand him, he advances little that cannot be found, in substance, in our own publications prior to our conversion, and, if we did not know that the theory had been advocated by several eminent German authors, and that it was entertained by him, in part at least, at as early a day as by ourselves, we should be half tempted to suspect him of having plagiarized it from our own writings. Of course, we are far from pretending that we set it forth with the systematic fulness and consistency, or with the philosophic depth of thought, the various learning, and the clearness and vigor of expression, with which he does, for in these respects we readily confess our inferiority ; but we did set it forth in its principles, and in what he has said we have found nothing that has taken us by surprise, or with which we do not seem to ourselves to have been tolerably familiar. Whether true or false, adequate or inadequate, we are greatly deceived if the theory has not once been ours, and

if we have abandoned it, we must still be treated with some leniency, since the Reviewer winds up his article against us, by virtually conceding, with a candor that does him honor, that, after all, it is rather a statement than a solution of the difficulty.

As the Reviewer concedes that we are right against popular Protestantism, the question between him and us is not a question between us and Protestantism in general, but between us and his specific form of Protestantism, and if that specific form turns out to be untenable, he must accept our Church as the Church of God. The ground he takes is, either our Church or his form of Protestantism, and therefore, if his form be refuted, so far as he is concerned, we are free to conclude the truth of our Church against every form of Protestantism, nay, the absolute validity of her titles against every claimant. If he is wrong, we must be right. Whether we prove him wrong by direct evidence of the truth of our Church, or by direct evidence of the falsity of his own, can, therefore, make no difference, for in either case the truth of our Church is concluded. The latter is the more proper method of conducting the argument; for the Church is the prior occupant, and must be presumed true until the contrary is made to appear. If the Reviewer's doctrine is removed, ours remains, and he has, therefore, no possible means of disproving our doctrine but by proving his own; and, as the presumption is on our side, his failure to prove his own is, so far as we are concerned, its disproof. Moreover, he must prove his doctrine, not in what it has in common with ours, for, since we precede him, that is our own; but in that which is peculiar to it, which distinguishes it from Catholic doctrine, and makes it a doctrine opposed to it. Has he done this? If he has not, he has done nothing to his purpose, and we stand where we should have stood if he had not undertaken to allege any thing against us.

The Reviewer concedes authority and asserts private liberty in matters of religious faith; for his aim is to accept both, and to reconcile them one with the other. His theory, then, is eclectic, and intended to embrace and reconcile "the liberty of the individual subject with the binding force of the universal object," which, he says, are, on the Catholic system, antagonists, and mutually destructive one of the other. He proposes to do this, not by a shallow and absurd syncretism, which, after the manner of Anglicanism, accepts both in their mutual exclusiveness, and follows arbitrarily first one and then the

other, playing off authority against those who accuse it of believing too much, and liberty against those who accuse it of believing too little; but, by dissolving both in "a new religious principle and theory," higher and broader than either taken separately.

The theory by which he proposes to do this, simply stated, is, in its generative principles, that Christianity is a new and a higher life in the world, and that this new life is literally "God entering into human nature," or the Word made flesh and dwelling among us, full of grace and truth. In an article on *The Relation of Church and State* (November, 1849, p. 576), he says, the *ideal* of the Christian Church is "a higher order of Divine life in the world, which, in its developments, takes to itself a body from the elements of humanity. The principle of this new life is the Lord Jesus Christ, the incarnate Saviour, who is very God and very man in one person, and in whom dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. In him the human and Divine natures are united as they never were before. The union is deep, mysterious, vital. The growth of the Church is the development of Christ's life in the world." Again (July, 1849, pp. 314, 315), he says, the confession of Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," "utters, in the most immediate and direct way, the fact of Christianity, the new order of life it has brought into the world, as apprehended in its most general character in the person of Christ. The object so apprehended, and thus at once brought to utterance, is no doctrine or report simply concerning Christ, but the glorious reality of the Incarnation itself, as exhibited in him under an historical and enduring form. Christianity resolves itself ultimately into this mystery. It has its principle and root in Christ's person. . . . . The Word reveals itself, not by outward oracle or prophecy, but by becoming *flesh*; he is the living comprehension of the truth he proclaims, the actual world of grace which he unfolds and makes known. . . . . The new creation, which is at the same time the end and completion of the old, starts from the mystery of his person. The Incarnation is the deepest and most comprehensive fact in the economy of the world. Jesus Christ authenticates himself, and all truth and reality besides, or rather, all truth and reality are such only by the relation in which they stand to him as their great centre and ground. In him are hid thus all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. He is the absolute revelation of God in the world. . . . . As all this he is primarily no object of intellection, but can be apprehended only by faith; and

in this form he constitutes the sum and substance of Christianity, as it lives in the consciousness of the Church, and finds its expression in the Creed."

It is clear, we think, from this, that the Reviewer's theory is, that the new creation, the Christian order, Christianity, is throughout Christ himself, the "Word made flesh,"— not Christ as the universe is God *mediante* his creative act, or act creating, sustaining, and governing it, but Christ himself, identically in his own substance and person, — and is indistinguishable in its substance from him. Thus he says (*Ibid.*, p. 316), — "The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the *evolution* or development simply of capabilities, relations, and powers, that are treasured up in him from the beginning." And again (January, 1850, p. 4), — "The Lord is perpetually born anew in the hearts of believers; his life is reproduced in their life; and their formation into his image involves an inward adunation also into the very *substance* of his mediatorial person. . . . . Christ and his people are joined together in a *common* life, which starts from him as its source, and is carried over to them by real *organic* derivation," and is in them "an actual participation in his living substance. . . . . The union between Christ and his people actually inserts them spiritually into the substance of his life. They are a new creation in Christ Jesus, not a new creation out of him, and beyond him, by *the fiat of Omnipotence*, bearing some resemblance to him in a different sphere, but a new creation whose original seat and fountain is Christ's own person, and which conveys over to them, accordingly, with true reproductive force, the vitality which belongs to it [Christ's person] in this form."

These passages, and many more like them might be adduced, seem to be conclusive that our Mercersburg friend holds and teaches that the new creation is indistinguishably the Incarnate God; and that we are Christians, are introduced into the Christian order, only by being literally, organically, physically, adunated into his living substance. How this theory is supposed to solve the difficulty as to liberty and authority, it is not difficult to understand. "The mystery of the Incarnation," says the Reviewer (July, 1849, p. 323), "as it stands before us in the person of Christ, includes two sides, which must both enter steadily into our faith to make it complete. We must apprehend, in the first place, the presence of a truly Divine life in the fact, the entrance of God into the world as he had not been

in it before ; in the second place, this life must be admitted under a true human form, and in such relation to the previous constitution of the world, that it shall not violate its order, but be felt rather to fall in with it organically, and complete its sense." Christ is the object, and affirms himself immediately to the apprehension of faith ; he, affirming or authenticating himself immediately in the act of faith, is authority, and constitutes "the binding force of the universal object." But as he affirms himself under a human form only, in the way of human thought and will, as the complement, in some sort, of the natural order of the world, he recognizes the activity of the individual subject ; and as he propounds nothing to the mind, imposes nothing upon it, but simply generates faith in and through it by its own activity, the freedom of the individual is preserved, in the same way that it is preserved in the operations of interior grace.

Whether this be or be not a real solution of the difficulty will, perhaps, appear as we proceed ; for the moment we ask the attention of our readers to the assumptions it makes ; namely, Christ, Christianity, or the Christian order always affirms or authenticates himself from within the believer, and always under a strictly human form. These two assumptions are fundamental in the theory proposed, underlie all the Reviewer's reasoning against us, and give to it whatever of pertinency and force it may have. That reasoning, as far as we comprehend it, is, — 1. That, by maintaining that Christianity is the supernatural object of faith, and as such is extrinsic to the soul, and credible only by means of an extrinsic authority to propound it, we deny the activity of the soul in its reception, and therefore violate the rights of the mind, or the liberty of the individual subject ; 2. That, by asserting that faith is elicitable only by means of an external authority sufficiently accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, fall into sheer Rationalism, and lose the supernatural, and therefore authority, or "the binding force of the universal object"; and, 3. That making Christianity an external object, propoundable by an external authority to reason, as something to be believed or done, we deny that it always presents itself in a true and proper human form, we exclude all human activity in its elaboration or growth, foreclose development, and therefore deny history to be a continuous revelation of God's mind and will, the evolution or realization of the capabilities, revelations, and powers treasured up in the Incarnate God, or God preparing his Incarnation, and actually becoming incarnate. This reasoning, though that

of a no vulgar mind, cannot strike the Catholic as of much force against his Church; but all will agree that it is valuable as illustrating and determining the theory of the author; and it proves clearly enough, that, if it be not true that Christ affirms himself always from within, and only from within, and always and only under a proper human form, that theory cannot be sustained.

The Reviewer professes to object, not to the assertion of Christianity as an object of faith, but simply to its assertion as an *outward* object propoundable from without; nor does he avowedly object to authority, as such, but to that authority which is extrinsic, operating on the mind and commanding it, instead of operating from the mind, in the way of its own intelligence and will. To Christianity and authority, as he understands us to assert them, he objects that they violate the rights of the mind, and operate only in a mechanical way, and by magic. Christianity, according to us, he says, "is taken as a revelation of supernatural truth, which men are to receive as something wholly out of themselves, that is brought near them for their use in a purely outward way. As it has its source and seat beyond their proper nature altogether, so it cannot be allowed to find in this any rule or measure whatever for its apprehension. It must be taken as a matter of mere authority. The relation between the receptivity of faith on the one side, and of the propounded truth on the other, ... is held to be in no sense inward and living, but mechanical only and juxtapositional, the one remaining always on the outside of the other." (January, 1850, pp. 53, 54.) Again: — "As a supernatural constitution, it [Christianity] must not conform to the order of nature. It must be neither organic, nor historical, nor *human* in its higher sphere, but one long monotony rather of mere outward law and authority, superseding the natural order of the world, and contradicting it, from age to age, to the end of time. The Roman system carries in itself thus a constant tendency to resolve the whole force of Christianity into magic, and to fall into the snare of the *opus operatum* in its bad sense." (*Ibid.*, p. 62.)

What the Reviewer here objects to our doctrine is, in substance, — 1. That it places Christianity, as supernatural object of faith, out of the subject; 2. That it places the supernatural wholly above the sphere of the natural; and, 3. That it makes faith the mediate, instead of the immediate, apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. These objections throw light on his own doctrine, and prove that he either has no right to bring them, or holds the exact contrary; namely, — 1. The

supernatural object of faith is in the subject, not out of it; 2. The supernatural does not wholly transcend the natural; and, 3. Faith is the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed. That he does so hold is evident, not only from the fact, that he objects to us for holding the contrary, but from the general tenor of all the articles in his journal bearing on the subject; although he certainly asserts, sometimes, doctrines which contradict these, owing to the fact we shall hereafter point out, of confounding subject with object, and object with subject.

The Reviewer identifies, as we have seen, Christ and Christianity, and regards the whole Christian order, the new creation, as the Incarnate God, or Word made flesh. He places this order in the believer; it is God entering into human nature as he was not in it before, the insertion of a new principle of life in our life, in the very constitution of our nature; and hence "Christianity, as far as it prevails, is the actual elevation of our general life into a higher sphere of existence." Christ is not an outward teacher, or model, as the Unitarians vainly imagine, but an inward principle, from which all flows forth as from its fontal spring. "If Christ be no *principle* of life for humanity, if he be not, in truth, the power of a new creation in its constitution, it follows necessarily that it needs nothing of the sort for its redemption. This is at once Pelagianism." (January, 1850, p. 11.)

It must not be supposed that our Reviewer is merely endeavouring to prove that Christ must be in us, by his gracious operations moving and assisting us to believe and love him as out of us and before us, as the object and final cause of our faith and love; for this is Catholic doctrine, the very doctrine he is professedly warring against. Hence he objects to our doctrine, which makes the object of faith, as object, extrinsic, that "the general law of our nature is, that mind must fulfil its mission, not by following blindly a mere outward force of any sort, but by the activity of its own intelligence and will. . . . . It must move in the light that springs from itself, by a power it continually generates within." This law, he contends, must hold good in the Christian order as well as in the natural. "Christianity claims to be the perfection of man's life; this, in its ordinary constitution, unfolds itself by its own self-movement in the way of thought and will; but just here all this is superseded by another law altogether; the supernatural comes in as the outward complement of the natural, in such sort as to make the force of this last null and void in all that pertains to its higher

sphere." (January, 1850, p. 56.) Hence he tells us that "all revelation, as distinguished from magic, implies the self-exhibition of God, in a real way, through the medium of the world in its natural form. To a certain extent, we have such a revelation in the material universe. The outward creation is the symbol, mirror, shrine, and sacrament of God's presence and glory as a supernatural fact in the most actual way. The word of prophecy and inspiration is the gradual coming forth of eternal truth into time, in a like real way, through the medium of human thought and speech; a process which completes itself finally, in the full domiciliation, we may say, of the Infinite Word itself in the life of the world by Jesus Christ." (*Ibid.*, p. 65.) Christian faith, what we call Christian doctrine, is not something propounded to the reason of man, but is the out-birth of the new life placed by the Incarnation in men, the expression or utterance, by believers, of the life that is in them, and which they live by having the great realities of faith in their own conscious life through organic union with the person of Christ. In treating of the Apostles' Creed, the Reviewer says, — "The Creed is no work of mere outward *authority*, *imposed* on the Church by Christ or his Apostles. It would help its credit in the eyes of some, no doubt, if it could be considered in this view. Their idea of Christianity is such as involves, prevailingly, the notion of a given, fixed scheme of things, *to be believed and done*, propounded for the use of man, on the authority of Heaven, in a purely mechanical and outward way." (May, 1849, p. 201.) But all this is false. The Creed "was not exhibited as a formulary imposed by outward authority, nor as the result of any process of reflection. It presented itself to the world, simply as the firm affirmation, on the part of the Church, of what Christianity was in her living consciousness in the way of direct and immediate fact. . . . . It has its very being in the element and sphere of faith; and it holds there in the character of a direct spontaneous witness, with the mouth, to the great central realities of faith as they are immediately felt in the heart. . . . . It is the product of the early Christian life." (*Ibid.*, pp. 214, 215.) "No man can be said to have composed it; it is no work of bishops or synods; it must be taken rather as the grand epos of Christianity itself, the spontaneous poem of its own life, unfolded in fit word and expression from the inmost consciousness of the universal Church." (*Ibid.*, p. 217.) So faith springs from the life of believers, not the life of believers from faith!

We might multiply citations to the same purport without end, but these suffice to show that the Reviewer's theory is, that Christianity, as supernatural object, as the living truth, in some way inserts itself in the believer, and is in the believing subject, operating in the act of faith from the subject's own centre, in the way of his own thought and will, and therefore, in regard to the act of faith, is not object, but subject, in the same sense, and on the same principle, that auxiliary grace is subject. In denying, then, that the object of faith is extrinsic, or out of the subject, and contending that it is in the subject, acting in the direction of the soul's own action, and coalescing with it, he denies the object itself; for whatever is objective is out of the subject, and whatever is in the subject is subjective. He, then, loses the act of faith itself; for the creditive subject can elicit the act only in concurrence with the credible object. He also fails to solve his problem, for he cannot deny the object, and still assert its binding force.

The Reviewer admits no proper supernatural, as is evident from the fact that he objects to us for making it transcend the natural, and from the fact that he holds that we have an original natural capacity for the direct and immediate apprehension of it. He confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, and understands by it nothing but the intelligible or *noetic* world as distinguished from the sensible, the *noumenon* as distinguished from the *phenomenon* of Kant. He objects to the way in which we oppose faith to reason, that is, distinguish faith from reason. "Its opposition," he says, "is properly to sense, and to nature as known by sense; to reason only in so far as taken for the understanding in relation to such knowledge. Faith is the capacity of perceiving the invisible and supernatural, ... which as such does not lie on the outside of reason, ... but opens to view rather a higher form of . . . . . its own proper life. It requires, of a truth, in our present circumstances, a supernatural *influence* to call faith into exercise; . . . . . there must be for this purpose a new life by the spirit of Christ; but all this forms at best but the proper *education* or *drawing out* of the true sense of man's life as it stood before." (Jan., 1850, p. 67.) "Faith stands just in the apprehension of invisible things in their true and proper reality. The direct and immediate communication of our nature with this higher world, in virtue of its original capacity for such purpose, the state or activity in which this communication holds, is itself precisely what we understand by faith." "Our

nature is formed for such direct communication with the world of spirit; carries in itself an original capacity for transcending the world of sense, in the immediate apprehension of a higher order of existence, and can never be complete without its active development." (May, 1849, p. 209 and p. 208.)

Here it is undeniable that no reality is allowed to be held in faith that transcends the original capacity of our nature, and that nothing above the intelligible world is apprehended. This is not supernatural, for it is a contradiction in terms to say the supernatural does not transcend the capacity of the natural. Undoubtedly, we have a natural faculty of apprehending the supersensible. Certainly, the human mind, as naturally constituted, is not confined, as Locke maintains, to the knowledge derived from sensation and reflection. There is for us an intelligible world above the sensible, and it is only by virtue of this intelligible world that the sensible itself becomes intelligible, or is for us any thing more than a mode or affection of our own sensitive subject. In this intelligible world, the being, though not the essence, of God, is apprehended, and the invisible things of God from the creation, or foundation, of the world, even his eternal power and divinity, are clearly seen, being understood, that is, known, *intellecta*, by the things that are made; and therefore the very heathen were inexcusable for lapsing into idolatry; but all this lies in the order of nature, the primitive creation, and is included in God's revelation of himself as the Intelligible. The supernatural is above this, above the whole order of the natural universe, regarded either in its first cause or in its final cause, and is God's revelation of himself as superintelligible, as the Author of the new creation, the order of grace, not promised in the order of nature, not included in its original plan, nor necessary to complete it in its own order. The new creation presupposes the old, and grace presupposes nature, and as both proceed from the same Creator, there must of course be a congruity between them, for God can never be in contradiction with himself; but the new creation is strictly supernatural, and therefore in a sphere outside of reason and infinitely above it. We have no natural power to apprehend either what it is, or that it is; and we know absolutely nothing of it, except what is communicated to us, not from within, but from above, by God himself. This is the supernatural in the sense of Catholic theology, and we must be elevated to its order, before we rise above mere natural religion. The Reviewer, by confounding it with the supersensible, shows that he only fol-

lows in the wake of American and German Transcendentalists, and remains, with all his lofty pretensions, in a sphere below the lowest distinctively Christian sphere of thought.

The Reviewer, it is well to notice, by the way, restricts expressly all the supernatural he recognizes to a simple *influence* which calls faith into exercise, and this influence he supposes to be necessary only in our present circumstances. The power is in us by nature, and nothing is needed but to render it active. So the new and higher principle, which, we have seen, is Christ himself, God entering into the world as he was never in it before, the new creation, the whole Christian order, is, then, at most, simply prevenient grace, revealing nothing, teaching nothing, commanding nothing, doing nothing, but simply exciting one of our dormant powers to activity! Here are great words, and a tremendous preparation for comparatively a small affair. Really our Mercersburg friend must have been napping when he invented this part of his doctrine. But let him not be too much depressed. Homer sometimes nods, as Horace says, and human inventions are frequently dreams.

That the Reviewer understands by faith the immediate, not simply the mediate, apprehension of the matter believed, is evident from the passages just cited to prove that he confounds the supernatural with the supersensible, for in them he defines it to be the direct and immediate communication with the realities it holds; and if he did not so understand it, his objection to us, that we make it mediate only, would be irrelevant and absurd. What we maintain is, that, in matters of faith, as distinguished from matters of knowledge or science, the objective truth, though extrinsically evident, is intrinsically inevident, and therefore, in itself considered, is no immediate object of intellectual apprehension. This we had supposed follows from the nature of faith, which, by its very definition, is assent to a proposition on testimony, or the authority of another, and from the fact, which every Christian at least must acknowledge, that mysteries are credible. But it is precisely the intrinsic inevidence of the revealed truth, and the necessity of receiving it on authority, or of any motives of assent which the mind does not draw from immediate contemplation of it, that we understand our Mercersburg theologian to deny. Our doctrine, he says, "carries with it a wrong conception of the nature and power of faith. . . . . It goes on the assumption that the supernatural, with which faith has to do, is so sundered from the natural as to admit of no approach or apprehension from

that side; that truth in such form is *inevident* for the mind wholly, in its own nature, and without force of reason *intrinsically* to engage its assent; that the mind is moved to such assent, ... not by any motives either in itself or in the object set before it, but by something extrinsic to both, — the weight of an intermediate authority, which is felt to be fully valid as a ground of certainty, without regard to the nature of what is thus taken on trust, one way or another. 'In belief,' says Mr. Brownson, 'I must go out of myself, and also out of the object, for my motives of assent.' Subjective and objective come to no union whatever. The gulf between them is sprung only by means of outward *testimony*. The case requires, indeed, Divine testimony. Still it is always as something between the subject and object, in a purely separate and external way." (Jan., 1850, pp. 66, 67.) Even Divine testimony is not to be credited, it seems, according to our German Reformed Doctor, till we have examined what it testifies to, and satisfied ourselves by our own light that it is true, and worthy to be believed. "It will not do," he says, "in the face of such a fact as the *Incarnation*, to say that the realities with which faith has to do, in distinction from reason, are wholly without light or evidence for this last, in their own nature, and as such to be taken on the mere authority of God, ascertained in some other way; in such sense that a man might be supposed to be infallibly sure, first, that he has this authority to go upon, and so be prepared to accept any and every proposition as true, on the strength of it, with equal readiness and ease." (*Ibid.*, p. 64.) "Faith stands in rational correspondence with its contents, ... makes the mind in some measure actually in their sphere, ... touches its object as truly as sense," (*Ibid.*, p. 67,) and "is led by motives of assent in its object, and not simply by motives drawn from some other quarter; in other words, the authority of God moving it is not on the outside of the object, but comes to view in and by the object bearing its proper seals." (*Ibid.*, p. 70.) There is no need of further extracts, for these prove clearly that the Reviewer rejects as faith the apprehension of truth through the medium of testimony, even that of God himself, and will not allow the object to be credible, unless the mind immediately perceives its truth. Hence he censures us for maintaining that we must take the word from the speaker, not the speaker from the word, and holds (*Ibid.*, p. 68) that Christ's miracles do not accredit him, but he accredits them. Clearly, then, he holds faith to be, in

some way, the immediate apprehension of the truth of the matter believed, especially since, in a passage we shall cite again soon, for another purpose, he asserts that "faith without truth for its contents can no more be in exercise or existence, than natural vision can be where light is wanting." But such immediate apprehension of truth is intuition, knowledge, not faith. So it follows that the Reviewer's new principle and theory of religious life, which he says we needed when we left Rationalism to spare us the labor of going to Rome, lose the object of faith by resolving it into subject, the supernatural revelation by resolving it into the supersensible, and faith itself by resolving it into knowledge or intuition; that is, since he recognizes the supernatural at all only as an exciting influence, — a mere stimulus, — if even so much, his system is substantially the very Rationalism he applauds us for having rejected.

It is easy enough for us, who have had personal experience of the Reviewer's theory, and who have the light of Catholic theology to guide us, to comprehend his difficulties, and to see the source of his errors. He does not clearly understand that things must have an outside as well as an inside, and that he cannot deny their outside without also denying their inside. It is always well to try to get at the "inmost" heart of things, but it is necessary, that, in the effort to do so, we do not destroy the life of things themselves. We are far from believing that our Mercersburg Doctor intends to deny all faith objectively considered, but he is confused by his German pantheism, or rather, Oriental doctrine of emanation, and his mystical philosophy, exaggerated by his Calvinistic training. He intends to acknowledge both subject and object, but he does not appear to see clearly that they are necessarily the one outside of the other, that subject stands opposed to object, and object to subject, that the subject is the human soul, and that object, if object at all, is something distinct from the soul, out of the soul, and independent of it. The subject, indeed, cannot act, or exist even, independently of its object, for it is not God, — who alone is from and by himself, or is his own object, — but the object can and does exist without the subject.

Hence the object is always authoritative, and all evidence is objective; and we beg leave here to correct one of our assertions, made in 1845, cited by the Reviewer, but not used or objected to by him, that in the fact of intuition the evidence is in the subject. This, though true enough in relation to the purpose for which we asserted it, is, nevertheless, not strictly accurate.

All we there meant to assert was, that in intuition the assent is immediate, not discursive, as in demonstrative science, nor by the mediation of another, as in faith; but the language naturally bears a Cartesian sense, to which we object. The evidence is never in the subject, but is always objective, as we have shown in the foregoing article. The subject never affirms the object, but the object is always affirmed, either *per se* or *per alia*, to the subject. In knowledge it affirms itself, is evident, or intelligible *per se*; in faith it is inevident *per se*, and is affirmed only by a witness to whom it is not so inevident, but evident. Hence, as in the case of Christianity, when it is supernatural, it can be affirmed only by a supernatural witness; for to none but a supernatural witness can the supernatural be evident or intelligible by itself.

But the Reviewer either denies or misapprehends all this, and makes the subject and object mutually dependent one on the other, or rather, following Fichte, regards the object as the product of the subject. "The word lives," he says, "and is the word truly, only by faith." (May, 1849, p. 209.) "The existence of truth is objective, and in such view, of course, universal and independent of all private thought and will; but as thus objective, it must be at the same time subjective, must enter into particular thought and will, in order to be *real*. As object merely, without subject, it becomes a pure abstraction. Mere single mind can never be, in and of itself, the measure of either truth or right; it must be ruled, and so bound by the objective, or authority of the general. On the other hand, the general as such, mere law or object, is no such measure either, in and of itself; to be so, it must take concrete form in the life of the world, which resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds." (Jan., 1850, pp. 56, 57.)

It is difficult to conceive greater confusion of thought than we find here, or to compress more, or more fundamental, error into the same number of words. The writer says, indeed, that "the existence of truth is objective," but he resolves it as objective into the general, and distinguishes it from the particular, and therefore, though he seems not to be aware of it, denies the existence of particular, concrete objects. Only the general is objective; then particulars are subjective. Man exists, indeed, independent of my private thought and will, but men exist only as I think and will them! But the object without subject is unreal, a pure abstraction. A pure abstraction is a nullity; then existence can be predicated of nullity. This equals He-

gel's assertion of the identity in the last analysis of *das Seyn* and *das Nicht-seyn*, of *to be* and *not to be*, *being* and *non-being*. This cannot be said. Consequently, if the objective is a pure abstraction, the truth that is said to be objective is no objective reality at all. Then all reality is subjective, — which is simply Kantism as developed by Fichte, that is, pure autotheism. By resolving the object, which, we must remember, is Christ, God Incarnate, into the general, and denying it to be authoritative, or the measure of truth and right, till it "takes concrete form in the life of the world, which resolves itself at last into the thinking and willing of single minds," he makes God himself dependent on the thinking and willing of these minds for his reality, his very being, and implies that if it were not for them there would be no God. He thus denies God, or, what is the same thing, resolves him into infinite void, mere abstract possibility, seeking to become *plenum*, full, or real in the life of the world, — pure Buddhism. But abstract possibility, infinite void, is a nullity, and can do nothing, neither create the world nor realize itself in its life. Then there is no world, and if there is no world, and God is a nullity, nothing is or exists, — pure nullism, or nihilism, to which, we have shown over and over again, all Protestantism, whatever its form, has an invincible tendency.

The Reviewer, we doubt not, intends to be a true Christian believer, and fails to see that these consequences follow necessarily from his principles; but he must permit us to suggest that he is misled by modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real being only in that he is creator, and actually creates *ad extra*, as well as by his Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone, which he wishes to be able to understand in a real inward sense, not in a purely forensic sense, as is the case with Protestants generally. He misconceives the language of St. Paul (Heb. xi. 1), "Est fides sperandarum substantia rerum," and interprets it to mean, not that faith is the substance of things hoped for, that is, beatitude, because in the order of their acquisition it is their inchoation, or beginning, as the principles of a science are said, and very properly, to be its substance, because that from which all in the science follows, but that it substantiates them, renders them real, or gives them substance, in the sense in which the word is taken in the category of substance. But this is absurd. The Apostle declares faith to be "the substance of things *hoped* for," *sperandarum substantia rerum*, not of things already possessed; yet, as faith is

possessed by the believer, if it were their substantiality, they would be things already possessed, and not things hoped for. What is hoped for by the Christian is beatitude, that is, the possession of God as the Supreme Good. To say that our faith is the substance of this, or gives to it its substance, is to say, either that our faith is God, or that it makes God, creates the Sovereign Good; neither of which can be said. We applaud the Reviewer for his wish to get rid of the Protestant doctrine of forensic justification, which is only a sham justification, and no real justification at all; but we cannot applaud him for attempting to do it, either by asserting for us beatitude in this life, or by assuming that we are, or that we make, our own final cause.

Following modern philosophy, which teaches that God is real only in that he is creator, the Reviewer can assert that God lives, is living God, only by asserting that he lives in the life of the world, that is, as he explains it, "in the thinking and willing of single minds." His system seems to us to be based on the supposition, that God comes to reality only in the life of the universe, and that the universe, whether natural or supernatural, is simply the evolution or development, that is, realization, of the abstract potentialities or possibilities of the Divine nature. The two orders completed are the realized or completed God. Thus he says, "The new creation grows forth actually from the mystery of Christ's person, being from first to last the evolution or development simply of the capabilities, relations, and powers treasured up in him from the beginning." (July, 1849, p. 316.) If the new, then the old, or there would be no congruity between the two orders, on which the Reviewer so strenuously insists. Hence the significance and sacredness of history. It is God's realization of his own potentiality, in space and time, or his *coming* to reality. It is, then, the manifested God, and whoso censures it is a blasphemer. Assuming that it starts from the Incarnation, either as preparatory to it or as realizing it, and flows on since the Incarnation, under the forms of the Roman Church, down to the sixteenth century, and thence on through the Reformers and the central life of Protestant nations down to our times, he condemns as unhistorical, and as real blasphemers of God, all who denounce the Catholic Church prior to the Reformers, and also all who defend it since. Such seems to us to be the Reviewer's theory, and our readers will see at once that it is, substantially, the very theory we refuted in our critical examina-

tion, last year, of Mr. Wm. H. Channing's Discourse on *The Christian Church and Social Reform*. It is decidedly pantheistic, at best nothing but an imperfect reproduction of the old Oriental doctrine of emanation, which teaches that the universe is evolved from God, or flows forth from him, not as the effect from the cause, but as the stream from the fountain.

The error, under a theological point of view, lies in making faith the substantiality, or substantialization, of the things hoped for, instead of their first principle in the order of attainment; and, under a philosophical point of view, in conceiving God, primarily, not as *Ens reale*, or real being, but as *Ens in genere*, or mere abstract possibility. If our Mercersburg friend had understood clearly that divine truth, or the faith as object, however much it may, by being believed, impart to the believer, is itself, as Divine reality, always the same, whether believed or unbelieved, and that God is absolutely real, most pure act in himself, as real, and as complete, without the universe as with it, and that, while it is absolutely dependent on him, he in no sense depends on it, he would have seen that his doctrine, that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be real, is the grossest absurdity, to use a mild term, into which the human mind can fall.

Will the Reviewer reply, that we misunderstand his language, and hold him responsible for principles which he repudiates? It is barely possible. It is barely possible that he does not intend to deny the reality of truth, considered in itself, when unbelieved, but merely that it is real as a fact of our life, that is, real to us. This would seem to follow from his assertion, that "faith does not create truth," and that "the existence of truth is objective." Much that he says is easily explained, and easily explained only, on the supposition that all he means to assert is, that truth, when not believed, though not a pure abstraction considered in itself, is a pure abstraction in regard to our actual life, and, as to us, is as if it were not. But this is only saying, in other words, that the truth when unbelieved is not believed, and when separate from us is not united to us. We cannot persuade ourselves that so able and learned a man could have supposed it necessary to assert, much less to go into an elaborate argument to prove, so obvious a truism. His labor, on this supposition, at least so far as Catholics are concerned, would have been "much ado about nothing." That the truth is not real as a fact of our life when not believed; that in the act of believing, the creditive subject and credible object are,

in some way, brought into direct contact, and the assent in the last instance is immediate ; that, in believing, the mind takes hold of the object, appropriates it, is united to it as the true, in like manner as in charity it is united to it as the good; and that, in believing and appropriating it, the mind is active, not passive, are facts that we have never expressly or by implication denied, or dreamed of denying. Besides, we are unable to reconcile this view of the Reviewer's meaning with his theory of development and of history, which is undeniably pantheistic ; with his assertion, that faith is the primitive form in which Divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men, that the relation between faith and truth is that between form and its contents, and that the truth is no doctrine received by believers, but a fact uttered or expressed by them ; with his denial of Christianity as a supernatural revelation of truth, or doctrine, extrinsically propoundable to the mind ; or, in fine, with his censure of us for allowing the human mind no activity in elaborating Christianity, in forming what we are to believe, and in constituting or enacting the law we are to obey. These all imply something more than the simple truism we have pointed out, if the Reviewer were, as he is not, a man to deal in mere truisms.

"The theory of Mr. Brownson," he says, "requires us to assume that in the highest form of religion, that which is reached in Christianity, the human mind ceases to be directly active in the accomplishment of that which is *brought to pass in its favor*. . . . . The difficulty is, that no activity is allowed it in the *realization* of Christianity itself." (Jan., 1850, p. 56.) He objects that, according to us, "Christianity is taken to be of force for the world only under an abstract form ; an outwardly supernatural revelation, transcending the whole order of our common life, and not needing nor allowing the activity of man himself, as an intelligent and free subject, to be the medium of its presence and power." (*Ibid.*, p. 57.) "Certainly the theory before us is ready to say, the law must be obeyed freely, by the option and choice of the obeying subject ; but this requires no *autonomy* of the subject in the *constitution of the law*, no voice in its legislation ; all the case demands or allows is, that, on grounds wholly extrinsic to its constitution, the subject be rationally persuaded that obedience is wise and right." (*Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.) There is here a confusion of thought, a vagueness of expression, that perplexes us ; but it is clear, that, whatever be the writer's precise meaning, he certainly means this much, that man ought to have a hand in forming the truth believed, and a

voice in constituting the law he is to obey. "Freedom is more, a great deal, than any such outward consent to the authority of law. It is life *in* the law [that is, activity in constituting it], the very form in which it comes to its revelation in the moral world. Place law as an objective force on the outside of the intelligence and will of those who are to be its subjects, and at once you convert it into an abstract nothing. This is the natural extreme of Romanism." (*Ibid.*) It would seem to be evident enough from this, that the Reviewer means literally that the truth as objective must at the same time be subjective in order to be in any sense real, and that, when he says the object without subject is a pure abstraction, he means that it is an abstraction in every sense, not merely an abstraction as to our subjective life. This follows from the two fundamental assumptions on which his whole theory rests, namely, that Christ always affirms or authenticates himself from within, and always under a human form. Thus he says, — "The relation between perception and object is of the most inward and necessary character. It is the relation which holds between contents and form. Faith is the form in which Divine truth comes to its proper revelation among men." (May, 1849, p. 208.) Faith is subjective, for the Reviewer calls it sometimes an original capacity of our nature, and sometimes "an inward form or habit" of the soul. The contents, without form, are simply the *materia informis* of the Schoolmen, mere potential existence; consequently truth becomes *materia formata,* or real existence, only by virtue of the formative power of faith, that is, of the subject. This proves clearly that the Reviewer holds the truth, when not believed, when not formed by the human mind, to be in fact a pure abstraction, a simple abstract possibility; for it is the form that gives reality, or renders the possible actual. Consequently, the author's theory must be what we have supposed it, and lead, as we have shown, to nullism. It is the object that gives the form or species, and to contend that it is the subject is simply making man, if creation is supposed, the creator, and God the creature, — that is, man makes God, and not God man!

The Reviewer seems to us, not only to confound natural and supernatural, running the one alternately into the other, but to overlook the distinction between first cause and final cause, and to forget that God alone is both first cause and final cause of all things. The universe presents us two cycles, — the one the procession of existences by way of creation, not

emanation, from God as first cause; and the other, the return of existences, without absorption in him, to God as their final cause, or ultimate end. God has made all things for himself; that is, as first cause he makes all things for himself as final cause; that is, again, he makes all things as creator for himself as the *Summum Bonum*, or Sovereign Good. In the first cycle, whether in the new creation or the old, the supernatural order or the natural, God alone is active; for he creates all things out of nothing by himself alone, by the sole word of his power, and the assumption of human nature by the second person of the ever-adorable Trinity forms no exception, because the Incarnation is remedial, and the share or merit of the human nature of Christ as an instrument in our redemption is due solely to the *gratia unionis*, or grace of union, as it is called, which is God himself. To claim for man or for any creature any activity, direct or indirect, in this first cycle, either in the procession of nature or in the procession of grace, would be to convert the creature into creator, — if not at once formally to supplant God, at least, to give him a rival, companion, or assistant, which is little better, and in the last analysis comes to the same thing. Hence all creatures owe their entire existence to God, and to God alone; and hence, too, in the new creation, we can do absolutely nothing towards our salvation without Divine grace moving and assisting us. The Reviewer sins against this truth, when he censures us for excluding human activity from all share in forming, developing, or realizing Christianity as the new creature, and contends that the new creation subsists only in a human form, and has reality only in our intelligence and will.

In the second cycle, or return of existences, God stands as the terminus *ad quem*, as in the first cycle or procession of existences he stands as the terminus *a quo*. Nullity can no more be final cause than it can be first cause, and the creature can no more be or create the one than the other; for the final cause must, logically speaking, precede in the mind of the creator the act of creation. The intellect must present the end before the will can command it, for the will, taken distinctly, is a blind faculty, and cannot act in reference to an end not apprehended, and an end that is not, cannot be apprehended. God is in himself the Sovereign Good, and therefore eternally the Sovereign Good in itself; therefore the Sovereign Good is no creature, no creation; and to suppose it a creature would deny God as creator, by deny-

ing to him the Sovereign Good for which to create. The first cause and the final are then both increate, eternal, self-subsisting, and self-sufficing. In regard to the production of either, the creature has and can have no activity. The Reviewer sins against this undeniable truth, when he censures us for allowing man no autonomy, no right, collectively or individually, to be governed only by his own will, no voice in constituting the law to which he is to be subject. Nothing can be worse than this, for it supposes the law is created, and in part at least by man himself. But this cannot be. The law is not created at all; it is eternal, and, as a rule, has its seat, not in the creative will of God as such, not precisely in God regarded as first cause, but in God as final cause, that is, in God as the Sovereign Good, and is promulgated and enforced by God as Supreme Ruler, because he always rules as he creates, in accordance with and for himself as the Sovereign Good. The law is not only eternal, but immutable, and God himself cannot change it; for he cannot change his own immutable nature which is it. To suppose God creates it, is to suppose that he creates himself; to suppose that man creates it, is to suppose that man creates God; and to assert man's autonomy, or right to be governed only by his own will, is to deny that he is under law, or bound at all to seek God as the Sovereign Good. Does the Reviewer maintain that we are not morally bound to seek God as our ultimate end? Does he deny all morality, and assert that man is free to live as he lists? Is he an Antinomian? We cannot believe it. Then God is himself man's law, and then man is morally bound to will what God wills, that is, to love what God loves, that is to say, God himself, as Supreme Good, and has no right to will or to love as his ultimate end any thing else. How, then, pretend that man is his own legislator, his own lawgiver? As well might you say, man is his own maker, that man is God, nay, that man is God's maker. No laws that are not transcripts of the Divine law, the eternal and immutable law, which is God himself, have any of the essential characteristics of law.

It follows from this, that, as God is both our first cause and our final cause, he is also our law, and therefore in regard to our origin, our end, and the law by which we proceed from God, and by which we are to return to him, we have no voice, no will, no activity. All here is either God himself, or the work of his infinite, eternal, and immutable goodness and love. To claim activity in regard to our origin is the fundamental error

of Pelagianism,— to claim it in regard either to our end or to the law is at once Pelagianism and Antinomianism, — and in both cases is to fall into that sin of pride for which the angels lost their first estate, and our first parents were expelled from paradise. The Reviewer, we fear, has suffered himself to be seduced by the flattering words of the serpent, "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," and, in the unconscious pride of his heart, refuses to obey a law which comes to him from God, or one which he has had no voice in enacting.

This premised, it follows that the activity of the creature, whether we speak of the natural order or the supernatural, is confined to the second cycle of the universe, of the *cosmos*, and all its rightful activity consists in seeking, according to the law, and by the means and conditions imposed, or granted, by the Divinity, to return, without absorption in him, to union with God as Ultimate End or Supreme Good. All creatures in their several degrees, and according to their respective natures, tend, mediately or immediately, to this end, the rational immediately, the irrational mediately in the rational, for the irrational is for the rational creation. Hence to man is given full dominion under God over the lower world, and he may lawfully appropriate it to his use. The rational creation is subject in its return to a moral law, and therefore must return voluntarily, from choice, that is, love. Here in this second cycle of creation, its return to God as Ultimate End, or Supreme Good, is the sole sphere of man's activity, and it consists in voluntary obedience to the law of God, in concurring or coöperating with the Divine grace moving and assisting him to fulfil it, that is, to return to his union with God as his Supreme Good, and as the Supreme Good in itself.

Christianity, in its largest sense, is the entire supernatural order, the supernatural *cosmos*, or new creation, and supposes God as its creator and end, therefore the first cause, the final cause, and the law of the Christian. But it presupposes the natural or primitive order, according to the well-known maxim, *gratia præsupponit naturam*. It is not nature, is not necessary to complete nature, as nature, but it is for nature, a new creation in its favor, proceeding from the superintelligible and ineffable love and goodness of God, as infinitely transcending the love and goodness in nature, and therefore apprehensible only as it is supernaturally revealed, and even then only as a mystery, that is, only as truth or reality intrinsically inevident, and only extrinsically evident to us ; that is, again,

evident to us only through the medium of God as the intelligible, distinguishable as to us from God as superintelligible, but who in himself is indistinguishably both. Hence the Reviewer's objection, that the natural and supernatural, if constituting two distinct spheres, can never coalesce or come to real inward union, unless he understands by union identity, has no foundation, for they are linked together in the unity of God and the simplicity of the Divine act regarded in its terminus *a quo*. The natural creation proceeds from the essence of God, for in God there is no distinction between essence and being, but it does not, so to speak, exhaust or reveal that infinite essence. In other words, in the natural order God is not as to his essence evident *per se*, though the fact that he is and creates is thus evident. As the intelligible has its root in the superintelligible, so God can, as superintelligible, extrinsically evidence to it, and through it, what he is as to his infinite essence. The medium is adequate thus far, because, *ex parte Dei*, the intelligible and the superintelligible are identical, and because on our part, in receiving the revelation of God as the intelligible, we receive also the certification of the fact that he is also, as to us, superintelligible, that he must be in his essence infinitely more than appears to us, or that he infinitely surpasses our comprehension, as we assert in asserting, as we do by natural reason, his incomprehensibility. Hence all Christians assert that the possibility of a supernatural revelation, and therefore of a supernatural order or new creation, is provable by the light of nature ; that it is possible for God, if he has created such an order, to reveal the fact, and the character, the laws, elements, contents, demands, of that order to us, as an object of faith ; and also that it is possible for the revelation to be so accredited as his, that we shall be bound in reason to believe it.

The Reviewer, we presume, is not prepared precisely to deny this, for he professes to believe in Divine revelation ; but he denies that the revelation is any doctrine or report concerning God, holds that God is himself his own revelation, asserts that his revelation is his mere self-exhibition, and that faith is simply the expression by the believer of what is immediately apprehended of him. Hence he denies that the Christian revelation is any thing that can be proposed to the believer. But this, if he examines it, he will see is the denial of Divine revelation, and of the new creation itself. He makes, as we have seen, Christ, that is, God himself, not the author of the new

creation, but the new creation itself. This is what we showed in the outset. Consequently, he admits no supernatural *created* order, and hence we have found him resolving the supernatural into the natural. If there is no created supernatural order, then no such order can be revealed, and then no revelation of supernatural truth can be made or propounded for our belief. But Christ is the new creation no more than he is the primitive creation, and if he is declared to be identically the one, then he must be the other, which is pure pantheism, into which we have already seen the Reviewer's system logically resolves itself. He starts with a false assumption, that Christ is the new creation, and that the new creation consists precisely in his assumption of human nature. Christ is God, and is the new creation, as he is the old, only *mediante actu creativo*, only in that he creates it; and though it is nothing without him, he is all without it that he is with it. Either there is a new creation or there is not; either there is a supernatural order, or there is not. If there is not, it is idle to talk about Christianity, for its very existence is denied. If there is, although we can know by the revelation of God to us as the intelgible, that is, by the light of natural reason, that a new creation is possible, yet that there is a new creation in fact, and if so, what it is, we can know only as God himself supernaturally informs us. Clearly, then, there are matters — namely, the things hoped for, and the means and conditions of attaining them — distinguishable from God, if we suppose the fact of a new creation, and matters which are not revealed by the simple self-exhibition of God, for God is a free creator, and his act *ad extra* is always a free act, an act of the Divine free will, and therefore they are contained in him only as the effect is contained in the cause, not as the consequence is contained in the principle, since this last would make him necessary cause, and thus assert pantheism. He must, in order to reveal them to us, reveal himself, or, in the language preferred by the Reviewer, exhibit himself as their first cause and their final cause, which implies a specific or formal revelation of them. If, then, the Reviewer does not elect to insist on the pantheism, and therefore the nullism, which he asserts, without being aware, we presume, that he does assert it, and if he does not choose to deny the fact of the Christian order altogether, he must admit the supernatural order as a created order, a new creation, as distinct, as such, from God as is the natural creation itself; and then he must concede the possibility and need of a supernatural

revelation of what it is, and of what God himself is as its first and last cause. Then he must retract his reasoning against us, and concede that Christianity is supernatural truth supernaturally revealed to us, and by its very revelation propounded *ab extra* to us as an object of faith.

But even restricting the new creation, as the Reviewer improperly does, to the fact of the incarnation or assumption of our nature by the Word, this conclusion must still be conceded. This fact takes place in time, — is a fact, therefore, distinguishable from God himself; it is also a fact quite out of the order of nature, and therefore in itself above our natural intelligence. That it is a fact can be known to us only as it is supernaturally revealed. The simple exhibition by the Word of himself in the world, is not the authentication of himself as God having assumed human nature, for by simply beholding Jesus, men did not know, and could not know, that he was God, as is evident of itself, and also from the answer of our Lord to Peter. Peter confessed him to be "Christ, the Son of the living God"; and Jesus answered, *Beatus es Simon Bar-Jona: quia caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi, sed Pater meus, qui in cœlis est.* (St. Matt. xvi. 17.) What Peter immediately believed was not that the person before him was Christ the Son of the living God, but God himself revealing and asserting it, and asserting it *ab extra*, too, as distinguished from Peter's own thought and will. Otherwise it would not have been true that flesh and blood did not reveal it to him. Doubtless it was revealed by immediate inspiration, but *in*spiration is not *ex*spiration, — is a breathing in from without, not a breathing out from within. In no way could Peter, or could any of the disciples, know that Christ was God, the "Word made flesh," but through a supernatural revelation of the fact, — by God himself supernaturally proposing the fact to their minds, and infallibly assuring them that he who thus proposes it is God. If we must say this of those who were inspired to reveal truth, then *a fortiori* of those who were not so inspired.

But passing by those whom our Lord personally instructed through the medium of speech, or whom he chose to instruct by direct and immediate inspiration, what are we to say of those who were to believe in him through *their* word? *Non pro eis autem rogo tantum, sed et pro eis qui credituri sunt per verbum eorum in me.* (St. John xvii. 20.) How were these to believe Christ through the word of his Apostles, if there is no Christian truth to be extrinsically propounded and accredited? Certain

it is some have not believed, certain it is that some are not believers, and certain it is, also, that all who are believers have once been unbelievers. Do believers believe nothing? Is there, or is there not, supernatural truth revealed by God, which all are commanded to believe? There must be, according to the Reviewer's own doctrine, that the assumption by the Word of our nature is a new, therefore a supernatural, creation. How is this fact to be believed by those who are not believers, if it is not propounded or proposed to them? "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? And how shall they believe him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how can they preach unless they be sent? . . . . . Faith, then, cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ,"—*ergo fides ex auditu, auditus per verbum Christi.* (Rom. x. 13 – 17.) These are St. Paul's words, not ours; and if the Reviewer refuses to yield to their authority as Divine inspiration, we trust it will not be too much to ask him either to yield to their logic or to refute it.

Indeed, the Reviewer is, after all, unable to avoid contradicting himself, and asserting, even while denying, the Christian order as something to be extrinsically propounded for belief. His Review itself is established as the organ of the so-called Mercersburg system of theology, and it is certainly intended to propound, propagate, and defend that system, — a system which he, at least, it is fair to suppose, identifies with Christian truth. What is he doing in writing against us, but attempting to prove that our doctrine is not Christian doctrine, and that his is? Are we rash in supposing that he holds that he has a revealed truth of some sort, which we do not accept, but which he wishes to induce us to accept? Or shall we say that he regards the matters involved in the controversy between us, not as revealed truths, but as mere human opinions? We cannot do him the wrong to adopt this latter supposition. He must, then, assume that he has some revealed truth which we have not, and which he is really proposing to us, in an outward way, and thus is doing the very thing which he contends cannot be done.

The Reviewer, in fact, asserts, in principle, the very things which, in his reasoning against us, he so severely censures. Discussing the *Rule of Faith* (July, 1849, p. 371), he says, — "Taking these facts together, and summing up their import, we shall find that the Christian religion lays down the com-

bined *testimony* of the Word and the Church, past, present, and to come, to all fundamental articles and essential ordinances as the only rule of faith. To these all men are *bound*, on pain of eternal exclusion from all the privileges and blessings of the Church, here and hereafter, to yield hearty faith and support; and, with reference to all things not so *defined* by them, all men are left to the upright exercise of their own judgment, enlightened by a faithful use of all the means of knowledge within their reach." We do not accept this as a correct statement of the rule of faith, but it contains every principle objected to in us, and is, if it is any rule at all, as stringent as any thing we have contended for. It is outward, for the Word and the Church are external to the believer, and it is authoritative, for it defines what is or is not a fundamental article, or an essential ordinance, and allows private judgment only in the matters not defined. What more does the Catholic contend for?

But, asserting the authority of the Church to define what are fundamental articles and essential ordinances, and leaving the individual free only in matters not defined, and binding him even there by the moral law, it is plain the Reviewer fails to obtain a solution of the problem with which he starts; that is, to reconcile liberty and authority. Indeed, he seems to be fully aware of this fact. Thus he says, — "To preserve due harmony between freedom and authority is an exceedingly difficult problem in any sphere. But it seems to be more so in the Church than in the family and the state. *That She, holy and catholic, is possessed of Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question;* that this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty, is also clear. That the individual has rights to be sacredly respected, and may exercise his private judgment in stout resistance to the abuse of power, we are not disposed to deny; but, on the other hand, the lawless setting up of particular private judgment in defiance of the universal Church is manifestly schismatic and sectarian." (September, 1849, p. 515.)

It is clear from this, that the Reviewer conceives liberty and authority only as opposed one to the other, and, consequently, has not been able to dissolve and recombine them in a new and higher principle. Aside from this, the extract we have just made is something of a curiosity in its way, and has evidently proceeded from a frank, honest-hearted man. The writer asserts not only the authority, but the *Divine* authority, of the Church, in the strongest and most unqualified terms.

"That she, holy and catholic, is possessed of Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, admits of no question." That is positive and universal, and corresponds to what our Lord said, — "He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me." (St. Luke x. 16.) "That this authority may be grossly abused to the destruction of individual liberty is also clear." But, with the Reviewer's leave, that cannot be. The authority is Divine, and we do not understand how Divine authority, that is, God's authority, can be abused. If, as the Reviewer asserts, the Church possesses Divine authority, it is God who teaches and commands in and through her. How is it possible, then, for her to abuse her authority? His word is pledged that she shall not abuse it, and can you have a better guaranty than that? Can God's word fail? Can God abuse his authority? To assert that the authority of the Church is Divine, is to assert that it cannot be abused by her, — is to offer the highest guaranty the individual can possibly have, that his rights will be sacredly respected; for he has no rights but those which God has given him, and God never contradicts himself. We are vehemently inclined to believe that our rights have far more security in the justice and love of God, than they have, or can have, in our own private judgment; and we do not find it very humiliating to acknowledge that we are far more likely to have the truth when we rely on the judgment of God than when we rely on our own. No; it will not do, after you have conceded that the Church possesses Divine authority, which cannot be resisted without sin, to contend that she can abuse her authority. You must either deny her Divine authority, or concede that for her to abuse her authority is impossible.

The objection on which the Reviewer seems to place his principal reliance is, that, if we conceive the supernatural as wholly out of the sphere of the natural, no authority can mediate it, and bring the two into real union. The objection is specious, but will not bear examination; for it implies that a supernatural revelation of supernatural truth is impossible, which we have already shown is not true, in showing that the intelligible and superintelligible in God are identical, and that, in knowing God as the intelligible, we know, not, indeed, what he is as superintelligible, but that he is superintelligible, that is, infinitely above, in his essence, both our comprehension and our apprehension. That the supernatural cannot be so evidenced to the natural, that the natural shall apprehend or believe it su-

pernaturally, we concede; but that it cannot be so evidenced as to be apprehended, or believed, with what is called human faith, as distinguished from Divine faith, we deny, for reasons just assigned. To apprehend the supernatural as supernatural, or to believe it with supernatural faith, *ex parte subjecti*, the subject must, no doubt, be supernaturally elevated, by the *donum fidei*, or gift of faith, which places the creditive subject, as to the form of his act, on the plane of the credible object. But, if this be so, the Reviewer asks, in substance, why faith cannot be elicited without, as well as with, the authority of the Church propounding the object? We answer, — 1. Because the act of faith is not elicited or elicitable without the credible object, and the gift of faith does not propose the credible object; it only prepares, by supernaturally elevating it, the natural creditive subject to believe it supernaturally when it is proposed. 2. Because the authority of the Church proposing, though extrinsic in part to the *material* object of faith, is yet included, integrally, in the credible object, as the *formal* object of faith, and must, therefore, itself be believed in believing it. And, 3. Because *gratia præsupponit naturam*, and though the act of faith demands more than natural reason to be elicited, it yet cannot be elicited without natural reason, and therefore not without such authority as is *in se* satisfactory to natural reason. The will can do nothing in the work of sanctification without grace, and yet grace does nothing without the concurrence of the will; and hence we address to the will the motives naturally fitted to move it. It is the same with reason as intellect. It can do nothing in the order of supernatural faith without the appropriate grace; but as the grace, in turn, does nothing without the intellect, we address to intellect the motives naturally fitted to convince it. Without such motives, motives proper to convince reason as reason, the grace of faith would supersede reason, the supernatural would dispense with the natural, and faith would be no reasonable act, but mere Illuminism or Enthusiasm, and piety mere fanaticism. If the Reviewer had penetrated a little deeper into the principle of his objection, he would have seen that he was really objecting to our doctrine, not that it does, as he asserts, but that it does not, "supersede the natural order of the world, and contradict it, from age to age, to the end of time."

But the Reviewer contends, further, that if we demand for eliciting faith infallible authority, infallibly accredited to reason, we make faith a conclusion of logic, and fall into Rationalism. This objection seems to us to be urged without due con-

sideration. Rationalism is not the assertion of the legitimacy or sufficiency of reason in its proper sphere, but the assertion of the sufficiency of reason in all spheres, and the denial of the necessity and the fact of grace. Rationalism is developed Pelagianism. We do not assert it, for we deny the sufficiency of reason without grace, and acknowledge its sufficiency only when it acts from grace, and in concurrence with it. To call this Rationalism or Pelagianism is to fall into the opposite heresy of Calvinism, which denies all exercise of reason, and loses the natural, as Pelagianism loses the supernatural; or which, in losing the natural, loses also the supernatural, — decidedly the more destructive heresy of the two. The only way of avoiding both extremes, and of reconciling faith and reason, authority and liberty, is to accept the maxim of our theologians, that grace presupposes nature, and therefore, in effecting our faith and sanctity, while reason does, and can do, nothing without grace moving, elevating, and assisting it, grace itself does nothing, save in concurrence with reason, that is, reason as both intellect and will. It is singular enough that the Reviewer should object in us to the very principle he himself needs, is striving after, and actually condemns us for *not* holding!

If the Reviewer clearly apprehended the principle expressed in the maxim, Grace presupposes nature, of which he catches now and then a faint glimmer through the darkness of his Calvinistic mysticism, and which, not understanding much of Catholic theology, he supposes we deny, he would see that the problem, which he contends needs a higher than the Catholic principle for its solution, is solved by this very Catholic principle itself, and can be effectually solved only in the Catholic Church, for she alone, at the same time that she is the medium of the grace, presents the motives of credibility satisfactory to reason. Out of the Church you can have only reason without faith, or faith without reason. Thus the whole Protestant world alternates eternally, as every one knows, between Pelagianism and Calvinism, Rationalism and Illuminism, Fanaticism and Impiety, Despotism and Licentiousness. The Reviewer, in principle, does the same. When he objects that we, in placing the supernatural above the sphere of natural reason, deny natural reason itself and wrong the individual mind, and when, in opposition, he asserts faith as a natural capacity, and that we are naturally able to apprehend immediately the supernatural, he assumes and maintains the radical principle of Rationalism, or Pelagianism. When, on the other hand, he objects that faith in the super-

natural, elicited on a supernatural authority, accredited by motives satisfactory or convincing to natural reason, Divine grace moving and assisting the reason to elicit it, is Rationalism, he asserts the radical principle of Calvinistic Illuminism, or, as it is now called, *Evangelicalism*, and on the Continent of Europe, ordinarily, Methodism; and, to be consistent, he must assert irresistible grace, and, if he does not choose to be a Universalist, particular unconditional election and reprobation, — mere vulgar Calvinism, which, as the Reviewer must be aware, is the denial of the natural, of reason and will, and the assertion of man's absolute passivity in conversion and sanctification; thus making justification purely forensic, and giving the one justified a *carte blanche* to live as he lists after justification, with absolute impunity. Here are the two extremes, Calvinism and Rationalism, not Rationalism and Catholicity, as the Reviewer erroneously alleges, for Catholicity saves both terms, the natural and the supernatural, by the principle, *gratia præsupponit naturam*.

The Reviewer, notwithstanding the many grievous errors which flow logically from his principles, has done well in protesting against sham, and in demanding reality. He also has really some dim and indistinct view of the principle he needs in order to solve his problem; but he misapprehends that principle, as we ourselves did before knowing Catholic theology. He seeks this principle in the mystery of the Incarnation. Unquestionably, the Incarnation has given to the world the principle of a higher life than the life of the natural order, whether sensible or intelligible; but it has not, properly speaking, inserted a new principle into the constitution of human nature as such. The Reviewer misapprehends this sacred mystery. It was not the introduction into human nature of any principle that it had not from the first. The "Word was made flesh," not in the sense that God was converted into man, or that man assumed God, but in the sense that the Divine nature assumed the human. Strictly speaking, God did *not* enter into human nature in a new sense, or in any sense in which he was not always in it; he simply took human nature up to himself; but they remained each *secundum rationem suam* as distinct after the assumption as they were before. There was in the Incarnation no conversion or transformation of nature, whether human or Divine; there was no intermingling or confusion of the two natures; for there remained and remain for ever in Christ two distinct natures, two natural operations, and two natural wills in one person. To deny this, is to fall into the Eutychian and Monothelite heresies,

which the Reviewer's school, both at home and abroad, we are sorry to add, seem to us strongly inclined to revive. Indeed, these heresies underlie not a few of the errors of our age.

It is also a great mistake to suppose, as the Reviewer does, that our Lord came to complete the natural, or as the complement of human nature in its own order; for the human nature our Lord assumed was not incomplete; it was perfect human nature, since he is perfect God and perfect man, and the human nature he assumed was man's nature as it was before, as well as since, the Incarnation. He came not as the complement of the natural as natural, otherwise the Christian order would not be an order of grace, or a new creation; but he came as the complement of the supernatural, to complete the order of grace, instituted as early as man's fall, — to consummate the realities promised to our first parents and to the patriarchs, and which were prefigured in the institutions of the old law, so that life might be had, and had more abundantly; that is, he came to make real the life hitherto held only by promise, and to render grace more easy and abundant. That grace is more abundant, and its means facilitated and multiplied, under the new law is most true; but this does not imply the creation of a new principle in our nature, for the *ens supernaturale* is given us only *in patria*, and grace remains always a *habitus*, or an *auxilium*, enabling us to do what without it we could not do, but continuing always distinguishable from our nature, changing the form of its activity, indeed, but never transforming the nature itself; for it may be resisted by the will and wholly lost, and our nature remain physically what it was before. The inamissibility of grace is a heresy; but if grace transformed our nature it would be inamissible, without the destruction of our nature itself. As in the Incarnation there is no conversion, mixture, or confusion of the two natures, so is there no intermingling or interfusion of nature and grace, in such sense as to form a new nature; and hence what we do in grace, it is not we that do it, but the grace that is in us; and therefore it is that our acts performed from grace, by its aid, and in concurrence with it, are estimated, not by the nature which is assisted, but by the grace that assists, and rewarded accordingly, for, in rewarding us, as St. Austin says, God simply crowns his own gifts. Overlooking this fact, the Reviewer loses his new principle by converting it into a natural principle, and regarding it, not as a supernatural habit or aid, but as a mere completion of the original sketch or design of man's natural constitution.

The Reviewer also misconceives the real character of our Lord's intimate presence and immanence in the new creation. Certainly, the Christian, as such, is inseparable from Christ, and we most firmly hold, as Catholic doctrine, that Christ must be in us as well as out of us; for we can do nothing, absolutely nothing, without him, as he himself says, "Without me, ye can do nothing." But Christ is both the first cause and the final cause of the new creation. As first cause he is in us, creating in us the power to believe and love him as final cause, or to believe what he teaches and to do what he commands, and to believe and do it for his sake. It is the same Christ who is in us that is out of us, and before us; but the same Christ in diverse respects, as God as Creator of the universe is considered in a diverse respect from God as its final cause, or the end for which he creates it. In the former, he is the first cause of all things; in the latter, he is the final cause, or end, of all things. The distinction is valid *quoad nos*, for to us there is necessarily a distinction between God as loving, and God as the object he loves. Christ as final cause, or end, is before us, not as an end gained, but as an end to be gained; and as first cause he is in us, moving us to him as before us, and assisting us to reach him. Thus it is not only he whom we believe, but it is he by whom and for whom we believe. Thus the act of faith is defined to be *credere Deo*, *credere Deum*, *credere in Deum*. In charity, it is Christ by whom we love, whom we love, and for whom we love. All this we certainly hold, and have clearly expressed or implied, whenever we have had any occasion to touch the subject, and if the Reviewer means this, and only this, he has unwittingly opposed to us our own doctrine.

But this is not the doctrine the Reviewer advances, although it is undoubtedly the truth he is striving after, and of which he catches, now and then, a dim and confused view. He evidently gives the Incarnation a pantheistic interpretation, and none of his objections to us are pertinent, if he simply understands our Lord to be in us, but distinct from us, — in us, not as a new principle in our natural constitution, but simply by his gracious operations. He is present in every Christian, personally present, present and immanent in his substance, in his Divine essence, but only as he is present and immanent in the natural order, that is, *mediante* his creative act. His presence and immanence in human nature, in any stricter sense, implies an identity of the human and Divine, which cannot for a moment be conceded in the supernatural any more than in the natural order.

We are *united* to him as first cause of grace in us, and through grace, as its final cause; but we are not made one with him in the sense of identity with him, nor are we *deificated*. As led by the Holy Ghost, we are truly sons of God, but sons by adoption, not natural sons of God, as is Christ our Lord, who is not only the first, but the *only*, begotten Son of God.

The Reviewer's theory of history has so often been discussed in our pages, that we have no occasion to discuss it again, and as applicable to Christian doctrine, we disposed of it in our reviews of Mr. Newman's Essay, and replies to *The Dublin Review*. The theory, even as contained in Mr. Newman's Essay, is pantheistic, and flows from the assumption that man cooperates with God in the work of creation, or rather, that creation itself is an emanation from God, a development, evolution, or realization of God. We cannot concede this, nor are we prepared to pronounce all history sacred and divine. We do not believe in the modern historical optimism, whether propounded in the dry abstractions of Hegel, or the brilliant eloquence of Cousin and our friend the Reviewer. We believe there is sin in the world, and that history records crimes, events which have not been approved of by God, and which are no indications of what he wills men should believe and do. We shall not do truth or common sense the gross dishonor of supposing it necessary to prove this. The Reviewer thinks that we are very unhistorical, and ridiculous even, in not seeing the hand of God in Protestantism, and in venturing to regard it as the work of the Devil. "Unless we choose," he says, "to give up all faith in history as the revelation of God's mind and will, we must bow before this great fact of three hundred years with earnest reverence, and admit that it has a meaning for the kingdom of God in some way worthy of its vast proportions." (Jan., 1850, p. 44.) That God will overrule the Protestant movement for good, and cause it to redound to the glory of his Spouse, the *Roman* Catholic Church, whom he loves, and whom he hath purchased with his own blood, we do not doubt; but that Protestantism has any thing good in itself, even the Reviewer cannot seriously expect us to believe, for he immediately adds, — "Suppose the worst even, in the case, that Protestantism is destined to prove a failure, still it would be in the highest degree unphilosophical and irrational to deny its significance, at least in this point of view, as the medium of transition for the Church to a better and brighter state, that could not have been reached without such a period of inward contradiction going

before." A sensible man, having much inward respect for Protestantism, would hardly allow us to make a supposition so much to its discredit. Are the works of God destined to prove failures? And are we to suppose that God's Church needs mending, or that, if it does, he cannot mend it without taking it to pieces, and leaving the whole world for three hundred years and more without any Church, without any religion, without law or order, without faith, without hope, without charity, to worry and devour one another as dogs, — to live like swine, and die like beasts? How know we that God did not make his Church perfect at first? Certainly, if the principles we have established in the course of this article deserve any consideration, man is no church-builder, or church-reformer, and his proper sphere of activity lies in believing what God's Church teaches, and in doing what she commands, and the only development that can be asserted is growth in the understanding and appropriation of the truth, and in the practice of Christian perfection, by single minds and wills, or individual believers. It is ours to perfect ourselves by the Church, not to perfect her by us.

Then, as to the magnitude of Protestantism, we are not much impressed by it. We have had too near a view of it for it to loom up very large in our eyes. It is far inferior in the magnitude of its results to the sin of our first parents; it is not so great an event as the lapse of nearly the whole ancient world into idolatry; it is not greater than Brahminism, than Buddhism, or than Arianism, and it dwindles into insignificance before Mahometanism, — all manifestly of the Devil. Why, then, not Protestantism also? Wherefore pronounce them the work of the Devil, and it, on account of its magnitude alone, the work of God? Protestantism is nothing but what it is in individual minds and hearts, and we see nothing unphilosophical or irrational, taking into the account the depravity of human nature, or men's proneness to evil, in supposing that so considerable a number of persons as there are Protestants should fall into error and sin, leave God to follow their own foolish pride, vicious appetites and propensities, corrupt passions and sentiments. Its influence on modern civilization has not been such as to command our respect. It has everywhere been deleterious, tending to draw off the mind and heart from God, to fix the affections on the low and transitory, the material and the sensual, to corrupt morals, to dry up the springs of spiritual life, and to prepare the way for the return to barbarism. Whatever advance modern civilization has made, has been

made in spite of it, by virtue of principles and influences drawn from Catholicity. Indeed, the most severe condemnation of Protestantism is to assert the necessity of divinizing all history in order to be able to divinize it, or to take it out of the category of the works of our great Enemy.

There are some other points of minor importance, as made by the Reviewer, on which we would comment if our space permitted, and we were not already fatigued; but we have said enough, if it is understood, to prove that the Reviewer has not made out his case, has not established a theory that meets the difficulties he acknowledges; and we are therefore entitled to conclude our Church against him. In what we have said, we have aimed to treat him with respect, and we certainly do respect him as a man, a scholar, and a writer. He is nearer the truth in his spirit than in his words; he has generous impulses towards something better than vulgar Protestantism, and we trust in God that he will persevere till he finds it. If what we have said, although strongly put, more strongly than may be pleasing to him, enables him to understand better his own doctrine in its relation to ours, and to form a more correct judgment of Catholic theology, we shall have done him and many others no mean service. At any rate, if he choose to rejoin, he will hardly fail to see the points he must make and defend, what he must prove and disprove, in order to feel that he can have any hope of salvation, without abandoning his theory, not for another of man's concoction, but for the glorious old Catholic Church, which, though assailed continually by the folly of men and the rage of devils, stands firm as ever upon the Rock on which her Lord has founded her.

Art. IV. — *Conversations of an Old Man and his Young Friends.* — No. II.

F. All you say seems plausible enough, and perhaps follows logically from principles that cannot very well be denied; but there is always danger in pushing matters to extremes. I am a Catholic as well as you, and, unlike you, have been one from my infancy, and I would rather die than give up my Church. I am a "Catholic of the Catholics," and have no

need to be instructed by neophytes in my religion, however much my seniors in years. Pushing the principles of our religion to their last consequences, and taking extreme views of all questions of practical life, can do no good, — is impolitic, subjects our Church to unnecessary odium, and imposes too heavy a burden upon us who mingle in the world, and have more or less to do with "our separated brethren." Virtue, the Philosopher tells us, is the mean between two extremes.

B. I am very happy to hear my young friend say that he is a Catholic, — a fact which I own I had not even suspected. As a neophyte I stand rebuked. But I have heard of Catholics who will fight to the death for their religion, as a point of honor, who yet will not live it. The test of a man's love of Catholicity is in living it. If ye love me, says our Lord, keep my commandments; and this we must do, if we would enter into eternal life. Extremes are dangerous, no doubt; but it is always well to understand our terms. Virtue, in a certain sense, may be the mean between two extremes, but I have never understood that the extremes were more and less of virtue itself. Too little virtue to be virtue is not virtue at all, and I have never been aware that a man can have too much virtue to be virtuous; at any rate, I do not think any of us are likely to sin by an excess of virtuous action. Extremes are not in pushing true principles to their logical consequences, but in false principles themselves. A man can no more have an excess of truth than he can of virtue.

R. But what we object to is, that you are ultra. You were always, we have been told, even when a Protestant, disposed to be ultra in every thing. You would push your Protestantism, your notions of government and society, to such extremes, that no one could act with you. And now you push your Catholicity to extremes.

B. Beyond Catholicity itself?

R. No; I do not precisely say that; but you push it farther than it seems to me necessary to go. You are too rigid, too uncompromising, — nay, to be plain, you are too bigoted and intolerant.

B. Bigotry is the obstinate adherence to one's own opinions, without any solid reason for them, and a blind intolerance of whatever contradicts them. If half that is said of my frequent changes be true, I must have very little obstinate attachment to any opinions, and in those matters which are really matters of opinion, it might be difficult to adduce an instance

in which I have shown myself intolerant. Nor am I aware that in matters which are mine, and of which I have the disposal, I have been thus far in my life remarkable for my rigidness, or want of liberality. The tendency to push matters to extremes has never been one of my besetting sins, and I have always been ready to accept any compromise that seemed expedient, if it involved no compromise of principle or dereliction from the truth. But I confess I am not and never was one of those who could say, "Good Lord," and "Good Devil," not knowing into whose hands I might fall. As to *ultra* Catholicity, I do not understand it. You might as well call a man ultra orthodox, as if one could be orthodox, and at the same time more or less than orthodox. Orthodoxy is a definite quantity, and one has it, or has it not. It is not a creation of mine, nor of yours, and all that either of us has to do is to accept it as prescribed to us by the Church. You can either hold it or not hold it, but you cannot both hold it and not hold it at the same time. You are bound to go as far as your religion requires you to go, or you sin by defect; and if you go beyond what it permits, you sin by excess. The medium is not something arbitrary, left to your will and caprice or to mine; it is determined by the truth itself. If I go beyond the truth, I certainly go too far, and you, if you go not as far as the truth, go not far enough. As you concede that I do not go beyond Catholic truth itself, it strikes me that, instead of charging me with the sin of ultraism, you would do much better to humble yourself and do penance for your short-comings.

F. All this looks plausible, I grant, and yet I see no need of being so *very* strict. There is no need of exaggeration.

B. All exaggeration is wrong, and to be condemned; but as long as one is within the bounds of truth, I do not see how he can be guilty of exaggeration. Then I do not understand what you mean when you say that there is no need of being so *very* strict. I must be as strict as truth and virtue, or I fall into error and sin. You doubtless remember that the early Christians were so very strict as to choose rather to undergo the most cruel tortures, to suffer death in its most frightful shapes, than to offer a single grain of incense to Jupiter or to the statues of Cæsar. Do you think they were foolish, ultra, more strict than their religion required them to be, and that they might, with credit to their religion, and without sin in themselves, have offered incense as the pagan magistrate commanded?

M. That was all very well in the Martyrs, and we honor them for it; but what your young friends contend is, that it is not necessary to place ourselves in opposition to our age, and to shut ourselves out from all communion with our kind, because they do not happen to be of our way of thinking.

B. I was not aware before that Catholicity, the Catholic Church, the Immaculate Spouse of God, the Mother of all the faithful, is *a way of thinking*. "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, nor sat in the chair of pestilence" (Ps. i. 1); but I do not remember that a blessing is anywhere pronounced upon those who follow the counsels of the ungodly, or hold communion with the workers of iniquity. "What participation hath justice with injustice? or what fellowship hath light with darkness? or what concord hath Christ with Belial? And what part hath the faithful with the unbeliever?" (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15.) In matters not of religion the faithful may, no doubt, have intercourse with such heretics as are tolerated, and they are certainly not required or permitted to oppose the age in any respect in which the age is right. But we cannot conform to the age wherein the age is wrong without sin, for that is precisely what is meant by sinful conformity to the world. That would bring us into bondage to the world, into bondage to sin, from which it is the design of our religion to free us. This setting up the age as a standard is by no means Catholic, and to fall in with the children of this age in their worship of it is as much idolatry as that which the early Christians resisted unto death.

F. You mistake our meaning. We do not advocate full conformity to the age; all we mean is, that, as the age manifestly tends to popular institutions, to the extension of popular liberty, it is an exaggeration of Catholic doctrine to contend that we should resist this tendency, fight against the people, and exert ourselves to uphold old abuses and despotic rulers.

B. My young friend certainly does not sin by an excess of clearness and precision in his ideas. If he would take a little pains to distribute things according to their categories, and to keep those things distinct in his reasoning which are distinct in their nature, I cannot believe that it would do him any serious harm. Catholic truth does not, of course, require us to uphold abuses or despotic rulers. In asserting things are *abuses*, and rulers despots, you assert your right as a Catholic to resist them, and, within the limits of prudence and charity, your duty to resist them. All that is clear enough. But before

you can pronounce a ruler a despot in the bad sense of the word, you must prove that he is not a legitimate ruler, that he is a usurper, a tyrant, an oppressor; and before you can call things *abuses*, you must know that they are not legitimate *uses*.

O. But it must always be right to favor the democratic tendency, to support popular institutions, and to struggle even unto death for liberty. What more glorious than to die fighting bravely for liberty, equality, fraternity?

B. Our company is too small, my young friend, to make it worth our while to get into the heroics. You can leave "Cambyses' vein" till you come before the crowd. It demands very little expenditure of thought to move a large audience; wind is the chief thing requisite for that. But in a small company, where each one present is cool, declamation is out of place. There it is necessary, if you would produce a favorable impression, to have clear and precise ideas, and to clothe them in appropriate language. When you address only a dozen, you speak to a dozen critics. When you address five thousand, all individuality is merged in the crowd, and you speak not even to one. Save your big words, liberty, equality, fraternity, till you have the mob before you. I heard those words, and screamed them in a tolerably strong voice, from the very top of my lungs, long before you were born. They were as popular in my boyhood as they are in yours, and they who screamed them then had as little love or understanding of them as have those who are loudest and foremost in vociferating them now. To tell you the honest truth, those big words are rather stale, and in very bad taste. You must wait till a new crop of fools is produced, before you can commend yourself by using them. Liberty, understood as the liberty of reason, of justice, of truth, is always a good, always to be defended, always to be asserted at all hazards; but understood as the liberty of passion, of man's inferior nature, it is any thing but good; it is only another name for slavery, for neither the individual nor the community is, or in the nature of things can be, free, save in governing and restraining the passions, as I never cease repeating to you, and as all young men, and, I am sorry to say, some old men, are always prone to forget. Liberty is in justice, and so is equality. Of each, justice is the measure. What is just is equal, and he who is subjected to no unjust restraint is free. And fraternity is only in the Catholic communion.

O. But you evade the question of democracy, and do not tell us whether it is or is not always right to fall in with the democratic tendency.

B. I have the example of the early Christians before me, and I have read the lives of many martyrs, who would not have been doomed to death for their religion, but who would have been permitted to live, and even have been loaded with honors, if they would only sacrifice to Cæsar, that is, to the state, or temporal authority, to which they owed civil allegiance. I am persuaded, nay, I know, they did well, and I would rather be crowned with them, than enjoy the pleasures of the senses for a season, and be sent to hell at last. I never sacrifice to the temporal authority. I obey it for God's sake, in all things it commands, which are not of sin, which are not incompatible with my love and duty to God. Beyond that, I have only one answer to give it, — "We ought to obey God rather than men." Where democracy is the law I obey it, not because it is democracy, but because it is the *law;* and I hold that I am bound to sustain popular institutions, simply for the reason that I am bound, and to the extent and only to the extent that I am bound, to sustain the laws of my country. Where monarchy or aristocracy is the law, I say precisely the same of it, as I very plainly intimated in our former conversation.

O. But suppose the people in an undemocratic state, in a monarchy or an aristocracy, should come to the belief that their condition would be essentially improved by changing the existing form of government, and adopting the democratic, would they not have a right to do so, and ought not every one, as a friend to liberty, to wish them success, aid them in the attempt to do so, and sympathize with them if defeated.

B. That depends on the sense in which you understand the word *people*, and on the fact whether their belief is well or ill founded. If you mean by *people* the state, they have, undoubtedly, the right to make such changes in the form of their civil polity, not suicidal, as may seem to them good; but I am not bound to wish them success, or to aid them in effecting such changes, or to regret their defeat, if the changes are foolish, uncalled for, and likely to be productive only of evil. If you mean by *people* the people not as the state, but as subjects of the state, they have no such right, for they are, in that sense, bound to obey the law.

R. Then you deny popular sovereignty, — that the people are sovereign.

B. That, again, depends on the sense in which you take the word *people*. If by *people* you mean the state, I do not deny their sovereignty, under God; for I admit that the state is

sovereign, and, within the limits of the moral law, may do what it pleases. If you mean by *people*, not the people as the state, but the people as subjects of the state, I deny their sovereignty; for it would be a contradiction in terms to assert it. They who are held to obey the law, in the sense in which they are held to obedience, are not free to abrogate or change the law. You cannot very logically assume democracy, and from your assumption conclude it.

F. Here is where I complain of you. You admit, indeed, that you are bound to uphold a democratic government where it is the law, but only because it is the law, not because it is the inherent right of every people.

B. That is to say, you complain of me, not because I refuse to obey *Cæsar* where he has legitimate authority to command, but because I will not sacrifice to him as God. Decidedly, my young Catholic friend, you would have been in little danger of martyrdom, had you lived even in the reign of Nero, Decius, Maximianus, or Diocletian.

F. You are too severe. We live in a democratic country, and you know that the great charge against our Church is, that she is hostile to democracy; and the interests of our Church herself require us to refute that charge, by showing that she is favorable to democracy.

B. The great charge against the Church in the time of the pagan Emperors was, that she was hostile to the heathen gods. Suppose some liberal-minded Catholic had risen up and said to his brethren, We live in an idolatrous country, and the great charge against our Church is, that she is hostile to idolatry; her interests therefore require us to refute this charge by burning incense to Cæsar. What would the old Saints have replied to him, do you think?

M. The cases are not parallel. Democracy is lawful, but idolatry is never lawful.

B. Precisely. Idolatry can never be tolerated, because it is never lawful; but we may conform to democracy because it is lawful. Certainly, where it is the law democracy is lawful, and there the Church commands us to sustain it; but where it is not the law, but monarchy or aristocracy is, there democracy is not lawful, and to undertake to show that there our Church favors it would be to attempt to show a falsehood, and to prove that our religion favors sedition and rebellion, and that by becoming Catholics we are emancipated from the civil law, — no great recommendation of Catholicity to

statesmen, I should think. It would be a much better reason for expelling her from the state, than for introducing her. In a word, my young Catholic friend, it would be well for you and me to remember that the Church does not rest upon our shoulders, that she has a more powerful supporter than either of us, and that the most effectual method we can adopt of serving her interests is to demean ourselves as her faithful children, believe what she teaches, do what she commands, and leave the care of protecting her to Him whose spouse she is. The best security we can give our heretical countrymen, or which they as lovers of our institutions can ask, is, that our Church is wedded to no particular form of civil polity, and commands us always to obey the law, and to discharge faithfully and conscientiously our duties as citizens and as subjects.

For my part, I pity the blindness and malice of those who urge the charge to which you refer; and I pity still more the silly Catholic, who, in order to get rid of it, tries to prove that his Church is democratic, runs into the wild extremes of radicalism in order to prove that his religion has no influence on his politics, throws up his cap and grows frantic with joy whenever he hears of a rebellion, and hails as a patriot and a saint every despicable scoundrel, whose only merit is that he is a rebel, and has succeeded in kindling the flames of civil war in his country. He may call himself what he pleases, but he is a disgrace to his religion, a living scandal, and unworthy the name of man, much less that of Catholic. No, no, never applaud yourself for being a Catholic of that stamp; call yourself a heathen at once, put on avowedly the livery of the Devil, so that all men can see and mark you for what you are.

F. You may be as severe as you please; but I shall never be persuaded that I cannot be a good Catholic and a good democrat.

B. You can be a good Catholic and a good democrat, if you properly understand yourself. A firm and loyal supporter of democracy, where it is the established order, that is, where it is the law, you not only can be, but, if a good Catholic, must be; but a democrat in the sense that democracy is the inherent right of the people everywhere, and that the multitude in every country has the right, when it chooses, to overthrow existing legal governments for the sake of introducing it, or, in other words, that democracy is universally the legitimate and only legitimate form of government, and that every other form of government is illegitimate, tyrannical, a usurpation, and

therefore null and void from the beginning, — which is the modern European, and, to some extent, American, sense of the word, — you cannot be, and at the same time a good Catholic. If you take the word in this sense, you make Cæsar God, and can worship him only by disavowing the law, and falling into sheer idolatry.

F. But suppose the government of a country dissolved, to have wholly forfeited its rights, so that there is no legitimate government existing; would not the people have the right, in such country and in such case, to establish a democracy, although the previous government had been monarchical?

B. If, as you suppose, the previously existing government is really and totally dissolved, and no political constitution remains in force, the people are thrown back under natural law, and are free to reconstitute the state as seems to them good, — in the democratic, the aristocratic, or the monarchical form, just as they please. The right of the multitude, where there are no legal institutions, to establish the democratic order is no more to be questioned, than their obligation to sustain that order where it is the law. What I deny is, that every form of government but the democratic is, in itself considered, illegal, illegitimate, or tyrannical; and that the people, as subjects of a state, have the right to rebel against any existing legal government not democratic, for the sake of introducing democracy. The right to resist tyranny I am not the man to deny, and that the tyranny of the prince, according to the reasoning of the American Declaration of Independence, absolves the subject from his allegiance, I have always held, and, as a Catholic, must hold, unless I would condemn the principles and practice of my own Church. It is only on this principle that I defend, or am able to defend, the power which she has claimed and exercised of deposing Catholic sovereigns when they became tyrants, and absolving their subjects from their allegiance. The doctrine of the Divine right of kings and passive obedience, as preached by Anglican ministers of the seventeenth century, I no more hold than did Bellarmin, Duperron, or the Spanish Jesuit, Suarez. No Catholic, without temerity, could hold it; for every Catholic must hold that civil power is a trust, and, like all trusts, may be forfeited, and is forfeited when exercised manifestly against the legitimate end of government, that is, the public good. The inamissibility of political power has just as little credit with Catholics as the inamissibility of grace. I have no respect for the memory of Dutch William, but I have never felt that,

were I an Englishman, I should be obliged to uphold the cause of the Stuarts, or refuse allegiance to the Guelfs. I do not believe in the legality of the present French republic, for the Constituent Assembly was not freely elected; but I do not feel it necessary to make myself the champion of the Bourbons, or the enemy of the Bonapartes. The Bourbon family have done enough, a hundred times over, to forfeit their original right to the crown of France, and Louis the Eighteenth was in my eyes no more a legitimate French sovereign than was Napoleon. If the Bourbons, after the Restoration, had given the Church her freedom, and abandoned the old Gallican traditions, they would hardly have been driven a second time into exile. A new restoration may take place, and become legitimate, but nothing in my judgment necessarily prevents either the republic or the empire from also becoming legitimate. For my own part, not being called upon to legislate for France, or to decide what her interest requires, I have no preferences on the subject, except that I must prefer any thing to Red Republicanism. Nor do I bring under the rule I have laid down colonies and conquered nations. A conquered nation, as long as it remains a nation, retains the right to assert, when it can do so with prudence, its national independence; for the right of self-government is inherent and inalienable in every nation as long as it is a nation, that is, as long as it has not by its own consent, expressed or implied, become merged in another. With regard to colonies the case is less clear; but I have no doubt that they *can* arrive at majority, and when they do that they may throw off the authority of the mother country and set up for themselves. What I deny is simply what in modern times is called the "sacred right of insurrection," or the right of the multitude to rebel against a government that only exercises its constitutional powers, and to seek, by way of revolution, to change the administrators or the form of the government, for the sake of what they regard as political or social amelioration. But after a revolution has been effected, the old order destroyed, and a new order established, capable of answering the just ends of government, I hold myself bound to accept and obey the new government, not, indeed, because the people had a right to effect the revolution and introduce it, but because, now it is established, it cannot be opposed without compromising the public good, which I am bound in morals to consult.

I am not opposed to popular governments as such, but I am opposed to the principles on which you young democrats

defend them ; for those principles are repugnant to all government, — to democratic governments themselves, as well as to others. It is just as easy to defend what is good on sound as on unsound principles. If you want merely to sustain your democratic institutions, it suffices to put them under the safeguard of law, and of that religion which makes it binding upon us in conscience to obey the law. But if you wish, under the pretext of establishing democracy, merely to assert the right of rebellion, insurrection, revolution, then I grant my principles will not aid you. And here is precisely why I oppose you. I find no fault with you for believing that democracy is the best form of government for every nation, though I myself believe no such thing ; but what I do find fault with you for is the assertion of the right of the mob in every nation to introduce it against existing law and order, whenever they judge it expedient. This would be to assert the universal right of rebellion, which is the negation of all government, and as incompatible with the maintenance of democratic as of any other government, as I should suppose the democrat himself might see and understand.

You young and unreflecting democrats defend democracy on the Jacobinical or revolutionary principle. It is to that principle I object, and we may have, as we have had, in our own country occasion to see and deplore its mischief. It manifests itself in various sections of our country, and ever and anon we are threatened with a dissolution of the Union. Just now, one class of fanatics are threatening to dissolve the Union, because slavery is legalized in some of the States ; and another class threaten to dissolve it, because there is resistance made to extending slavery where it now does not legally exist. The ringleaders of both, if not madmen, would deserve punishment for their disloyalty, and would not be suffered to run at large, if public sentiment had not already sanctioned the revolutionary principle, and taken from power all its sacredness. With the revolutionary principle fermenting in the minds and hearts of the people, there can be no government, or none but a government of mere physical force. Abandon your revolutionary doctrines, reassert loyalty as a virtue, and advocate your democratic insitutions on the ground that they are the law, and that every man is bound to obey the law, and I am as good a democrat as any of you. But as for advocating democracy on principles which deny law, undermine all government, and leave every one at the mercy of the irresponsible will of the majority, I cannot

do it; and if you maintain that I must, or be no democrat, then I am, and thank God that I am, no democrat. I demand a government of law, not of arbitrary will, whether your will or mine, — the will of the majority or of the minority.

N. What you say is very just, but your distinctions are too subtile and abstract for the popular mind; and you will be generally supposed to maintain doctrines that you do not.

B. Possibly so. But you offer in this a strong argument against democracy itself. It is true, any distinctions that do not lie on the surface, that require a little patient thought and power of discrimination, are too subtile and abstract for the popular mind taken collectively, although within the comprehension of almost every one taken singly. Here is the difficulty you always have in popular governments, unless the people are Catholics, and have that intellectual culture which the hearty love and practice of their religion is always sure to give, and not otherwise to be obtained. The great body of the poorest and least educated class of our Catholic population, the "ignorant Irish," as people are fond of saying, can understand any of the distinctions I have made, although never taught to read or write; and no Catholic, except a mongrel Catholic, who, because he has mingled with heretics, read their books, listened to their political harangues, and caught up a portion of their slang, fancies he is learned, and a bit of a philosopher and politician to boot, will stumble at any of them. I have had some experience in this matter. I have addressed, on the subject of which we have been speaking, both Protestant audiences and Catholic, and have even been astonished at the difference between them. To the Protestant I am obliged to simplify my language, to multiply my illustrations, and use all the precautions I would if addressing a class of pupils on one of the lower forms, and yet find that I make myself only imperfectly understood; while, to a Catholic audience, made up in no small part of laborers and servant-girls, I can speak right on in my own natural way, as I do to you, and feel always sure of being very generally understood, and of having my distinctions marked and appreciated. My audience are religious, and their religion has given them understanding. If one has got something to say of serious importance, something that is really worth saying and necessary to be said, something not superficial, but solid and profound, it is a pleasure to address a genuine unsophisticated Catholic audience. Your words are sure to tell; they do not bound back to you, as does your axe when chop-

ping cork. It is my experience in this respect that has convinced me that a Catholic country, a really Catholic country, can be well governed under a democracy, and that a Protestant or an infidel country cannot be.

A Protestant country cannot be, because Protestantism is illogical, unintellectual, both in itself and in its influence. Ask a Protestant what he believes; he can tell you, within certain limits, what he does *not* believe, but in vain does he try to tell you, in any clear or precise manner, what he does believe. In mere worldly matters, or material interests, he may be shrewd, and show intellectual acuteness and clearness, but in all other matters, in all that pertains to great principles of justice, or the higher order of intellectual and moral truth, he no sooner opens his mouth to speak, than you see that his mind is darkened, that his mental perception is dull, and his ideas are muddy and confused. He even regards all mental clearness, distinctness, and precision of thought as scholastic subtilties, to be despised by every man of common sense. Indeed, if you show a tendency to distinct, clear, and exact thought, he will make it the ground of reproach to you, and will applaud himself that he is above such littleness. Hence it is that Protestantism and Protestant culture, however powerful they may be in overthrowing an old established order, or obscuring and rendering ineffectual well-settled principles, are peculiarly unfitted to sustain popular institutions. Hence, as a general rule, popular freedom has little prevalence in Protestant countries. England is the freest Protestant country in Europe, and she is less free than she was when Catholic. Ours is the only really free country in the world where the majority of the people call themselves Protestant, and we owe our freedom to the accidents of our situation, and to the fact that the colonists were very generally dissenters from the Anglican Establishment, identified with the Anglican monarchy, not at all to Protestantism as such.

Nothing will save freedom here but the prevalence of Catholicity. Wild and reckless fanaticism is at work with our institutions, undermining law, and preparing the way for anarchy and despotism; principles are widely disseminated by all parties, that are incompatible with the existence of society itself; ever and anon, parties growing more and more formidable for their numbers and influence, spring up amongst us, and seek to translate their false principles into facts, or to make the country practically conform to them. In vain do you seek to arrest the evil. To do so you must draw, now and then, even

nice distinctions, and call upon the people to discriminate. But your distinctions are condemned as vain subtilties, as above the comprehension of the people, as unpopular, and making you unpopular; and the very men who see and feel their importance will make them subjects of ridicule with the people, and bid the rabble hoot at you for expressing them. Democracy itself has a natural tendency to merge the individual in the crowd, to bring every thing down to a commonplace level, and to superinduce the habit of asking, not, What is true and just? but, What will the people say? What will go down with the people? It is only by virtue of the presence of a highly intellectual religion, like the Catholic, — a religion that leaves us neither to reason without faith, nor to faith without reason, but gives us reason with faith, and faith with reason, that is adapted to the human soul, appeals to man's spiritual nature, and by its august offices, its solemn prayers, its public instructions, and private meditations, keeps the mind and heart in constant exercise on the highest order of truth, — that the levelling and deadening influence of democracy can be neutralized, and the mental activity and discrimination necessary to its preservation and wholesome operation can be secured. The very objection you urge against me is conclusive against your favorite democracy, unless you have the Church present as the religion of the great majority of the people. Protestant or godless democracy, like that which is popularly preached at home and abroad, would very soon plunge the most civilized nation into barbarism.

The considerations you suggest only show the necessity of the Catholic Church, under a political and social point of view no less than under a religious, to the salvation of society as well as to the salvation of the soul. It is necessary to inspire that spirit of self-sacrifice, that heroic virtue, without which society becomes a field of blood, or a mere charnel-house. All the evils of society spring from pride and the predominance of the flesh, and no greater absurdity was ever sent up to us from the pit, than that of attempting to maintain order and social prosperity by playing off the pride and lust of one against the pride and lust of another. Less absurd were those grave philosophers of Laputa, who attempted to extract sunbeams from cucumbers. You cannot extract virtue from vice, nor develop social order and well-being from the elements of disorder and ruin. You can remove the evils only so far as you succeed in removing or in subduing the pride and lust from

which they spring. It needs no great philosophy to know this, and, still less, one would suppose, to perceive that you neither remove nor subdue the causes by employing them and providing for their universal activity.

Your modern reformers, socialists, communists, Red Republicans, and radical democrats, are a stupid race of mortals, and as blind as they are destructive. They all undertake to obtain from unmitigated selfishness the results, which, in the nature of things, can be obtained only from the severest and most self-denying virtue. All their schemes are based on the principle, that selfishness is to be made to produce the results of the most perfect disinterestedness, or that pure selfishness, having a perfectly open field and fair play, is the equivalent of pure disinterested affection. What falsehood! What nonsense! Yet these men call themselves philosophers, — the great lights of our age! Alas! "if the light that is in you be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

As long as ignorance and sin remain, as long as men retain their vicious propensities and passions, there will be evil in the world, and there is not a more consummate fool than he who looks for a perfect civil polity, or a perfect state of society. Something to mitigate, even to ameliorate, no doubt, may be done, but can be done in no merely outward way. Nothing can be done further than you can reach the individual mind and heart, and bring them into harmony with the will of God, as he has revealed it in his word, and proclaims it through the voice of his Church. Men will never succeed in ameliorating their earthly condition till they learn to live for heaven alone, till they see all things in the light of God as their supreme good, and seek to modify them only at the bidding of divine charity.

You young men, even some of you who call yourselves Catholics, forget this. You have suffered yourselves to be seduced by the tempter. Protestantism and infidelity have no power over you, when they attack directly your Church or her dogmas; there you are on your guard and are firm; but you have not been equally on your guard against their indirect attacks, their attacks through your social affections and sentiments, your love of political liberty, — intensified by long ages of Protestant misrule and oppression in the countries of your birth or descent, — and your desire of worldly prosperity and social position. Through these the tempter assails you; through these he whispers to you honeyed words, makes you sweet promises, and excites brilliant hopes, only to undermine

your faith, to entangle you in his snares, and to drag you down to hell, — to hell both here and hereafter. Here is your danger ; here is your weak side. You listen with the open hearts of generous youth, with the confidence of unsuspecting innocence, to the soft words of the betrayer, as to an angel of light. You are caught, you are led on from step to step, till you find yourselves far from the home of your fathers, far from the affectionate embrace of your mother, in arms against your Church, false to all your vows to God, false to yourselves, a grief to all good men and angels, and a joy only to the enemies of religion, who, while accepting the treason, despise the traitor. The very devils despise those they are able to seduce, and so do their children and servants, infidels, heretics, and schismatics.

Nay, my young friends, if you would be free and noble, and honored even, listen never to the siren voice of the charmer. The entrance of the career into which she would seduce you may be bright and flowery, but its progress grows darker and rougher at every step, till it finally ends abruptly in the blackness of eternal despair. I know that career which you are tempted to believe opens into life. I entered it as innocent and as full of hope as yourselves, and, as I fondly trusted, with motives pure and holy. Alas ! how was I deceived ! I lost my innocence, my virtue, every thing that a man should hold dear and sacred, found myself the companion of scoffers and blasphemers, a chief among the revilers of God's truth and God's law, and have gained only a stock of bitter experience, and a source of continual regret. Fear God, my young friends, and keep his commandments, for this is the whole of man. Be true to God, and he will never abandon you; serve him as he commands, with promptitude and fidelity, and fear nothing for your earthly prosperity, or for the spread and maintenance of liberty.

ART. V. — *The Plan of the American Union, and the Structure of its Government explained and defended.* By JAMES A. WILLIAMS. Baltimore : Sherwood & Co. 1848. 12mo. pp. 168.

[This article was originally prepared for the *American Review*, at the request of the talented and accomplished editor of that highly

respectable journal, and in great part appeared in its number for August last. But as the editor omitted certain portions, and as his printers greatly disfigured, by serious typographical errors, the portions accepted, the writer of the article wishes us to insert it as it was originally prepared; which we do without any hesitation, for its views are our own. — Ed. *B. Q. Review.*]

This work appears to have been written with an honest intention, and it bears evident marks of talent and serious study. It contains many just views on the Constitution of the United States, clearly, though not very vividly, expressed, but appears to us to err in its general theory of government, by overlooking the fact, that the necessity of government does not grow wholly out of the depravity of human nature, and that government itself is not restricted in its functions merely to the repression of violence, or the unjust encroachment of one man upon the rights of another. The maintenance of justice, or the repression and redress of injustice, is, no doubt, a chief function of government; but government has beyond this a positive mission to perform, positive benefits to confer or secure, which in no sense grow out of the wickedness of man, and which would be the same whatever the intelligence and virtue of individuals. Man is by his essential nature a social being, and demands society; and society demands social as well as individual labors. These labors have for their end, not merely the negative, but the positive, benefit of the whole community, and cannot be performed without government, by which society is made a corporation, capable of acting as an individual person.

But our present purpose is not to criticize this little work itself; we have introduced it simply as an occasion for offering some remarks on the subject of the presidential or executive veto,— a subject which we should be happy to see discussed more generally than it has been, in a calm, philosophic spirit, from the point of view of the statesman, rather than from that of the demagogue or the partisan.

There is, and, as long as human nature remains as it is, will be, under popular governments, a strong tendency in the party that has succeeded to exaggerate the intrinsic importance of the constitutional provisions to which it owes its success, and also in the party frequently unsuccessful, to depreciate or unreasonably oppose those provisions, which, in their operations, have thwarted its wishes. We like that which aids us; we are hostile to that which defeats us. The men who can look be-

yond the passions of the moment, and judge of the merits of an institution by its average results, are, always and everywhere, comparatively few; the great majority look neither before nor after; they fix their eyes on the present; what favors that is for them good, — good in all times and places, and under all circumstances; what here and now impedes or thwarts them is bad, — can never be of service to them, must always work against them, and should nowhere, and under no circumstances, be tolerated for a moment. Constitutions are designed to maintain a fixed and permanent rule, and, if they answer their purpose, must not unfrequently control popular wishes and tendencies, and often restrain the majority, and prevent them, for a time at least, from adopting measures which they may be persuaded are for the interests of the country. Hence we must always expect under popular governments a party that will be dissatisfied with the constitution, now with this provision and now with that, and ready to agitate for its amendment, alteration, or total suppression.

It can hardly, as yet, have been forgotten, that, under the administration of General Jackson, the constitution of the Senate of the United States was the object of virulent attacks from the Democratic party of the time. That party denounced the Senate, as the aristocratic branch of the government, as repugnant to the genius of free institutions, and demanded its essential modification, because, just then, it happened not to be in their favor. Yet that party to-day find the Senate a purely democratic institution, and their chief reliance to prevent the administration from adopting a policy to which they are opposed; for they happen to have just now a majority of Senators on their side. They no longer denounce it as aristocratic, and no longer demand that its constitution be modified. On the other hand, it is remembered, that, in consequence of the use or abuse of the executive veto by General Jackson and Mr. Tyler, to defeat important measures which had received the sanction of a majority of Congress, many in the Whig party who were strongly in favor of those measures, believing them really demanded by the industry and business of the country, took up the notion that the veto power is anti-republican, exceedingly liable to be abused, and in its abuse throwing such undue influence into the hands of the executive as to endanger our free institutions, and therefore a constitutional provision that should be either abolished or essentially modified. Yet who is prepared to say that the time may not

even soon come when these same politicians will find the executive veto their best, perhaps their only, safeguard against measures which in their judgment would be ruinous to the country?

The tendency, when we are disappointed or defeated by some constitutional provision, to complain of the constitution itself, and to propose its amendment to suit our wishes for the moment, is strengthened and apparently justified by certain false notions as to the origin of constitutions and as to the rights of majorities, which have become, or are becoming, quite prevalent in our country, as well as in some others. It was pretended by some men in the last century, who then passed for philosophers, that to make a constitution is the easiest thing in the world; that nothing is simpler or more feasible than for a people, without government, or irrespective of it, acting as if in a state of nature, to come together in person or by their delegates in convention, and give themselves any constitution they please, and provide for its wise and beneficent practical operation. They put forth the most extravagant follies on the excellence and perfectibility of human nature, and virtually deified the people. They disdained, indeed, to believe in God, blasphemously alleging that they "had never seen him at the end of their telescopes"; but they did not hesitate to transfer to the people all the essential attributes of the Deity, and to fall down and worship them as a divinity. The people could remedy all evils; the people could make no mistake; the people could do no wrong; and we had only to clear the way for the free, full, and immediate expression of the popular will, in order to have a perfect civil constitution, and a wise and just administration. Hence there need be no hesitancy to overthrow existing institutions, to break up established order, or to trust to the unchecked will of the people for a wise remodelling of the state, or the reconstruction of society. In consequence of the prevalence of such a pleasant theory, all fear of change was removed, all prudence in experimenting or in introducing innovations rendered superfluous, and all attachment to old institutions or to a long-existing established order foolish, if not wicked. Nothing in heaven or on earth was to be henceforth sacred or inviolable, but the will of the people, — that is, the will of the demagogues who could contrive to speak for the people, — and we were to surrender ourselves to that will with as much confidence, and with as little reserve, as the Saint surrenders himself to the will of God.

Into this silly and impious doctrine the fathers of our repub-

lic did not fall. They were no vague theorizers, no mad visionaries ; they were plain, practical men, who looked at realities, and dealt with things as they found them. But this doctrine, which has for the last sixty years convulsed all Europe, overturned thrones, displaced dynasties, and left few things standing, except despotism on the one side, and the mob on the other, has finally found its way amongst us, and spread far and wide its subtile poison through our community. Our people, in large numbers, forget that constitutions are generated, not made, and that no convention can draw up and impose a constitution, which shall be really a constitution, unless its essential principles are already, through Providence, established in the wants, the habits, the usages, the manners and customs of the people for whom it is intended ; that the constitution can never be arbitrarily imposed, but must always grow out of the preëxisting elements of the national life ; and that when once formed, it is to be henceforth modified only according to its own internal law, through the most urgent necessity, and with the greatest delicacy and the most consummate wisdom and prudence. Hence they cease to regard the constitution as sacred, and look upon it as a thing that may be changed with as much facility, and almost for as slight reasons, as a gentleman changes the fashion of his coat, or a lady the make of her bonnet. To change it is not only the easiest, but the safest, thing in the world. Consequently, the thought of submitting to a present inconvenience, of suffering a constitutional provision which restrains their will or thwarts their present wishes, rarely occurs to them ; and whenever things do not go to their mind, they clamor for a change of the constitution. The danger of this state of the public mind hardly needs to be pointed out to the statesman. It is incompatible with every thing like established order, with every thing permanent or stable in government, and keeps every thing unsettled and fluctuating.

From the fact, that under our political order the greater number of questions are determined by the will of the majority, a large class of our politicians — seldom accustomed to look beneath the surface, or to trace facts to their principles — conclude that the majority have a *natural* right to govern, and that whatever tends to hinder the free and full expression of their will is contrary to natural law, and smells of usurpation and tyranny. They are exceedingly scandalized when they find the constitution opposing a barrier to the will of the majority, and call out with all their force, from the

very top of their lungs, for its amendment. Is it not the essential principle of all republicanism, say they, that the majority must govern? What, then, can be more anti-republican, more really undemocratic, than to uphold a constitution that hinders the majority from doing whatever they please? But these sage politicians would do well to remember that the right of the majority to rule is a *civil*, not a *natural*, right, and exists only by virtue of positive law. Anterior to civil society, or under the law of nature, all men are equal, respectively independent, and no one has any authority over another. Each is independent of all, and all of each; and both majorities and minorities are inconceivable. Civil society must be constituted before you can even conceive the existence of a *political* majority or a political minority, and when it is constituted, neither has any rights but those the particular civil constitution confers. Deriving their existence and their rights from the civil constitution, it is absurd to pretend that the majority are, or can be, deprived of any of their rights by any constitutional provision whatever. If, then, a given constitutional provision should restrain the majority, or prevent them from making their will prevail, that is no just cause of complaint; for no law is broken, no right is violated; and where no law is broken, no right violated, no injustice is done.

Setting aside these false notions or pretensions of modern radicals and socialists, which are revolutionary in principle, and incompatible, not only with all stable government, but with the very existence of the state (*status*), of *legal* order itself, we must always approach every established constitution with the presumption, as the lawyers say, in its favor, and as bound to accept and sustain it as it is, unless good and sufficient reasons are forthcoming for its alteration or amendment. On no other condition can we be distinguished, in principle, from radicals and destructives, and consistently profess to be conservatives, or friends of liberty, because friends of order. The presumption is universally in favor of authority; that the constitution, as it is, is right; that the law is just; and before we can have the right even to entertain a proposition to alter it, we must be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is wrong, that it is unjust. The fact that the veto power is in the constitution is to us, therefore, a presumption that it ought to be there, and a sufficient motive for retaining it until a valid and sufficient reason is shown for abolishing it. We insist on this view of the case, because we are anxious that the principle we indicate

should be regarded. The opposite principle is rapidly gaining ground amongst us, if, indeed, it has not already become predominant. The fashion is now to presume every man guilty till proved innocent; to hold every charge true till it is proved to be false; all government, all law, all authority, in the wrong, till the contrary is established. The popular tendency is to arraign government before the bar of anarchy, and compel it to vindicate its own innocence; thus reversing all the maxims of law, of justice, and of logic hitherto recognized and held in respect by the common sense of mankind. It is well, therefore, to remind the public, occasionally, that the presumption is always on the side of the constitution and the authorities holding under it.

The value of the veto power is not, however, left to be merely presumed. It is a vital element in our general system of government, which is not so much an original system, as an original and peculiar modification of the English system, well known to be a government of ESTATES, as distinguished from what has received the name of CENTRALISM. The characteristic feature of the English Constitution is the separation, on the one hand, of the bodies represented in the government, and, on the other, of the powers of government itself, each with a veto on the others. It is solely in this separation of the constituent bodies, and of the several departments of government, each with its veto, that consist the beauty and excellence of the English system; and it is this alone that constitutes the safeguard of English liberty. These divisions and veto power attaching to each are not in themselves, it is true, favorable to the efficiency of administration, nor are they intended to be so; they are intended to serve as checks or restraints on power, and to prevent it from becoming despotic, or hostile to the liberty of the subject; and the peculiar merit of the English system is, that they serve this purpose without impairing, in too great a degree, the unity and force of authority.

This system we inherited with the Common Law from our English ancestors, and have retained with simply such modifications as the circumstances of our country and the elements of our society rendered necessary or expedient. In interpreting our institutions, we are always to seek our principle of interpretation in this system, and are never to resort to any of the ancient republican, or to any of the modern democratic theories. Our government is republican in the sense that it is not monarchical; it is democratic in the sense that it recognizes

no political aristocracy, and treats all men as equal before the law ; but in no other sense is it, or was it ever intended to be, either republican or democratic, — save as all governments that are instituted for the public weal, instead of the private benefit of the governors, are republican, whatever their form. The people with us are the *motive* power, but not the *directive*, the governing power ; the government vests in the constitution rather than in them ; for outside of it they have no political existence, and they have no political authority, except from it, and in and through it. The government, in principle, is the government of law, not the government of mere will, whether of the one, the few, or the many. The constitution governs the state, or the people in their collective and associated capacity; the ordinary laws govern the people as individuals.

It is well to bear this fact in mind, especially in these times, when the rage is to abolish law, and introduce everywhere governments of mere will. Law is the will of the sovereign regulated by reason, the expression of power united with justice; will without reason is power disjoined from justice, and therefore the essential or the distinctive principle of despotism. Every government which is a government of mere will is despotic and incompatible with freedom, whether the will be that of the king, of the nobility, or of the democracy, — of the minority or of the majority. Strange as it may seem, there is not the least conceivable difference in principle between autocracy or Oriental despotism, and the pure absolute democracy which is just now the fashion in Italy, in France, in parts of Germany, and, we are sorry to add, in our own country. There can be no more true liberty under the one than under the other; in each the sovereign authority is absolute, unlimited, and under both, the law, or what is to be regarded as law, is nothing but the expression of mere arbitrary will. Practically, we should prefer the Russian or Oriental despotism to that which our fashionable democrats are laboring to establish here, both in the several States and in the nation, and which the National Assembly have done their best, in the ridiculous constitution they have just promulgated, to fasten upon France ; for we would much rather be subject to a single despot than to a mob of despots. In consequence of mistaking the real character of our government, of overlooking the fact, that what its framers most sedulously guarded against was that of making it, or leaving it to become, a government of mere will, and of seeking to naturalize amongst us a wild and destructive democracy im-

ported from abroad, from the radicals of Europe, who are born despots, and have not the least imaginable conception either of the nature or of the conditions of true liberty. Our democratic politicians have created, or suffered to be formed, in our community, a public opinion which already hinders the regular working of our political system, and threatens, at no distant day, if not soon arrested, its very existence.

The separation of the constituent bodies, represented in king, lords, and commons, adopted in England, we have not adopted, and could not have adopted if we had wished, because there was nothing in our society which rendered it either necessary or practicable. We had no king, and no lords ; for, as Mr. Bancroft has well remarked, royalty and nobility did not emigrate. Only the third estate emigrated. Of the three estates represented in the English government, we had only one, the commons, and of course could not represent what we had not. Having but one estate, we necessarily approached nearer to centralism in representation than the English, and so far their constitution has an advantage over ours. Nevertheless, in consequence of the division of the country into separate States, we have been able, in some degree, to escape centralism in the constitution of the national Senate, and we have also done it to some extent, though not as far as we might and ought to have done, in the several States, by dividing the representatives into two chambers, each with a different electoral basis. But in regard to the separation of the powers of government into legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, we have in the general government, and in most of the State governments, conformed exactly to the English model.

This separation of the powers of government into distinct and mutually independent departments, by which we escape the worst form of centralism, is fundamental in our political system, and to change it would destroy the essential character of the system itself, and, by centralizing all the powers of government in one and the same department, would render freedom wholly impracticable. To the maintenance of this separation, and of each department in its independence, the executive veto is indispensable, as every statesman — we say not every politician — must readily perceive and admit. It was given by the Convention, mainly, though not exclusively, to enable the executive to maintain its independence in face of legislative encroachments. Without it, there would be no independent, no efficient, and no responsible executive. All

the powers of government would be absorbed by Congress, and the President would cease to be the President of the United States, responsible to the public for his acts, and become merely an officer of Congress, with no functions but to execute blindly its mandates. The balance between the several powers intended could not be preserved, and the government would in principle, and very soon in practice, degenerate into a parliamentary despotism, like that of the Long Parliament in England, that of the Convention in France, and that which the latest French constitution contemplates, and will secure, if it lasts without essential alterations.

We are as strongly opposed to the "one-man power" as are any of our contemporaries, and as anxious to guard against every tendency towards monarchy as any body can be; but there is no less to be apprehended from legislative than from executive encroachment. Perhaps, under our peculiar system, the danger of legislative usurpations is even more imminent than any other, and executive usurpations themselves are chiefly stimulated by them. Against legislative usurpations the people are seldom on their guard; they are always usurpations which receive the support of the majority, and opposition to them is never raised, except from the minority, who are always impotent to resist, and still more impotent to redress them. Experience proves that legislative bodies always seek to absorb in themselves all the powers of government. The failure of the French during sixty years of experimenting to establish a free and stable government, has been due to their mad attempts to concentrate all the powers of government in the legislature, to their blind confidence in the wisdom and integrity of legislators, and their insane distrust of an efficient executive. In all their efforts we see them aiming to make the legislature omnipotent, and the executive a nullity. Aside from his patronage, and means through that of exerting an indirect and corrupting influence, the present executive of France has as little power as a Virginia governor. No government can be stable or efficient without a strong and independent executive. A weak executive, especially in a large state, is a great curse, alike impotent to do good or to prevent evil. An administration that wants power to protect itself, that trembles every moment for its own existence, that has no discretion, no responsibility, is as mischievous as it is contemptible; for its resort is always to low cunning, to craft, to corruption. The history of the English Parliament proves to moral demonstration the tendency

of all legislative bodies, and the most serious danger to which the English constitution is now exposed is from the omnipotence of the legislature. The Revolution of 1688, which consisted in the final triumph of the Parliament over the crown, had it not been for King William's Dutch troops, and the Tory influence on the side of the executive in some measure holding the Whigs in check, and preventing them from realizing the last consequences of their victory, would have been not less disastrous for Great Britain than the Revolution of 1789 has been for France. The executive lies even now at the mercy of Parliament, and were it not for its patronage, and means of influence by appeals to interest, cupidity, the love of place or emolument, it would have scarcely the shadow of power. Were we subjects of the English government, we should seek to weaken the legislative department and to strengthen the executive; for of all despotisms the legislative is the most intolerable, more especially when the legislature is but the tool of an odious oligarchy.

So deeply impressed were the Convention of 1787 with the tendency of legislative bodies to absorb in themselves all the powers of the state, that many of them were for giving the executive even an absolute negative on all the acts of Congress; and some, fearing the executive would want the firmness to interpose his negative as often as it might be necessary, were for strengthening and encouraging him, by joining with him in a council of revision the supreme judges themselves. It is well they did not; but their proposition to do so is instructive, as showing how much the Convention distrusted legislative bodies, and how much importance they attached to the veto power, as enabling the executive to maintain his independence and respectability, and save himself from becoming the mere slave of Congress. No subsequent experience proves them to have judged hastily or unwisely. We need no argument to prove the importance of maintaining the independence and respectability of the executive. If he should cease to be independent, if his functions should be reduced from those of President of the United States to those of a mere executive officer of Congress, he would feel himself relieved of all responsibility of government; he would take no oversight of affairs, would make no efforts to maintain a wise and efficient administration; but would throw all responsibility upon Congress, and either enjoy his ease, as a *roi fainéant*, or exert all his craft, cunning, and opportunities, to abuse power to his own selfish pur-

poses. And how, without the veto power, he is to maintain his independence, and Congress is to be prevented from combining in itself both the legislative and the executive or administrative powers of government, is more than we are able to comprehend.

But the executive veto is necessary, not only to prevent the centralization of the powers of government, and to preserve the independence and respectability of the executive department, but also as a check on hasty and unjust legislation. There is, perhaps, far more need of such a check than the mass of our people now-a-days suspect, — at least the framers of the Constitution believed it to be highly necessary. They were, in the modern sense, no democrats, and had not the slightest tendency to radicalism. They were practical statesmen, who sought not to carry out a theory, but to establish a wise, strong, and durable government, which, in its practical operations, should secure the blessings of union, liberty, and internal peace, maintain justice, and promote the common weal. They held in horror all absolute governments, whether royal, noble, or popular, and, aware that power, in whatever hands it is lodged, may be abused if there is an opportunity to abuse it, they sought to guard against the tyranny of the sovereign at the same time that they secured the obedience of the subject. They had not learned to reject all the lessons of experience, and were far from accepting the doctrine of the impeccability of man, or of the divinity of the people. They believed that the people could err and do wrong as well as kings and nobles, in their collective as well as in their individual capacity, and that tyranny and oppression are tyranny and oppression when proceeding from a popular, no less than when proceeding from a royal or a noble source. They believed, strange as it may sound to the unfledged politicians of the day, that majorities can err and oppress as well as minorities, and that, although the rule that the majority must govern is adopted, it is necessary to subject the majority to such restraints, that, to be able to govern at all, it must govern justly. Here we may see their practical wisdom. They did not seek merely to enable the majority to govern, — so to organize the government that no will but the will of the majority should ever prevail, — but they went farther, and sought to establish limits to that will itself.

A government in which the will of the majority is unlimited, in which it can always prevail, is just as much an absolute government, and just as despotic in principle, as the most absolute

monarchy that ever existed. There is under it no guaranty of the liberty of the subject in face of power, — the essential element in all free governments. Modern democrats are aware of this, and seek to blunt the force of the objection, by assuming that the will of the majority is the will of the people, and that the people are always just and never will abuse their power. But we might as well say that the absolute monarch is always just and will never abuse his power. If it comes to deifying, we may as well deify the king as the people. Experience no more proves that the people can do no wrong, than it does that the king can do no wrong. There is never any guaranty for liberty where there is nothing that limits or restrains the exercise of arbitrary will, or sets bounds to the sovereign power; and, even if the people were not themselves capable of abusing their power, we know perfectly well that demagogues can usurp and abuse it for them. The Convention perfectly understood this, and throughout they were as anxious to provide for a limitation of authority, as they were to provide for the supremacy of the law itself, — for governing, if we may so speak, the government, as for governing the subject. The majority, indeed, must govern, directly or indirectly; but it must govern only under certain conditions, according to certain rules, within certain bounds.

But the Convention did not consider it enough to mark these bounds, and to prescribe these rules and conditions, on paper. "Experience," said Mr. Madison, "has taught us a distrust of that security, and that it is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers and interests as will guaranty the provisions on paper."* Paper constitutions are mere cobwebs, unless the organization of powers under them is such as to render it impossible for any power to violate them. Power will be sure to violate them, if able, whenever it has a sufficient motive to do so. If power is lodged in the majority, impose on it what paper restraints you please, you are no better off than if you had no constitution at all, unless you have somewhere in the state a force that guaranties them, that rises up and effectually resists the attempted violation. The Convention, therefore, while they engrossed the Constitution on parchment, took care to register it in the effectual organization of the several powers of government. The separation of the powers of government into distinct departments, each pro-

* *Madison Papers*, p. 1167.

vided with the means of self-defence, the separation of the legislature into two houses, the peculiar constitution of the Senate, the senatorial term for the long period of six years, and the necessity of the concurrent vote of both houses to an act of Congress, were all designed to operate as so many checks on the will of the majority, and to prevent, by restraining its action, hasty and unjust legislation. It was not enough to write on paper that Congress shall pass no laws hastily or without a due regard to justice; it was necessary to go farther, and to subject the enacting of laws to such conditions, to so many forms and processes, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to get a law hastily enacted, or enacted at all if contrary to justice.

The executive veto is integral in the system of checks on the will of the majority, of restraints imposed on the exercise of sovereign power, which the Convention saw proper to establish. The Convention installed the majority as sovereign, but as a limited, not as an absolute sovereign; and the executive veto is an integral part of the limitation which they imposed. They wished to make legislation, not easy, but difficult; and were far more anxious that the laws should be wise and just, than that they should be numerous. Their study was to subject every measure proposed to be adopted to the most rigid scrutiny, and to render it impossible for any measure to become a law till after it had been thoroughly sifted, and had received the approbation of the best minds and the highest wisdom of the country. To this end they required to the enactment of a law the concurrence of all branches of the government. They gave to each house a negative on the other, and to the executive and judiciary departments each a negative, at least a qualified or conditional negative, on both. The negative of the judiciary answers its purpose as far it goes; but it is insufficient, because the judiciary cannot take cognizance of the policy of a measure, and can interpose its negative only on the ground that the measure is unconstitutional. The system of checks would, therefore, have been incomplete, without the executive veto, which can negative an act, not only for its unconstitutionality, but also for its impolicy.

That the system of checks established has proved too strong, that it has rendered legislation too difficult, no statesman can pretend. Our danger lies, as experience amply proves, in too much legislation, not in too little. The tendency to overlegislate is quite too strong, and we make quite too little of wise and efficient administration. Nothing more distinguishes

modern times from antiquity than our excessive legislation, and tendency to make legislating, instead of administering, the chief business of government. The facility with which old laws are repealed or modified, and new statutes enacted, and not in our country only, is really frightful; and what the end thereof will be, men of stronger nerves than we may well tremble to think. The utmost contempt for law and the wildest disorder would prevail, even now, if it did not happen that our courts preserve the common law, the *lex non scripta*, which, happily for us, serves as a public conscience, and regulates the greater part of the relations between man and man. If the party among us opposed to the common law should succeed in abolishing it, and in reducing the whole law of the land to the *lex scripta*, or statute law, we should soon find ourselves as bad off as if we had no law at all. No man could tell for six months what the law would be. We scarcely, in the State or the nation, enact a law before we modify or repeal it, and especially if it is a law likely to prove of some utility in its practical operation. We have no settled policy; we are disputing about the simplest elements of both civil and criminal law, and multiplying statutes by steam, which would throw every thing into confusion, if the courts did not now and then go the full length of their prerogative in interpreting them, so as to get an innocent meaning where the legislature had either no meaning, or a meaning subversive of all the legitimate ends of legislation. Surely no statesman, especially no lawyer worthy of the name, can wish for greater facility of legislation than we now have, or regard the actual constitution as rendering it too difficult.

It is strange, we remark by the way, that at this late period of the world's history this rage for legislating should obtain, and whole communities should act as if law had now for the first time to be created. Has nothing been settled, and have we existed as a civilized people for these two hundred years without law, or without law adequate to the wants of a free and thriving people? Do we need to be told that law, as a science, was perfected even centuries before we were born, and that the modifications necessary to adapt it to what there may be novel or peculiar in our condition and circumstances are very few? Are we aware how many of the evils we are compelled to suffer spring from the rejection of old law science, and from experimenting in legislation as if we had the whole science to build up anew? Do we need to be told that our foolish legislative experiments

are the principal cause of the constant convulsions of our business world, and that, had it not been for the youth and vigor of our community, our experimental legislation would long ere this, by the insecurity to property it causes, and the frequency with which it makes it pass from its owners to others, have proved our total ruin? Surely, if we trace the history of our legislation for the last twenty years, we shall not doubt that checks on sovereign power are needed, and all the checks, and more than all the checks, the Constitution provides.

The Convention felt that there would be a tendency to hasty, unnecessary, and ruinous legislation; but that tendency has proved to be stronger even than they apprehended. They had no great confidence in the people or in majorities at best, but they did not foresee how majorities would be manufactured, nor anticipate the introduction of that perfect party discipline and party machinery which we have since introduced, and which render the people either a nullity, or the blind tools of irresponsible party managers. This discipline and machinery, when adopted by one party, has to be adopted by the other in self-defence, and we have now arrived at the point when all the affairs of government are managed by party; and a power, through party, unknown to the Constitution, is installed as sovereign. This power is vested, nobody can say where, or precisely in whom; it is wielded by no public law, by no responsible chiefs, and though all-controlling, you can nowhere lay your finger on it. It is at once the slave and the master of every body. This power, acting without public recognition, without public responsibility, dictates the policy of the government, and selects the candidates for office. The officers, when chosen, find themselves subject to it, hemmed in by it, obliged, they can hardly tell why or wherefore, to obey it; and, having no employment for their own judgments, they give themselves up to it, and merge their own responsibility in its irresponsibleness, and never trouble themselves to ascertain whether what they do is for the good of the country or not; it is enough for them that it receives the sanction of their party. The consequence is, that we do not get in the acts of government an expression of the popular reason, nor the personal convictions or conscientious judgments of even the men who are nominally clothed with authority; we get only the wishes or interests of party, or rather of the unnamable and irresponsible managers of party, one-sided and selfish, and rarely compatible with the interests of the country at large. Nothing is or can be more important,

then, than an organization of restraints which render legislation difficult, and prevent the possessors of power from rushing, in their madness and irresponsibleness, into measures absolutely ruinous to the country. You have some moral hold of a man as long as there is nothing between him and the public, as long as he feels that he must answer directly to the public for his acts; but when there stands a party between him and the public, and his reliance is on his party and not on his country, you have none at all. If he does the will of his party, that will uphold him and vindicate his acts; and that is all that his interest or his reputation requires. Consequently, the more predominant is partyism, the more necessary are constitutional checks on power.

It is true, that the very reasons which render the executive veto the more necessary tend to render it less adequate; because the same doctrine of party operates on the executive with hardly less force than on the members of Congress themselves, and tends to withhold him from employing it against a favorite measure of his own party, — perhaps the very measure of all others against which he ought to employ it. This is an evil, a great evil, but not an objection to the veto power itself. It is an objection only to its sufficiency, and proves, not that it is injurious, but that it does not do all the good or prevent all the mischief it should. The executive that refuses to employ it when he should is as an executive that has it not, and his refusing to employ it when its employment would do good is, as far as it goes, an argument for it, not against it. This evil, which we admit, will, no doubt, subsist as long as parties continue their present policy of selecting as candidates for the chief magistracy of the republic, not their greatest and best men, — men well known to be fully qualified for the office, and able to stand of themselves without being held up by party discipline and machinery, — but their most available men, — men who will run the best, because they carry the least weight. This is a bad policy even for the party itself, as well as for the country, though sometimes, perhaps, necessary, in order to avoid the greater evil. When one party adopts it, such is the feebleness, short-sightedness, and silliness of the mass of every party, that the other is often obliged to do the same. But the consequence is always bad. The executive wants self-reliance; conscious of his own inexperience, perhaps of his own inability, to discharge properly the duties of his high office, he is afraid to act independently, from his own convic-

tions, on his own responsibility, and therefore throws himself back on his party, merges his individuality in it, yields blindly to its dictation, and throws upon it the entire responsibility of his acts, which it must assume, or else go out of power, and let the opposition come in. The consequence is, that he surrenders his independence to his party in Congress, and, if that party is in the majority in both houses, brings about that amalgamation of the executive and legislative functions of government, which the Convention hoped by means of the executive veto to prevent. The terrible evil will be remedied only when we have an executive who adopts and *acts* on the sound principles proclaimed by our present worthy chief magistrate in his letters before his election, and in his noble Inaugural Address. But it is not easy in the present state of public opinion to act on those high and independent principles, and will not be, till the public mind by means of the press shall be brought more into harmony with those great conservative principles of government which have been so generally neglected for the last twenty years, but without which our liberties exist only in name, and wise and just government is but a dream.

It may be objected to the veto power, that it is seldom likely to be employed, except against such measures as secure a majority in Congress only by a union of some members of the party to which the executive belongs with the opposition, and which, since they combine, in some degree, the support of both parties, are the least likely to be hasty or unjust. That is, the negative will not be employed when it should be, and will be when it should not. Experience does not fully bear out this objection, but we grant that it has some force. In several instances the veto has been applied in the manner here supposed, and it is this fact that has led some of our Whig friends, contrary, as we must believe, to their general principles, to propose its abolition or modification. But we are conservatives, and we are loath to lay a rude hand on the Constitution. Experiments in amending constitutions, State or national, have not thus far proved very successful; and, in general, we find the *amended* constitution more in need of amendment than the original constitution itself. In almost every instance that has come under our knowledge, the so-called amendments adopted have proved a serious injury to the constitution, — have impaired its symmetry, rendered it less efficient, and made new alterations necessary ; besides weakening in the public conscience that sacredness which should always attach to

the constitution of the state. Obvious anomalies which tend to defeat in practice the general design or intent of the constitution, or clauses originally good, but rendered injurious by social changes or revolutions which have subsequently occurred, we would, of course, have removed; but beyond that we believe it never prudent to venture. Nothing is more unwise or unstatesmanlike, than to alter a constitution for the sake of harmonizing it with changes which may have taken place in mere public opinion, or of conforming it to the demands of some newly invented or newly revived political theory. No constitution constructed in accordance with a political theory ever worked or ever will work well, for the simple reason that every theory is despotic, and no man, much less the mass of men, ever did or ever will act throughout life in accordance with a theory. Every man's life is full of anomalies, and it is far more with the anomalous in life and society than with the normal, or what comes within the rule, that government must deal. A constitution that preserves a systematic consistency throughout, is necessarily either impracticable or despotic. Governments are founded in practical reason, not in speculative reason; and good sense, aided by large experience, must determine their constitution, not speculation. The English, who have much good sense, but very little speculative genius, and who care little for systematic consistency, maintain a comparatively free government; the French and Germans, who are far their superiors in speculative science, and who draw out constitutions perfectly satisfactory to speculative reason, for ever alternate in practice between anarchy and despotism. No constitution will avert all evil; for what works evil to-day may work good to-morrow. By attempting to remove the evils which we occasionally suffer, we not seldom lose the good we are in possession of, and open the door to greater evils from which we are as yet free.

There is no question but the executive may employ his negative against measures in themselves wise and just, but if they are measures of great public importance, and such as the country is really prepared for, he can at best only delay them for a short time. The exercise of his negative is on the part of the executive an act of great personal responsibility, and one that he can forego if he chooses. The easiest way for him is to throw the responsibility on Congress, and approve whatever act Congress choose to pass; and he always will do so, unless he has some motive to do otherwise. If he does

otherwise, it must be either from a sense of duty, or from the hope of gaining public applause or support. In the first case, the example, in times like ours, of a president of the United States hazarding his popularity, staking his reputation, at the demand of honest conviction, or a conscientious regard to his oath of office, would, of itself, be a moral benefit to the country equal to any injury that could result from the temporary loss of the most important public measure he is likely to negative. Indeed, a few examples of the sort are much needed, to keep alive among us the memory of public virtue, and convince us that it is not entirely the dream of the romancer, or the fiction of the poet.

If we suppose the executive by his veto seeks popularity, we must suppose there is a strong probability, at least, that his act will be sustained by the country, and therefore that there is not a clear, decided, and reliable majority in the country in favor of the measures negatived. If such be the fact, the measures, if of any great importance, ought not to pass; if of no great importance, it is of no great importance that they are defeated, and the matter is not worth quarrelling about. Measures of great importance, such as relate to finance, trade, and industry, and seriously affect the whole business and industrial interests of the country, in order to be beneficial must be permanent, and should never be adopted in the face of a minority which may be the majority to-morrow and repeal them. They should never be pressed, unless there is a reasonable prospect that they will so far meet the approbation of the country, that no party, on coming into power, will think of disturbing them. All measures of this sort produce an evil on their first adoption of no small magnitude; for they affect the standard of value, the relation of debtor and creditor, and operate, in some measure, as agrarian laws, though indirectly, and without its being perceived by every one. The oftener they are changed, the more insecure do they render property, and the more frequently do they take money from one man's pocket and put it into another's. We boast of the security of property in this country, and it is secure so far as direct attacks on it are concerned; but the fluctuations in the policy of the government for the last twenty years have really made it more insecure here than in any other civilized country, as we may see in the immense number of fortunes made, and a nearly equal number lost. The policy of the government will continue to be thus fluctuating as long as there is an attempt to fasten upon

the country any policy which has the support of only an accidental or temporary majority, a policy in which, when once adopted, all parties will not generally acquiesce. A measure, the repeal of which the opposition shall attempt as soon as passed, should never pass at all; because it can never work well, and will tend only to exasperate party spirit, to convulse the country, to corrupt the purity of elections, and by heated and violent contests destroy public virtue, and consolidate the despotism of party, as our experience too conclusively proves. To what else is due the party discipline and machinery now so ruinous? We say, then, if the executive is right in supposing the country will sustain him, and that the application of his negative will be popular, the application of it is not an evil; for it is better for the country that, under such circumstances, the measure, though good in itself, should be defeated, than that it should be suffered to pass. If the executive is wrong in his supposition, if the country does really demand the measure, or is prepared to sustain it, all the harm done is a little delay. Things are made no worse than they were before, and all that can be said is, that a good hoped to be realized is put off for a short period. This delay will, after all, be rather a benefit, for it will give time to consolidate public opinion, and to secure for the measure a greater likelihood of being permanent, when the new elections shall have prepared the way for its adoption. Taking this view of the question, and checking that impatience of our country which needs some checking in regard to legislation, as well as to other matters, we confess that we can see no serious evil that can result from the employment of the executive veto against even such measures of public policy as, if they could be adopted with the general approbation of the country, and with a reasonable prospect of being permanent, would be of great public utility, — the only case in which it can ever be pretended that the exercise of the veto power can do harm.

It should be borne in mind, that the veto power is purely negative. It gives to the executive no positive power of legislation, enables him to fasten no objectionable policy on the country, but merely gives him a conservative power, — a power to preserve to some extent laws already in force, and to prevent or delay the adoption of new measures and a new line of policy. It is a power perfectly in accordance with conservative principles of government, and is repugnant to Democratic, but not to Whig doctrines. Opposition to it could come consistently enough from the Democratic party; from the

Whig party, it strikes us, not without some inconsistency. True, it has been used to defeat favorite measures of the Whig party; but it is no Whig doctrine to seek to carry measures in spite of the Constitution, or to attack the Constitution when it operates against us. We are sworn to the Constitution "for better or for worse," and we trust we are prepared to forego every public good not to be attained under it, and in accordance with its provisions.

It is said by some, that the executive veto cannot be legitimately employed except on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the measure negatived. This, we apprehend, is a mistake. No restriction of this sort, or of any sort, is to be found in the Constitution itself. The power to negative extends to all acts of Congress, and nothing is said as to the grounds on which it is to be applied. The executive is left sole arbiter of his reasons for applying his negative, save that he is to communicate them to Congress. Congress may judge of their sufficiency; and if by a majority of two thirds they judge them insufficient, they count for nothing, and the measure becomes a law in spite of them. It is clear, from the debates of the Convention, that the Convention did not intend to restrict the power to the simple constitutionality of the acts of Congress; that power is in the judiciary, and the executive veto, if so restricted, would have been superfluous. The Convention believed that acts might be passed, not absolutely unconstitutional, which, nevertheless, would tend to impair the independence of the executive, or would be impolitic or unjust, and it was to provide a negative on such acts, which the judiciary could not reach, that they gave the executive his qualified negative. The policy and justice, as well as the constitutionality, of acts of Congress are, then, we must believe, proper subjects for the executive to consider; and since to confine him to the question of constitutionality alone would deprive him of the power to maintain the independence of the executive department of government, we must hold that he not only is not, but ought not to be, so confined in the employment of his negative.

Our readers will perceive that we have given ourselves a considerable latitude of discussion. Our object has, indeed, been to defend the veto power, but at the same time to draw attention to those general principles of our Constitution and government, which, in the democratic excitement of the times, and the bustle and confusion created by party struggles, we are in danger of forgetting. We have wished to point out the place

of the executive veto in our plan of government, and incidentally to lay open and defend that plan itself. The writer of this is no political theorist; he is an American, and an American conservative, both from principle and from inclination, and is opposed alike to innovations in the system of government established, and to the experimental legislation which has become so much the rage. He believes that the Constitution is too little studied, and that the real character of our institutions is too little understood and appreciated. If what he has said shall excite any of our gifted and learned young men to a more diligent study of the American Constitution, his purpose will have been answered, and he will not have written in vain.

Art. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

— *The History of the Old and New Testament, interspersed with Moral and Instructive Reflections, chiefly taken from the Holy Fathers.* From the French. By Rev. J. Reeve. Boston: Donahoe. 1849. 12mo. pp. 478.

This work is too well known, and too highly appreciated by the Catholic public, to render any notice of it at our hands at all necessary. It is an admirable compend of sacred history, and compresses within a small compass a great amount of most useful and interesting information, together with highly important and edifying moral reflections. It should be in the hands of every Catholic family.

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2. — *Preparation for Death; or Considerations on the Eternal Maxims. Useful for all as a Book of Meditations, &c.* By St. Alphonsus M. Liguori. Translated from the Italian, by a Catholic Clergyman. 2d Edition. Boston: Sweeney. 1850. 18mo. pp. 396.

This work is commended to the faithful by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Boston, and, like all the ascetic works of the illustrious St. Alphonsus, is a valuable aid to every one seeking Christian perfection. It is, no doubt, faithfully translated, but we cannot help feeling, as in the case of all the ascetic works of the same author translated into our language, that the translator has failed utterly to preserve any thing of the life and unction of the original. There is a coldness, an abruptness, a crispiness, in the translator's style, that belongs to the style of no Saint, and which is almost unpardonable

in the translation of the works of such a Saint as St. Alphonsus de Liguori. Setting aside this consideration, this little work is most excellent, and if used daily as a book of meditations, can hardly fail to prove a real "preparation for death."

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3. — *The Key of Heaven, or Manual of Prayer.* By the Right Reverend J. Milner, D. D. A new Edition, revised, corrected, and enlarged. By Rev. James Fitton. Boston: Sweeney. 1849. 32mo. pp. 422.

This is a very neat and convenient edition of a well-known manual of prayer. In addition to the devotions contained in other editions, the present contains an explanation of the priest's vestments, the ornaments and ceremonies used at Mass, an abridgment of Christian doctrine, a prayer for the souls in purgatory, another for one's confessor, Vespers for the Festival of the Blessed Virgin, Devotion for the Scapular, and several hymns. Among the hymns, we are sorry to see included some three or four from the heretical Watts.

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4. — *The Devout Manual: or a Collection of Prayers, tending to direct and promote the Practice of Solid Piety.* New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1850. 32mo. pp. 384.

This is, we believe, a new manual. It is published with the approbation of the Right Reverend the Bishop of New York, in the Messrs. Dunigan's best style, and is a very judicious collection of prayers. It will, no doubt, take a high rank among the many excellent manuals of devotion in circulation, and prove quite a favorite.

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5. — *The Spiritual Consoler, or Instructions to enlighten Pious Souls in their Doubts, and to allay their Fears.* Written originally in Italian. By Father Quadrupani, Barnabite. First American Edition. Boston: Joseph A. Copes. 1850. 18mo. pp. 136.

The fact that this little work is in great part made up of selections from the all but inspired writings of the illustrious Bishop of Geneva, St. Francis de Sales, is itself a sufficient guaranty of its excellence, and the following approbation by the Right Reverend the Bishop of Boston leaves nothing for us to say. "The English translation of Father Quadrupani's little work, entitled *The Spiritual Consoler*, has appeared to us, after due examination, sound in doctrine, and full of instruction and counsel, most useful to souls seeking advancement in piety and Christian perfection. We have,

therefore, approved its publication, and recommend the use of it to the faithful." We can add nothing, and it would be impertinence on our part to attempt to add any thing, after this. We will only say, that we have found it one of the very best works of the sort we are acquainted with. Mr. Copes has done well in selecting it for his first publication.

6. — *Remarks of Mr. Charles C. Kelly, in the Convention, on the Native American Question.* A. G. Hodges & Co., Printers.

In what convention, when or where held, these *remarks* were made, we are not told; and of Mr. Charles C. Kelly himself we know nothing, except that he tells us that he is "the son of an Irishman," is "a Catholic in faith, though not a member of the Catholic Church," that "he would die sooner than yield" his faith, and that he has "contributed more to the support of Protestant churches than to the support of Catholic ones." From the fact that the pamphlet has been sent to us by a friend in Kentucky, we presume the convention intended in the title was the convention recently held in that State for the purpose of amending its constitution, and we should conjecture, from the character he gives of himself, that Mr. Kelly is a real Kentuckian, of "the half-horse, half-alligator, with a spice of the snapping-turtle," breed. He does not appear to lack volubility, or "a gude conceit o' himsel'," and probably he has, as he professes, really meant to defend the Catholic Church, and to strike a death-blow at the Native American party; but his speech seems to us admirably adapted to render the Church ridiculous in the eyes of intelligent heretics, and to create a distrust of the class of persons he wishes to vindicate. He is far too ignorant of Catholicity to be able to speak of it with credit to himself, and the arguments he urges against the silly and fanatical Native American movement are just such as are calculated to induce the mass of the American people, this side the Alleghanies at least, to think favorably of it. It is such men as he that have created the greatest part of the hostility of the American people to the naturalization of foreigners, and it is such miserable defenders of Catholicity that have made many persons believe that a Catholic never regards truth where his Church is concerned. We would not speak harshly of this poor man, but we would tell him, that the demagogical spirit is the farthest removed possible from the Catholic spirit, and that a nominal Catholic turned demagogue is an animal of those unclean habits which disgust, not only all good Catholics, but even heretics themselves. The man who is not incapable of pandering to the prejudices of the mob, be they prejudices of what sort they may, lacks the essential ingredient of a

freeman, and the louder he screams in behalf of democracy, the louder and more unequivocally he proclaims his slavery. He who dares not be true to his God, who calumniates the fearless and unswerving friends of his Church, in order to gain the momentary applause of its enemies, is incapable of giving any guaranty that he will be true to his country and faithful to her institutions. The man who will betray his religion to obtain political promotion, will betray his country the moment he fancies it for his interest to do so. If we had had in this country no political demagogues of foreign birth or descent, we should never have heard of a "Native American Party." Let Catholics be good Catholics, let them fear God, and show, as they should, that they are incapable of fearing any one else; let them adhere firmly to their faith, and to the practice of their religion, without apology, and without asking any man's permission, and there will be no Native Americanism to disturb them. But multiply such orators as Charles C. Kelly, and such papers as *The Truth-Teller* and *The Nation*, and you will have Native Americanism, and more than you will be able to manage. There are demagogues, radicals, and infidels enough of native growth, without any importation from abroad. The distrust of the Catholic population arises chiefly from the facility with which they suffer themselves to be imposed upon by such orators and papers as these we mention, and the American people will never have any confidence in them, so long as they suffer themselves to be preyed upon, as they heretofore have been, by a set of political harpies, whether native-born or foreign-born, whether sailing under the Catholic flag or that of heresy. No man is our friend who wishes merely to use us for his own selfish purposes; no man should be trusted by us who places the state before the Church, a political theory before Catholic faith, or his passions before his religion. Let every such man be marked and avoided. Trust no man who seeks to conform his religion to the age or the country, who has the impudence to apologize for his Church, or to express his regret for deeds she has approved, and boasts of his having done what she forbids. He who believes himself wiser than his Church betrays his folly or his hypocrisy, and the less you have to do with him the better. Can one touch pitch and not be defiled?

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7. — *The Seaside and the Fireside.* By H. W. Longfellow. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 16mo. pp. 141.

We have so lately spoken of Mr. Longfellow as a poet, and at so great length, that it is not necessary for us to enter here into any consideration of his merits. We have always esteemed him more highly than we have found him esteemed by our literary friends.

He is not in our judgment a great poet, but he has a truly poetic temperament, and, if there is seldom a thought in his writings that recurs to the memory, there is a melody in his verse that charms us, and recurs to our hearts as the half-forgotten strains we loved in the remote days of childhood and youth. We like him because he always brings back to us our young feelings, mellowed by time and distance, and pleases us in our manhood, as Mother Goose did in our childhood, without demanding too much intellectual labor. *The Building of the Ship* is a pleasing poem, half an allegory, conveying a very useful moral just now.

The translation of *The Blind Girl of Castèl-Cuillè*, from the Gascon of Jasmin, strikes us as very happy, and pleases us far better than the original, — perhaps because the Gascon is to us pretty much an unknown tongue; but we cannot award the poem itself so high a rank as the critics generally seem disposed to assign it. The attempted suicide at the close offends us, and we have no patience with the poet who makes a well-instructed Catholic girl express a hope that God will pardon suicide under any circumstances, and certainly not for killing herself because deserted by a faithless swain. Piety would have taught her resignation, and made her thankful that she had escaped being wedded to one undeserving; never would it have led her to commit the horrible crime of self-murder. The conceit of the interposition of the guardian angel is idle; for though the poor girl does not actually kill herself, she dies with the intention of doing so, and therefore is really a self-murderer before God. Is it any consolation to think that the poor girl escaped her earthly sufferings by plunging herself into the eternal tortures of hell? But why talk of such things to men who have no faith, and no religion, but whimpering sentimentalism? The volume, however, upon the whole, has pleased us as much as any of the author's volumes that we have seen, and, if it does not add to his reputation, it certainly will not diminish it.

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8. — *Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund. Organ für die gemeinsamen Interessen der Americanisch-deutschen Kirchen.* Herausgegeben von Philipp Schaff, Professor der Theologie zu Mercersburg, Pa. Mercersburg. 1849. Zweiter Jahrgang. 8vo. pp. 464.

This is a monthly periodical, published at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, by Professor Schaff, of the Mercersburg Theological Seminary. Its aim is to be a central organ for the theological and moral interests of the American-German Church, Lutheran, Reformed, and United Confession; and to contain, among other matters, leading articles on the questions of the day, with special reference to the wants of the American-German Church, ecclesias-

tical intelligence from the Old World and the New, communications from German missionary districts, in the western part of our country, and critical notices of the more remarkable productions of German and Anglo-German theology. It is Protestant, mainly after the *Mercersburg Review* stamp; but, as far as we have examined it, appears to be conducted with industry, ability, and good temper. The articles on the *History of the German Church in America* we have read with a good deal of interest. We wish the work all the success we can wish any heretical work, and consider it superior to most Protestant works that fall under our notice.

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9. — *New-Yorker Sion. Herausgegeben von einem Vereine von Katholiken.* Redigirt von L. Vogele, Prof. February 16, 1850. 4to. Jahrgang I., Nr. I.

This is a new Catholic paper, published weekly, in the city of New York, in the German language. Judging from the numbers already issued, it is an excellent paper, conducted with ability, energy, zeal, and in a true Catholic spirit, well adapted to the wants of our German brethren, who form so large and so important a part of our American Catholic population. The editor speaks the language of a freeman, in tones which gladden the freeman's heart. He dares tell the truth, which the men of the age, struggling for the liberty of passion, do not like to hear. And he does not fear to assert the right of religion to rule over our politics; that man is as much bound to obey God when acting in the political field, as when assisting at the Divine offices. It would be well if such men as Mr. Charles C. Kelly, noticed above, would read his bold and energetic assertion of the rights of religion, of the man, and of the citizen. We rejoice that our German Catholics have so able and so truly a Catholic journal as this promises to be. It is necessary to protect them against the false notions of liberty so rife in our age and country, and which those not on their guard may imbibe before suspecting their dangerous character. We wish it all success, and warmly recommend it to the support of all who read the language in which it is published.

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10. — *Poems.* By Sarah A. Nowell. Boston: Tompkins. 1850. 12mo. pp. 208.

This is a very unpretending volume of poems, by one of our near neighbours, but is far superior to many which make much greater pretensions, and are commended by the newspaper critics. Mrs. Nowell possesses a good deal of facility in versification, has much

poetic feeling, and a mind of a high order. The poems seem to have been written mainly for her own amusement; but were she to devote more time and thought to the cultivation of poetry, she could easily place herself far above the Sigourneys, the Osgoods, and the Welbys.

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11. — *Poems.* By James Russell Lowell. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1849. 2 vols. 16mo.

We have recently expressed our general estimate of Mr. Lowell as a poet. He has written no poem that we much admire, but he has written occasional passages of as exquisite poetry as are to be found in any American poet. He is now and then a little cockneyish, and babbles of nature as one to whom nature is unfamiliar; but he does not lack either the poetical temper or the poetical heart. He is, we are sorry to say, a philanthropist; and of all poetry, the philanthropic species is the least endurable, as of all men philanthropists are the most intolerable. Poor Dr. Channing has much to answer for. His everlasting preachments about the "dignity of human nature" has corrupted our literature, as it has our morals; and if philanthropy, which received such an impetus from him, continues to rage much longer in this Commonwealth, it will be necessary for every honest man and peaceable man to emigrate from it. What with our moral-reform societies, our anti-hangman societies, prisoners' friend societies, abolition societies, temperance societies, there will soon be no living here for a man who wishes to mind his own business, and to let his neighbours mind theirs. Really the evil is becoming insufferable, and we are fast retrograding to the days of the old colonial sumptuary laws, which even our fathers could not bear. Mr. Lowell would be a great poet if he were not a great philanthropist.

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12. — *The Second Advent: or what do the Scriptures teach respecting the Second Coming of Christ, the End of the World, the Resurrection of the Dead, and the General Judgment?* By Alpheus Crosby. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. 1850. 12mo. pp. 173.

We have not read this book: we broke down before we had got beyond half a dozen pages.

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13. — *The War with Mexico reviewed.* By A. A. Livermore. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1850. 12mo. pp. 310.

This volume is written with ability, and contains a good deal of information, together with a much greater amount of childish prattle

and nonsense. No work coming out under the patronage of the American Peace Society could by any possibility be really worth reading. We dislike war, and disliked the Mexican war in particular; but not for the nonsensical reasons set forth by your namby-pamby peace men, your Worcesters, Ladds, Burritts, and Cobdens. Mr. Livermore is a Unitarian minister, a man of respectable attainments and commendable industry; but he is a philanthropist, that is, the lover of man in general, and the hater of all men in particular, — unless they chance to be rogues and criminals. Leave your philanthropy, man, and learn *charity*, the good, old-fashioned Christian virtue of charity, and then you may write things that it will not sicken a sober man to read.

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14. — *Circassia, or a Tour to the Caucasus.* By G. L. Ditson, Esq.. New York: Stringer & Townsend. 1850. 8vo. pp. 453.

This is a work of lofty pretensions, but of feeble performance. Who the author is we know not, and have no wish to know. His style is inflated, stilted, and altogether uncivilized, and his book tells us very little which we could not have learned without going out of the room in which we are now writing. The author, it appears, entered two or three huts in Circassia, saw a woman or two with breasts uncovered and with bare and dirty feet. This is about all the addition he makes to our previous knowledge of the Caucasians. Yet, though the reader is every moment on the point of throwing the book in the fire, he continues to read on to the end. Why, he can hardly explain to himself. If the author had more simplicity, if he made fewer pretensions, and retained some respect for religion and morals, we are not sure but he might write a very pleasing book of travels. Even while he disgusts us, he throws a sort of interest over his work which we cannot shake off, but which we are at the same time ashamed of feeling.

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15. — *Poems.* By Robert Browning. A new Edition. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1850. 2 vols. 16mo.

We have read only one or two of Browning's poems, and must reserve our judgment of these volumes till we have succeeded in reading the rest. Mr. Browning is too weighty to be despatched in a light literary notice. We will only add, that the Messrs. Ticknor & Co. have issued these volumes, as they do all their poetical publications, in a style becoming a poet of the first order.